From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 23CF9A1A for ; Tue, 28 Jun 2016 21:40:28 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-lf0-f44.google.com (mail-lf0-f44.google.com [209.85.215.44]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4306C1E5 for ; Tue, 28 Jun 2016 21:40:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-lf0-f44.google.com with SMTP id h129so20542403lfh.1 for ; Tue, 28 Jun 2016 14:40:27 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=9QtJU7CNnOFVtpUDoAqIZB+FbCDoUTN20uUghBOA2K4=; b=R2fSvtmFzGmfn8KFKT9BHSuPyB1VuyjtVUXm2fw46BYOcvQdNSJupos5nUhET70Ypc FASiQuGMu44H+kLlt1jLUWEX2ptyAPsT2SYY12jRZXojbT70PzYBUjIcazbtuAeO08xw qgaxoFMCmGh5C7vvOT/nejjXw+cXAxy56MKnAEYrUDfpfFEgVKoZljhiEPPPW+SKZzTq 5Q7oDpY+oAWvM5ALeo8YZhmQZ3ZnSEONZnSgBgFIFXX2kfOIjVMjXC16zgnD1xV0j0wr +UQgEgUJh9EbSasNHYQ3PGiAEv3cPA5QwwIcQhomS5mORTYSJb7RkmFtekyzNmyRDQnx 16XQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=9QtJU7CNnOFVtpUDoAqIZB+FbCDoUTN20uUghBOA2K4=; b=CVmFJQkXUXqrTIQLrl0+kgbDnFgc62VahvrPYtZKITmL/On7o0rysu9+mJlhFtanNr Fopdfi/X9VNEGEanRl7RZRI4srbBQCOHO+iRT7aPBazK2R4P+Iwa+szGLiFGVLHFUH0K Smz87ypvY13TrfR1Jr9i0tmQJSycoNySypjzZXICgOfm/PxiHL3BVSX33r9Rwi/304vJ vYf+Y/VJ/yzwdvOZlhvJyD8kX0VMp73/pV4iRSB77lr914eRPtMWDjS199NAf2ccka3j uCN8J9i0J9QWG6aNoCoNXoydU0qdZ/0V5vKcRNTzSDEXUbBagU+Ah2CpHXjW64wy3nco 1b2w== X-Gm-Message-State: ALyK8tIv65DJ5Mv5+AaahgvoO8UQGjRn8Bp2cLHIyq1Q3ADL5OwDzIXO0bRxogLOIPXcLg== X-Received: by 10.25.131.141 with SMTP id f135mr1669076lfd.42.1467150025175; Tue, 28 Jun 2016 14:40:25 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [192.168.0.103] (188-115-185-127.broadband.tenet.odessa.ua. [188.115.185.127]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id k18sm51524lfg.47.2016.06.28.14.40.23 (version=TLS1 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Tue, 28 Jun 2016 14:40:24 -0700 (PDT) Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-6F871291-EF15-4F60-BBF3-9E6E90AC02A2 Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) From: Cameron Garnham X-Mailer: iPhone Mail (13F69) In-Reply-To: Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2016 00:40:23 +0300 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-Id: References: <87h9cecad5.fsf@rustcorp.com.au> <1E86A00F-0609-4DBC-9543-94AE04CC13C9@voskuil.org> <577234A4.3030808@jonasschnelli.ch> <360EF9B8-A174-41CA-AFDD-2BC2C0B4DECB@voskuil.org> <20160628182202.GA5519@fedora-21-dvm> <20160628201447.GA1148@fedora-21-dvm> <4DCF7DD2-6533-4F79-8CA1-871B67C01BDA@voskuil.org> <20160628203605.GA1328@fedora-21-dvm> To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.4 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_ENVFROM_END_DIGIT,FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, MIME_QP_LONG_LINE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Tue, 28 Jun 2016 21:52:19 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP 151 X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2016 21:40:28 -0000 --Apple-Mail-6F871291-EF15-4F60-BBF3-9E6E90AC02A2 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Unauthenticated link level encryption is wonderful! MITM attacks are overrat= ed; as they require an active attacker. Stopping passive attacks is the low hanging fruit. This should be taken firs= t. Automated and secure peer authentication in a mesh network is a huge topic. O= ne of the unsolved problems in computer science. A simple 'who is that' by asking for the fingerprint of your peers from your= other peers is a very simple way to get 'some' authentication. Semi-truste= d index nodes also is a low hanging fruit for authentication. However, let's first get unauthenticated encryption. Force the attackers to u= se active attacks. (That are thousands times more costly to couduct). Sent from my iPhone > On 29 Jun 2016, at 00:36, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev wrote: >=20 > On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 9:22 PM, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev > wrote: >> An "out of band key check" is not part of BIP151. >=20 > It has a session ID for this purpose. >=20 >> It requires a secure channel and is authentication. So BIP151 doesn't pro= vide the tools to detect an attack, that requires authentication. A general r= equirement for authentication is the issue I have raised. >=20 > One might wonder how you ever use a Bitcoin address, or even why we > might guess these emails from "you" aren't actually coming from the > NSA. > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev --Apple-Mail-6F871291-EF15-4F60-BBF3-9E6E90AC02A2 Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Unauthenticated link level encryption is wonderful! MITM= attacks are overrated; as they require an active attacker.

<= span style=3D"background-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0);">Stopping passive at= tacks is the low hanging fruit. This should be taken first.

=
Automated and= secure peer authentication in a mesh network is a huge topic. One of the un= solved problems in computer science.

A simple 'who is that' by asking= for the fingerprint of your peers from your other peers is a very simple wa= y to get 'some' authentication.  Semi-trusted index nodes also is a low= hanging fruit for authentication.

However, let's first get unauthentica= ted encryption. Force the attackers to use active attacks. (That are thousan= ds times more costly to couduct).

Sent from my i= Phone

On 29 Jun 2016, at 00:36, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-de= v <bitcoin-dev@l= ists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 9:22 PM, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev<= /span>
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
An "out of band key check" is not part of BIP151.<= br>

It has a session ID for this purpose.=

It requires a se= cure channel and is authentication. So BIP151 doesn't provide the tools to d= etect an attack, that requires authentication. A general requirement for aut= hentication is the issue I have raised.
=
One might wonder how you ever use a Bitcoin address, or even why w= e
might guess these emails from "you" aren't actually coming= from the
NSA.
_____________________________= __________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.l= inuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mail= man/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
= --Apple-Mail-6F871291-EF15-4F60-BBF3-9E6E90AC02A2--