> Hi,
> 
> I'm writing to suggest and discuss the addition of paper wallet
> functionality in bitcoin-core software, starting with a single new RPC
> call: genExternalAddress [type].
> 

AFAIK, client implementations such as your proposal are off-topic for this ML.
Better use bitcoin-core-dev (ML or IRC) or Github (bitcoin/bitcoin) for such proposals.


> On 09/29/2017 02:03 PM, Luke Dashjr wrote:
> Paper wallets are a safety hazard, insecure, and generally not advisable.
> 

I have to agree with Luke.
And I would also extend those concerns to BIP39 plaintext paper backups.

IMO, private keys should be generated and used (signing) on a trusted, minimal and offline hardware/os. They should never leave the device over the channel used for the signing I/O. Users should have no way to view or export the private keys (expect for the seed backup). Backups should be encrypted (whoever finds the paper backup should need a second factor to decrypt) and the restore process should be footgun-safe (especially the lost-passphrase deadlock).


/jonas