From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from hemlock.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [140.211.166.133]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9DC78C016E for ; Fri, 5 Jun 2020 11:45:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hemlock.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 923B488B61 for ; Fri, 5 Jun 2020 11:45:00 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org Received: from hemlock.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 8Fb1SucvHCKU for ; Fri, 5 Jun 2020 11:44:58 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-40138.protonmail.ch (mail-40138.protonmail.ch [185.70.40.138]) by hemlock.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B6D59888A3 for ; Fri, 5 Jun 2020 11:44:58 +0000 (UTC) Date: Fri, 05 Jun 2020 11:44:53 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=protonmail.com; s=protonmail; t=1591357495; bh=tTUcmfbHnFWpd3ZuQB0iUCwGMfvGTO65vzio31eokTw=; h=Date:To:From:Cc:Reply-To:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=NJ+9TKY+7mKlDyW1MLC5+EgYnRnYVkWkmUjUEyw60y8hSUqNTAm98yL5J2jgdA0Ik /oCTb/noKSaw6HrGJ4uhdj6xPFzHqGfEcKrWo+DUOs5hoUbEqe8bk4Mmi5StakveAr w0bYOdTtoONh1EpkD9toHmXI+6Df666zMdwScMXc= To: Aymeric Vitte From: ZmnSCPxj Reply-To: ZmnSCPxj Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: <2e8fba65-f7fa-4c37-a318-222547e25a06@Spark> <9e4dfaa7-895a-48a1-8116-eaafc80da34f@Spark> <2phhD75B8ww3hFQ8Do039wAIlW8EVOjUeiedm-JtIek-TEnVocYSx-untchGrO3VoRLoPzinVAG95UN1yR3CadNWBJGSu19vJpFJ_yN-wZY=@protonmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Cc: Gleb Naumenko , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Time-dilation Attacks on the Lightning Network X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 05 Jun 2020 11:45:00 -0000 Good morning Aymeric, > The issue each time there are discussions/research linking to Tor is that= it is biased since the beginning because based on a wrong postulate: using= the Tor network > Well, in the interest of using the wrong tool for a highly important job, l= et me present this thought: * The Tor network is weakened due to its dependence on a limited set of exi= t nodes. * "Direct", within-Tor rendezvous points are good, i.e. Tor hidden services= . * Thus, there is no issue with Tor-to-Tor or clearnet-to-clearnet connectio= ns, the issue is with Tor-to-clearnet connections. * Of course, no miner is going to run over Tor because latency, so all the = miners will be on clearnet. * So make your own bridge between Tor and clearnet. * Run two fullnodes on your computer (with sufficient ingenuity, you can pr= obably share their block storages, or make one pruning). * One fullnode is on the public network but runs in `blocksonly` so it does= not propagate any transactions (which might be attached to your public IP)= . * The other fullnode is on the Tor network and has an `-addnode` to the pub= lic-network node via `localhost`, which I assume is very hard for an eclips= e attacker to get at. * Use the Tor-fullnode to propagate your transactions. Of course, the eclipse attacker can still attack all Tor exit nodes and blo= ck outgoing transaction traffic to perform eclipse attacks. And if you decide to propagate transactions to the public-network node then= you pretty much lose your privacy there. Regards, ZmnSCPxj