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Mon, 16 Nov 2026 07:54:01 -0800 (PST) X-Received: by 2002:a05:6808:2218:b0:4c5:38f1:80cf with SMTP id 5614622812f47-56cd7d12752mr8872771b6e.21.1794844441764; Mon, 16 Nov 2026 07:54:01 -0800 (PST) Received: by 2002:a05:690c:13:b0:8ae:b617:7167 with SMTP id 00721157ae682-8b4b0d296e4ms7b3; Mon, 16 Nov 2026 07:23:42 -0800 (PST) X-Received: by 2002:a05:690c:f89:b0:8b4:dba5:f100 with SMTP id 00721157ae682-8b4dba5f2e4mr13824277b3.10.1794842621717; Mon, 16 Nov 2026 07:23:41 -0800 (PST) Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 07:23:41 -0800 (PST) From: Yevhen Hrubiian To: Bitcoin Development Mailing List Message-Id: <9386e438-b305-46cd-b64f-5337be9f5961n@googlegroups.com> In-Reply-To: <12a1a76d-0e27-4035-9fe8-a47524729c47n@googlegroups.com> References: <12a1a76d-0e27-4035-9fe8-a47524729c47n@googlegroups.com> Subject: [bitcoindev] Re: BIP Proposal: ML-KEM Key Establishment MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----=_Part_187438_1955707363.1794842621152" X-Original-Sender: grubian.euhen@gmail.com Precedence: list Mailing-list: list bitcoindev@googlegroups.com; contact bitcoindev+owners@googlegroups.com List-ID: X-Google-Group-Id: 786775582512 List-Post: , List-Help: , List-Archive: , List-Unsubscribe: , X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/) ------=_Part_187438_1955707363.1794842621152 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_Part_187439_1110943632.1794842621152" ------=_Part_187439_1110943632.1794842621152 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hey ! We have recently proposed a very similar idea of Hybrid Key=20 Encapsulation (HKE) for the Elements project as ELIP PR:=20 https://github.com/ElementsProject/ELIPs/pull/46 Actually the design is very simple, it uses UG combiner function from the= =20 CFRG draft=20 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-hybrid-kems-12/ to=20 compose 2 paths (classic secp256k1 ECDH + ML-KEM-768) so the construction= =20 achieves IND-CCA as long as either path is secure. Hope this will be helpful. =D0=BF=CA=BC=D1=8F=D1=82=D0=BD=D0=B8=D1=86=D1=8F, 13 =D0=BB=D0=B8=D1=81=D1= =82=D0=BE=D0=BF=D0=B0=D0=B4=D0=B0 2026=E2=80=AF=D1=80. =D0=BE 20:15:44 UTC+= 2 Liam Gilligan =D0=BF=D0=B8=D1=88=D0=B5: > Hi everyone, > > Based on discussions started by Laolu about post-quantum key establishmen= t=20 > in the P2P protocol [1], I earlier proposed a BIP that provides a mechani= sm=20 > for negotiating transport layer upgrades, such as key establishment or=20 > authentication [2]. > > The first feature I'd like to specify for it is ML-KEM key establishment,= =20 > so that P2P traffic recorded today cannot be decrypted by a future quantu= m=20 > attacker. > > I propose we use the ML-KEM-768 parameter set. ECDH on secp256k1 gives=20 > about 128 bits of security against a classical attacker. ML-KEM-512 targe= ts=20 > a comparable level (NIST category 1), but given the youth of the assumpti= on=20 > ML-KEM relies on, more margin should be given to hedge against improved= =20 > attacks. ML-KEM-768 (category 3) provides that margin and is the paramete= r=20 > set NIST recommends by default. ML-KEM-1024 (category 5) gives more still= ,=20 > but at the cost of larger encapsulation keys and ciphertexts. > > The feature will simply consist of payloads directly containing the=20 > encapsulation key (1184 bytes) and ciphertext (1088 bytes) as defined by= =20 > FIPS 203 [3]. The advertiser will have the option to omit its encapsulati= on=20 > key when advertising ML-KEM support, to avoid the bandwidth cost of sendi= ng=20 > it to a peer that may not support ML-KEM. If the advertiser omits it, the= =20 > selector sends an encapsulation key instead, and the advertiser responds= =20 > with its ciphertext in a subsequent feature packet. > > The new keys are derived from both the existing BIP-324 shared secret and= =20 > the ML-KEM shared secret, so the connection is at least as secure as it i= s=20 > today. The party that sends the ciphertext rekeys immediately, and encryp= ts=20 > under the new keys beginning with its next packet. The party that sends t= he=20 > encapsulation key sends nothing further until it receives the ciphertext,= =20 > then rekeys, so its next packet is also the first under the new keys. > > A node disconnects if the encapsulation key it receives fails the input= =20 > check FIPS 203 requires. ML-KEM does not guarantee success: there is abou= t=20 > a 2^-165 chance of decapsulation failure. This is unreachable in practice= ,=20 > and needs no handling of its own, as the peers would derive different key= s=20 > and the next packet would fail to decrypt. > > No encoding like ElligatorSwift [4], such as Kemeleon [5], is required fo= r=20 > the encapsulation key or ciphertext, as they are already encrypted under= =20 > BIP-324 and therefore appear random on the wire. > > Let me know your thoughts, particularly on the parameter set and on=20 > whether the advertiser should send its encapsulation key by default. > > - Liam > > [1] https://groups.google.com/g/bitcoindev/c/n_5WuKVYqwI/ > [2] https://groups.google.com/g/bitcoindev/c/LbTSN08fYlM > [3] https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.203.pdf > [4]=20 > https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0324.mediawiki#elligators= wift-encoding-of-curve-x-coordinates > [5]=20 > https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Events/2025/workshop-on-guidance-for-kem= s/documents/papers/kemeleon-paper.pdf --=20 You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "= Bitcoin Development Mailing List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an e= mail to bitcoindev+unsubscribe@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bitcoindev/= 9386e438-b305-46cd-b64f-5337be9f5961n%40googlegroups.com. ------=_Part_187439_1110943632.1794842621152 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hey ! We have recently proposed a very similar idea of Hybrid Key Enca= psulation (HKE) for the Elements project as ELIP PR: https://github.com/ElementsProject/E= LIPs/pull/46
Actually the design is very simple, it uses UG c= ombiner function from the CFRG draft=C2=A0https://datatracker.ietf.o= rg/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-hybrid-kems-12/=C2=A0to compose 2 paths (cl= assic secp256k1 ECDH + ML-KEM-768) so the construction achieves IND-CCA as = long as either path is secure.
Hope this will be helpful.
=D0= =BF=CA=BC=D1=8F=D1=82=D0=BD=D0=B8=D1=86=D1=8F, 13 =D0=BB=D0=B8=D1=81=D1=82= =D0=BE=D0=BF=D0=B0=D0=B4=D0=B0 2026=E2=80=AF=D1=80. =D0=BE 20:15:44 UTC+2 L= iam Gilligan =D0=BF=D0=B8=D1=88=D0=B5:
Hi everyone,

Based on di= scussions started by Laolu about post-quantum key establishment in the P2P = protocol [1], I earlier proposed a BIP that provides a mechanism for negoti= ating transport layer upgrades, such as key establishment or authentication= [2].

The first feature I'd like to specify for it is ML-KEM key= establishment, so that P2P traffic recorded today cannot be decrypted by a= future quantum attacker.

I propose we use the ML-KEM-768 parameter = set. ECDH on secp256k1 gives about 128 bits of security against a classical= attacker. ML-KEM-512 targets a comparable level (NIST category 1), but giv= en the youth of the assumption ML-KEM relies on, more margin should be give= n to hedge against improved attacks. ML-KEM-768 (category 3) provides that = margin and is the parameter set NIST recommends by default. ML-KEM-1024 (ca= tegory 5) gives more still, but at the cost of larger encapsulation keys an= d ciphertexts.

The feature will simply consist of payloads directly = containing the encapsulation key (1184 bytes) and ciphertext (1088 bytes) a= s defined by FIPS 203 [3]. The advertiser will have the option to omit its = encapsulation key when advertising ML-KEM support, to avoid the bandwidth c= ost of sending it to a peer that may not support ML-KEM. If the advertiser = omits it, the selector sends an encapsulation key instead, and the advertis= er responds with its ciphertext in a subsequent feature packet.

The = new keys are derived from both the existing BIP-324 shared secret and the M= L-KEM shared secret, so the connection is at least as secure as it is today= . The party that sends the ciphertext rekeys immediately, and encrypts unde= r the new keys beginning with its next packet. The party that sends the enc= apsulation key sends nothing further until it receives the ciphertext, then= rekeys, so its next packet is also the first under the new keys.

A = node disconnects if the encapsulation key it receives fails the input check= FIPS 203 requires. ML-KEM does not guarantee success: there is about a 2^-= 165 chance of decapsulation failure. This is unreachable in practice, and n= eeds no handling of its own, as the peers would derive different keys and t= he next packet would fail to decrypt.

No encoding like ElligatorSwif= t [4], such as Kemeleon [5], is required for the encapsulation key or ciphe= rtext, as they are already encrypted under BIP-324 and therefore appear ran= dom on the wire.

Let me know your thoughts, particularly on the para= meter set and on whether the advertiser should send its encapsulation key b= y default.

- Liam

[1] https://groups.google.com/g/bit= coindev/c/n_5WuKVYqwI/
[2] https://groups.google.com/g/bitcoin= dev/c/LbTSN08fYlM
[3] https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpub= s/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.203.pdf
[4] https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0324.mediawiki#elli= gatorswift-encoding-of-curve-x-coordinates
[5] https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Events/2025/work= shop-on-guidance-for-kems/documents/papers/kemeleon-paper.pdf

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