From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 90E441BD8 for ; Fri, 2 Oct 2015 01:23:49 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from ozlabs.org (ozlabs.org [103.22.144.67]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 65FB4160 for ; Fri, 2 Oct 2015 01:23:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: by ozlabs.org (Postfix, from userid 1011) id EB4AC140D6D; Fri, 2 Oct 2015 11:23:43 +1000 (AEST) From: Rusty Russell To: Gregory Maxwell In-Reply-To: <87bncjph6c.fsf@rustcorp.com.au> References: <87zj04fxkw.fsf@rustcorp.com.au> <87bncjph6c.fsf@rustcorp.com.au> User-Agent: Notmuch/0.17 (http://notmuchmail.org) Emacs/24.4.1 (x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) Date: Fri, 02 Oct 2015 10:52:14 +0930 Message-ID: <87d1wynjy1.fsf@rustcorp.com.au> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev , Pieter Wuille Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Versionbits BIP (009) minor revision proposal. X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 02 Oct 2015 01:23:49 -0000 Rusty Russell via bitcoin-dev writes: > Gregory Maxwell writes: >> I can, however, argue it the other way (and probably have in the >> past): The bit is easily checked by thin clients, so thin clients >> could use it to reject potentially ill-fated blocks from non-upgraded >> miners post switch (which otherwise they couldn't reject without >> inspecting the whole thing). This is an improvement over not forcing >> the bit, and it's why I was previously in favor of the way the >> versions were enforced. But, experience has played out other ways, >> and thin clients have not done anything useful with the version >> numbers. >> >> A middle ground might be to require setting the bit for a period of >> time after rule enforcing begins, but don't enforce the bit, just >> enforce validity of the block under new rules. Thus a thin client >> could treat these blocks with increased skepticism. > > Introducing this later would trigger warnings on older clients, who > would consider the bit to represent a new soft fork :( Actually, this isn't a decisive argument, since we can use the current mechanism to upgrade versionbits, or as Eric says, tack it on to an existing soft fork. So, I think I'm back where I started. We leave this for now. There was no nak on the "keep setting bit until activation" proposal, so I'm opening a PullReq for that now: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/209 Cheers, Rusty.