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Thu, 20 Oct 2022 15:02:19 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2022 19:02:13 -0300 From: Eloy To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion User-Agent: K-9 Mail for Android In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <874FE3CC-5F27-40A2-9BD3-FD9937C1A40D@gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=----K0KL030ENUOIRF3FI4W8MZAZG7IBWN Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Autocrypt: addr=eloyesp@gmail.com; keydata= mQGNBFp4kysBDAD0oZA5ojIBuhdncQwZKGPMJIl6m4UoiUzv7duv5i1mDTgV6ItkFpsjRl+4A+5s 3vTwLAqYhE+J27GsLwA0h5Gm7d32USX7SScQ+I+zvLPTyKCRBSWoVE+f6nwaPLGbBGa8t7Aobla2 CZrFGptoBjgOOBwu5mDqa88c/bxrkgWa+mF/+libTx3+AdnI71YtBkEA0VfIOs4E67WSuEyfxto3 k+vhOYe4DXQ6PDD97+mnAxrhG90wQ/WUmgDA+Q6lbdWmO41V4j3KO31EVHGL6BiwnFIXfrMVM+pb RJ1o0AsqEx7+yEROTBsKy6j0V31M35j6ByGKZitAJs39FtTMTExbW9JCgtscQW0AkwnmbCDJxYEm RAbuqEZFsDFXmZD4C4dyXiO+gxKXSc6fy2Leusxh1cxpxdgRC4zlzBUHxDUgEzq3afNjxUkvQAk7 p9IpblpiLeiHlqKwA8XNGcB3BRUvv2WERAyyd+Qg9In+vu0vaODFp7rUeqtQ8KMdOBTqBXEAEQEA AbQhRWxveSBFc3BpbmFjbyA8ZWxveWVzcEBnbWFpbC5jb20+iQHUBBMBCgA+AhsDBQsJCAcCBhUK CQgLAgQWAgMBAh4BAheAFiEED+YFPqF1uItVRsYBTjocMAZOZ0IFAmIotDcFCQoBY/8ACgkQTjoc MAZOZ0Kn2Qv+OgpURwEp/HKHP4GDgPVZDUS1Jq2Vpb8dIV7xzUZ9bcSK0WL4rF1+aLxRf1kj2Gy4 6+X43S7AZg78Lic/AL7FGicPHTJ8SaQGbG244SStJsHhbC4RcMJ9gP2KO+Xc6Rj24988bopGkCpR +K3brkL+O3iRsBYpwEGrPjir6fssspVgQEKpjrGSbVm2A/xcBSOxIrCQA65nAhCXctDg1rdr5oba Uf3rMhb7MRyfTlaTFVelN9wJ05jktl38SAxifLUPVYA+JK1VhhvlHgImH5vqPbPdtiqpMRQEI7ti JwPubeCton0MZC+UqXDDcIqHX11cdK7roJfYOBy1ccouEMPzNvIperCZaq896qm3wM+FXgRiIfT6 FQgReNyXobfJN2MJ6hw3ixox3i7k86BJGdugVLa3JCEA2iKPlCYybGtM2TTazLcGAiBXCGkd6QFK m/u7sckVx5NaSyY6NXZXv1Pg6wEElyGgz7zOS6YhADLZtYP0aLgKPica0nzkaf/8L6quuQGNBF5Z HGQBDAD0HsEdHmDk/Da3YdBA23POyUDcM8kMCWVCWV+u4A5GGogbrvcEkjhMp1VL5QrWc0XVuEp3 VXH/TfHGPE5pNiqvyQbk+bEoHcpm9OXGLBGPy084YvkAjAP5Y1J/TwCPpyZFEdXo9E9gj+BUd870 rwmyFJI1Qnz9Ol2UcoF8KhZ9GeLoHL21IoDPGCVsv91c9mUBjbwp7bbZqr8PaIeTbryIaPuyHKXL aWNc8c9U0c26Fg14bokiv2Pg0ZVrPAEJXNlwLYRxZwAuYKGNzUA4w3GZMPnSZlhFgzOzd2OD4VAp 1xkVvYb97HlSqRIqdxBVqOt2EFL2yiu7zTwyD/26L+D78czuzsJvFaNozhUnb3GaB5d2QDCEZzZh wIvF2jPdrs9q71SGDOsex+tUQG7DgWw0SGhfkLoOnLETLi58FdTrjYP0KVD9QPOWmAk9tUy6t6nU ZpXOKmP285DaS8VaaeUq7q8woV2l04ALU0YUMMfgd2A7Q6N/eKE1AwcoYb670JsAEQEAAYkBvAQY AQoAJgIbDBYhBA/mBT6hdbiLVUbGAU46HDAGTmdCBQJgwMYwBQkGKhDMAAoJEE46HDAGTmdC3FQL /2qJkYqvw+c1K6l1Uiivb49eb88C0UVr98W3sMNBDH9zV4caf8ySmLu0cxM/TFcN5mhHSaQZhu0y F9lFWiv4g60eW4jFRllNQGr8qeG1fvDWmYzDaQ+pM50WQM3dy65+JJMBwQsL3SJlnO7p3ltly53D zmSWL8XwQnn0Tc/exc2w5xiaHFQgQsoBgJxTc98QhJExFfKSI9AV50zElGdBrWZ4Kq57j+NoN/OV q1BPvSNmkd66UTpUxgD0OLKpRLu5kmtxjnV3/dHtKbS1YWylhwHJGF+Q4B9+QAtbhTK2L3v+A14A UHrcb/O/0PFvYMI8yJGo+QZ87oAFlklm8U1NEODPx3VJzoFL0/6Dj4bZX/Jwo5UnxDGpRuAObEnq WMV7VoDBVIZWAnU+BW8woNMoBL8llShWeiRk78AlB3DSgzoIyPVOTPQNH9+BokCirODfD5Pts1lT AgUKWCKRmF9Fa7IZcA+SJ5doA13it0ldvUTiJgNK4FwrX8ILMEh+TJiCag== X-Mailman-Approved-At: Thu, 20 Oct 2022 22:03:49 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Opt-in full-RBF] Zero-conf apps in immediate danger X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 20 Oct 2022 22:02:25 -0000 ------K0KL030ENUOIRF3FI4W8MZAZG7IBWN Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable There is obviously an alternative approach to the issue=2E If we like opt-in RBF and would like to keep opt out RBF 0CONF working, we= could add another option to punish those nodes that replace transactions= =2E That is, a miner that publishes a block with a NO RBF, that is replaced= (that is easy to check for a full node) could stop propagation of that blo= ck (so it have less chances to win)=2E That would make the network decide w= hen it is the time to deploy RBF=2E It seems obvious for me that most devs prefer full RBF to force users to u= se centralized stuff (that is why the full RBF option is there already on c= ore), but just wanted to make that clear that there is always a way to enfo= rce a policy (read to keep zero conf working)=2E Regards=2E El 20 de octubre de 2022 18:07:07 ART, Greg Sanders via bitcoin-dev escribi=C3=B3: >> If it were growing in line with lightning capacity in BTC, per >bitcoinvisuals=2Ecom/ln-capacity; then 15% now would have grown from >perhaps 4% in May 2021, so perhaps 8% per year=2E With linear growth, >getting from 15% to 80% would then be about 8 years=2E > >I'd caution against any metrics-based approach like this, unless it's >simply used for ballparking potential adoption curves to set a a timefram= e >people can live with=2E > >A large number of coins/users sit on custodial rails and this would >essentially encumber protocol developers to those KYC/AML institutions=2E= If >Binance decides to never support Lightning in favor of BNC-wrapped BTC, >should this be an issue at all for reasoning about a path forward? > >Hoping to be wrong, >Greg > > > >On Thu, Oct 20, 2022 at 3:59 PM Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev < >bitcoin-dev@lists=2Elinuxfoundation=2Eorg> wrote: > >> On Thu, Oct 20, 2022 at 02:37:53PM +0200, Sergej Kotliar via bitcoin-de= v >> wrote: >> > > If someone's going to systematically exploit your store via this >> > > mechanism, it seems like they'd just find a single wallet with a go= od >> > > UX for opt-in RBF and lowballing fees, and go to town -- not someth= ing >> > > where opt-in rbf vs fullrbf policies make any difference at all? >> > Sort of=2E But yes once this starts being abused systemically we will= have >> to >> > do something else w RBF payments, such as crediting the amount in BTC= to >> a >> > custodial account=2E But this option isn't available to your normal p= ayment >> > processor type business=2E >> >> So, what I'm hearing is: >> >> * lightning works great, but is still pretty small >> * zeroconf works great for txs that opt-out of RBF >> * opt-in RBF is a pain for two reasons: >> - people don't like that it's not treated as zeroconf >> - the risk of fiat/BTC exchange rate changes between >> now and when the tx actually confirms is worrying >> even if it hasn't caused real problems yet >> >> (Please correct me if that's too far wrong) >> >> Maybe it would be productive to explore this opt-in RBF part a bit >> more? ie, see if "we" can come up with better answers to some question >> along the lines of: >> >> "how can we make on-chain payments for goods priced in fiat work well >> for payees that opt-in to RBF?" >> >> That seems like the sort of thing that's better solved by a collaborati= on >> between wallet devs and merchant devs (and protocol devs?), rather than >> just one or the other? >> >> Is that something that we could talk about here? Or maybe it's better >> done via an optech workgroup or something? >> >> If "we'll credit your account in BTC, then work out the USD coversion >> and deduct that for your purchase, then you can do whatever you like >> with any remaining BTC from your on-chain payment" is the idea, maybe w= e >> should just roll with that design, but make it more decentralised: have >> the initial payment setup a lightning channel between the customer and >> the merchant with the BTC (so it's not custodial), but do some magic to >> allow USD amounts to be transferred over it (Taro? something oracle bas= ed >> so that both parties are confident a fair exchange rate will be used?)= =2E >> >> Maybe that particular idea is naive, but having an actual problem to >> solve seems more constructive than just saying "we want rbf" "but we >> want zeroconf" all the time? >> >> (Ideally the lightning channels above would be dual funded so they coul= d >> be used for routing more generally; but then dual funded channels are >> one of the things that get broken by lack of full rbf) >> >> > > I thought the "normal" avenue for fooling non-RBF zeroconf was to >> create >> > > two conflicting txs in advance, one paying the merchant, one paying >> > > yourself, connect to many peers, relay the one paying the merchant = to >> > > the merchant, and the other to everyone else=2E >> > > I'm just basing this off Peter Todd's stuff from years ago: >> > > >> https://np=2Ereddit=2Ecom/r/Bitcoin/comments/40ejy8/peter_todd_with_my_= doublespendpy_tool_with/cytlhh0/ >> > > >> https://github=2Ecom/petertodd/replace-by-fee-tools/blob/master/doubles= pend=2Epy >> > Yeah, I know the list still rehashes a single incident from 10 years = ago >> to >> > declare the entire practice as unsafe, and ignores real-world data th= at >> of >> > the last million transactions we had zero cases of this successfully >> > abusing us=2E >> >> I mean, the avenue above isn't easy to exploit -- you have to identify >> the merchant's node so that they get the bad tx, and you have to connec= t >> to many peers so that your preferred tx propogates to miners first -- >> and probably more importantly, it's relatively easy to detect -- if the >> merchant has a few passive nodes that the attacker doesn't know about >> it, and uses those to watch for attempted doublespends while it tries >> to ensure the real tx has propogated widely=2E So it doesn't surprise m= e >> at all that it's not often attempted, and even less often successful=2E >> >> > > > Currently Lightning is somewhere around 15% of our total bitcoin >> > > > payments=2E >> > > So, based on last year's numbers, presumably that makes your bitcoi= n >> > > payments break down as something like: >> > > 5% txs are on-chain and seem shady and are excluded from zerocon= f >> > > 15% txs are lightning >> > > 20% txs are on-chain but signal rbf and are excluded from zerocon= f >> > > 60% txs are on-chain and seem fine for zeroconf >> > Numbers are right=2E Shady is too strong a word, >> >> Heh, fair enough=2E >> >> So the above suggests 25% of payments already get a sub-par experience, >> compared to what you'd like them to have (which sucks, but if you're >> trying to reinvent both money and payments, maybe isn't surprising)=2E = And >> going full rbf would bump that from 25% to 85%, which would be pretty >> terrible=2E >> >> > RBF is a strictly worse UX as proven by anyone >> > accepting bitcoin payments at scale=2E >> >> So let's make it better? Building bitcoin businesses on the lie that >> unconfirmed txs are safe and won't be replaced is going to bite us >> eventually; focussing on trying to push that back indefinitely is just >> going to make everyone less prepared when it eventually happens=2E >> >> > > > For me >> > > > personally it would be an easier discussion to have when Lightnin= g >> is at >> > > > 80%+ of all bitcoin transactions=2E >> > > Can you extrapolate from the numbers you've seen to estimate when t= hat >> > > might be, given current trends? >> > Not sure, it might be exponential growth, and the next 60% of Lightni= ng >> > growth happen faster than the first 15%=2E Hard to tell=2E But we're = likely >> > talking years here=2E=2E >> >> Okay? Two years is very different from 50 years, and at the moment ther= e's >> not really any data, so people are just going to go with their gut=2E= =2E=2E >> >> If it were growing in line with lightning capacity in BTC, per >> bitcoinvisuals=2Ecom/ln-capacity; then 15% now would have grown from >> perhaps 4% in May 2021, so perhaps 8% per year=2E With linear growth, >> getting from 15% to 80% would then be about 8 years=2E >> >> Presumably that's a laughably terrible model, of course=2E But if we ha= d >> some actual numbers where we can watch the progress, it might be a lot >> easier to be patient about waiting for lightning adoption to hit 80% >> or whatever, and focus on productive things in the meantime? >> >> Cheers, >> aj >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists=2Elinuxfoundation=2Eorg >> https://lists=2Elinuxfoundation=2Eorg/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> --=20 Enviado desde mi dispositivo Android con K-9 Mail=2E Por favor, disculpa m= i brevedad=2E ------K0KL030ENUOIRF3FI4W8MZAZG7IBWN Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable There is obviously an alternative approach to the = issue=2E

If we like opt-in RBF and would like to keep opt out RBF 0C= ONF working, we could add another option to punish those nodes that replace= transactions=2E That is, a miner that publishes a block with a NO RBF, tha= t is replaced (that is easy to check for a full node) could stop propagatio= n of that block (so it have less chances to win)=2E That would make the net= work decide when it is the time to deploy RBF=2E

It seems obvious fo= r me that most devs prefer full RBF to force users to use centralized stuff= (that is why the full RBF option is there already on core), but just wante= d to make that clear that there is always a way to enforce a policy (read t= o keep zero conf working)=2E

Regards=2E

El 20 de octubre de 2022 18:07:07 ART, Greg Sanders via bitcoin-dev &= lt;bitcoin-dev@lists=2Elinuxfoundation=2Eorg> escribi=C3=B3:
> If it were growing in line with lightning capacity i= n BTC, per
bitcoinvisuals=2Ecom/ln-capacity; then 15% = now would have grown from
perhaps 4% in May 2021, so perhaps 8% per year= =2E With linear growth,
getting from 15% to 80% would then be about 8 ye= ars=2E

I'd caution against any metrics-based approach li= ke this, unless it's simply used for ballparking potential adoption curves = to set a a timeframe people can live with=2E

= A large number of coins/users sit on custodial rails and this would essenti= ally encumber protocol developers to those KYC/AML institutions=2E If Binan= ce decides to never support Lightning in favor of BNC-wrapped BTC, should t= his be an issue at all for reasoning about a path forward?
<= br>
Hoping to be wrong,
Greg

<= br>

On Thu, Oct 20, 2022 at 3:59 PM Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev <= bitcoin-dev@li= sts=2Elinuxfoundation=2Eorg> wrote:
On Thu, Oct 20, 2022 at 02:37:53PM +0200, Serg= ej Kotliar via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> > If someone's going to systematically exploit your store via this=
> > mechanism, it seems like they'd just find a single wallet with a= good
> > UX for opt-in RBF and lowballing fees, and go to town -- not som= ething
> > where opt-in rbf vs fullrbf policies make any difference at all?=
> Sort of=2E But yes once this starts being abused systemically we will= have to
> do something else w RBF payments, such as crediting the amount in BTC= to a
> custodial account=2E But this option isn't available to your normal p= ayment
> processor type business=2E

So, what I'm hearing is:

 * lightning works great, but is still pretty small
 * zeroconf works great for txs that opt-out of RBF
 * opt-in RBF is a pain for two reasons:
    - people don't like that it's not treated as zeroconf
    - the risk of fiat/BTC exchange rate changes between
      now and when the tx actually confirms is worrying
      even if it hasn't caused real problems yet

(Please correct me if that's too far wrong)

Maybe it would be productive to explore this opt-in RBF part a bit
more? ie, see if "we" can come up with better answers to some question
along the lines of:

 "how can we make on-chain payments for goods priced in fiat work wel= l
  for payees that opt-in to RBF?"

That seems like the sort of thing that's better solved by a collaboration<= br> between wallet devs and merchant devs (and protocol devs?), rather than just one or the other?

Is that something that we could talk about here? Or maybe it's better
done via an optech workgroup or something?

If "we'll credit your account in BTC, then work out the USD coversion
and deduct that for your purchase, then you can do whatever you like
with any remaining BTC from your on-chain payment" is the idea, maybe we should just roll with that design, but make it more decentralised: have the initial payment setup a lightning channel between the customer and
the merchant with the BTC (so it's not custodial), but do some magic to allow USD amounts to be transferred over it (Taro? something oracle based<= br> so that both parties are confident a fair exchange rate will be used?)=2E<= br>
Maybe that particular idea is naive, but having an actual problem to
solve seems more constructive than just saying "we want rbf" "but we
want zeroconf" all the time?

(Ideally the lightning channels above would be dual funded so they could be used for routing more generally; but then dual funded channels are
one of the things that get broken by lack of full rbf)

> > I thought the "normal" avenue for fooling non-RBF zeroconf was t= o create
> > two conflicting txs in advance, one paying the merchant, one pay= ing
> > yourself, connect to many peers, relay the one paying the mercha= nt to
> > the merchant, and the other to everyone else=2E
> > I'm just basing this off Peter Todd's stuff from years ago:
> > https://np=2Ereddit=2Ecom/r/Bitcoin/comments/40ejy8/peter_tod= d_with_my_doublespendpy_tool_with/cytlhh0/
> > https://g= ithub=2Ecom/petertodd/replace-by-fee-tools/blob/master/doublespend=2Epy=
> Yeah, I know the list still rehashes a single incident from 10 years = ago to
> declare the entire practice as unsafe, and ignores real-world data th= at of
> the last million transactions we had zero cases of this successfully<= br> > abusing us=2E

I mean, the avenue above isn't easy to exploit -- you have to identify
the merchant's node so that they get the bad tx, and you have to connect to many peers so that your preferred tx propogates to miners first --
and probably more importantly, it's relatively easy to detect -- if the merchant has a few passive nodes that the attacker doesn't know about
it, and uses those to watch for attempted doublespends while it tries
to ensure the real tx has propogated widely=2E So it doesn't surprise me at all that it's not often attempted, and even less often successful=2E
> > > Currently Lightning is somewhere around 15% of our total bi= tcoin
> > > payments=2E
> > So, based on last year's numbers, presumably that makes your bit= coin
> > payments break down as something like:
> >    5% txs are on-chain and seem shady and are excluded= from zeroconf
> >   15% txs are lightning
> >   20% txs are on-chain but signal rbf and are excluded= from zeroconf
> >   60% txs are on-chain and seem fine for zeroconf
> Numbers are right=2E Shady is too strong a word,

Heh, fair enough=2E

So the above suggests 25% of payments already get a sub-par experience, compared to what you'd like them to have (which sucks, but if you're
trying to reinvent both money and payments, maybe isn't surprising)=2E And=
going full rbf would bump that from 25% to 85%, which would be pretty
terrible=2E

> RBF is a strictly worse UX as proven by anyone
> accepting bitcoin payments at scale=2E

So let's make it better? Building bitcoin businesses on the lie that
unconfirmed txs are safe and won't be replaced is going to bite us
eventually; focussing on trying to push that back indefinitely is just
going to make everyone less prepared when it eventually happens=2E

> > > For me
> > > personally it would be an easier discussion to have when Li= ghtning is at
> > > 80%+ of all bitcoin transactions=2E
> > Can you extrapolate from the numbers you've seen to estimate whe= n that
> > might be, given current trends?
> Not sure, it might be exponential growth, and the next 60% of Lightni= ng
> growth happen faster than the first 15%=2E Hard to tell=2E But we're = likely
> talking years here=2E=2E

Okay? Two years is very different from 50 years, and at the moment there's=
not really any data, so people are just going to go with their gut=2E=2E= =2E

If it were growing in line with lightning capacity in BTC, per
bitcoinvisuals=2Ecom/ln-capacity; then 15% now would hav= e grown from
perhaps 4% in May 2021, so perhaps 8% per year=2E With linear growth,
getting from 15% to 80% would then be about 8 years=2E

Presumably that's a laughably terrible model, of course=2E But if we had some actual numbers where we can watch the progress, it might be a lot
easier to be patient about waiting for lightning adoption to hit 80%
or whatever, and focus on productive things in the meantime?

Cheers,
aj
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