From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 60ED2DD8 for ; Sun, 30 Aug 2015 02:00:05 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mout.gmx.net (mout.gmx.net [212.227.15.18]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A12D5176 for ; Sun, 30 Aug 2015 02:00:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [192.168.50.29] ([69.50.179.106]) by mail.gmx.com (mrgmx001) with ESMTPSA (Nemesis) id 0M0y8F-1YiAuN24eV-00vC5e; Sun, 30 Aug 2015 04:00:01 +0200 From: Peter R Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_5C3FA3B5-06DC-4E74-BD41-9EBB07B21A3B" Message-Id: Date: Sat, 29 Aug 2015 18:59:58 -0700 To: "bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Dev" , Gregory Maxwell Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 6.6 \(1510\)) X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1510) X-Provags-ID: V03:K0:tHiktMLcHXu3YcKmBtBRM/j3mnonnp0seferOEXohUWKKteGYCb pCD+RVQi76WUXqh+ltAfhNGZH5vcoJgQjdjvhptHPcgXt+WYgRiSHTp/XkeMAFJmNM/2R/P muY0lKgZcEvcIdpJTdJ0WdsAO0EXeBMzRernob2HdG1QnHF9NFSJNjtEtNzOASbYG38kMog U0/NC2uYn1toFspz39sJA== X-UI-Out-Filterresults: notjunk:1;V01:K0:g+ln88W7qls=:uB2zjuYMa86zJVbfitBZB8 z+PpC94oP3ol23JF6hKLziejn2wFJS4AxbtyEENp23WfaZ3udo4ZoKqGnCUuKnDrOv41BQbQl lBf9kZphpptsvcpC1+7ZVZYITx4CI7u/Vj0CPvUc3prtX1XZZ+zDZhi5fSlIdcqts0MOSDacB TvI5xVSeGyJ+M6JUUjXt24EHYEWqTK+k52jze9+uQv3rtK8tQwVsqX1T3fJ/ABEImeIn0y4W3 4xE/aWUA2qdllG7BLQwvIgmk0KTO5KDseqB2QEUJneDCCYrxepV8RPc9N5RsyM+WygJiQcEUe rT4a1mWlA9HU1aFirS4o9gfo+Qt+uJX+oZjh5s+GiPuDHQVA3XIy5L3JKhcC/ILpV5/ccXjZp DNCKOZs06ZB9PUvA+zu/5BbJKER/cP+5GQXjLLRKRxhAvSMUjPQvKCIHUOT7tGCOsFRAgSOPL CCt6FCdlPINsWx4zJkMpbdJpObFSiqUDgs6z4dtczD8ZpASOe8TeVjuYszU74Gd15E/mkii0H 5Kyn0xRIc9uA4RRVB03y1/mSdK8nElZnF9qQJF15ZliPruCsc9Nj3KzVZEaJ2DH4I2PzdXIAS TS8FHUJe5zoQf9mOPtNW6hvkmwPSyCT+LMdTsC3dCekLVFS0/lfzDnpzDNp8IbDGjQOMprjNo DhbRTmdmhVdCTXD7A/zl2u8xMWhmQmi82oTDWUk5D2i+8IagCxVCyHRhmveU3RhhHqW0dmk3q /IY+FgdcMIG2s4XjHByWYEoeNOJBRFviTkkGCw== X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Fwd: Your Gmaxwell exchange X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 30 Aug 2015 02:00:05 -0000 --Apple-Mail=_5C3FA3B5-06DC-4E74-BD41-9EBB07B21A3B Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Dear Greg, I am moving our conversation into public as I've recently learned that = you've been forwarding our private email conversation verbatim without = my permission [I received permission from dpinna to share the email that = proves this fact: http://pastebin.com/jFgkk8M3]. > Greg wrote to Peter R: "You know that your "proof" of this = problematic-- outright false under the discussion we had, or at least = likely of little pratical relevance under reasonable, pratical = assumptions. But you respond to dpinna agreeing with him and not = cautioning him on relying on these >=20 The proof is not "problematic." Right now you're providing an example = of what Mike Hearn refers to as "black-and-white" thinking. Just = because the proof makes simplifying assumptions, doesn't mean it's not = useful in helping us to understand the dynamics of the transaction fee = market. Proofs about physical systems need to make simplifying = assumptions because the physical world is messy (unlike the world of = pure math). =20 My proof assumes very reasonably that block solutions contain = information (i.e., Shannon Entropy) about the transactions included in a = block. As long as this is true, and as long as miners act rationally to = maximize their profit, then the fee market will remain "healthy" = according to the definitions given in my paper. This is the case right = now, this is the case with the Relay Network, and this would be the case = using any implementation of IBLTs that I can imagine, so long as miners = retain the ability to construct blocks according to their own volition. = The "healthy fee market" result follows from the Shannon-Hartley = theorem; the SH-theorem describes the maximum rate at which information = (Shannon Entropy) can be transmitted over a physical communication = channel. =20 You are imagining an academic scenario (to use your own words: "perhaps = of little practical relevance") where all of the block solutions = announcements contain no information at all about the transactions = included in the blocks. Although I agree that the fee market would not = be healthy in such a scenario, it is my feeling that this also requires = miners to relinquish their ability to construct blocks according to = their own volition (i.e., the system would already be centralized). I = look forward to reading a white paper where you show: (a) Under what assumptions/requirements such a communication scheme is = physically possible. (b) That such a configuration is not equivalent to a single entity[1] = controlling >50% of the hash power. (c) That the network moving into such a configuration is plausible. Lastly, I'd like to conclude by saying that we are all here trying to = learn about this new amazing thing called Bitcoin. Please go ahead and = write a paper that shows under what network configuration my results = don't hold. I'd love to read it! This is how we make progress in = science!! Sincerely,=20 Peter [1] For example, if--in order to achieve such a configuration with = infinite coding gain--miners can no longer choose how to structure their = blocks according to their own volition, then I would classify those = miners as slaves rather than as peers, and the network as already = centralized. Link to forwarded email pastebin: http://pastebin.com/jFgkk8M3 --Apple-Mail=_5C3FA3B5-06DC-4E74-BD41-9EBB07B21A3B Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/html; charset=us-ascii http://pastebin.com/jFgkk8M3].

Greg wrote to Peter R: =  "You know that your "proof" of this problematic-- outright = false under the discussion we had, or at least likely of = little pratical relevance under reasonable, pratical = assumptions.  But you respond to dpinna agreeing with = him and not cautioning him on relying on = these

The proof is not "problematic." =  Right now you're providing an example of what Mike Hearn refers to = as "black-and-white" thinking.  Just because the proof makes = simplifying assumptions, doesn't mean it's not useful in helping us to = understand the dynamics of the transaction fee market.  Proofs = about physical systems need to make simplifying = assumptions because the physical world is messy (unlike the world of = pure math).  

My proof assumes very = reasonably that block solutions contain information (i.e., Shannon = Entropy) about the transactions included in a block.  As long as = this is true, and as long as miners act rationally to maximize their = profit, then the fee market will remain "healthy" according to the = definitions given in my paper.  This is the case right now, this = is the case with the Relay Network, and this would be the case using any = implementation of IBLTs that I can imagine, so long as miners retain the = ability to construct blocks according to their own = volition.  The "healthy fee market" result follows from = the Shannon-Hartley theorem; the SH-theorem describes the maximum rate = at which information (Shannon Entropy) can be transmitted over a = physical communication channel. =   

You are imagining an = academic scenario (to use your own words: "perhaps of little practical = relevance") where all of the block solutions announcements = contain no information at all about the transactions = included in the blocks.  Although I agree that the fee market would = not be healthy in such a scenario, it is my feeling that this also = requires miners to relinquish their ability to construct blocks = according to their own volition (i.e., the system would already be = centralized).  I look forward to reading a white paper where you = show:

(a) Under what assumptions/requirements = such a communication scheme is physically = possible.

(b) That such a configuration is not = equivalent to a single entity[1] controlling >50% of the hash = power.

(c) That the network moving into such a = configuration is plausible.

Lastly, I'd like to = conclude by saying that we are all here trying to learn about this new = amazing thing called Bitcoin.  Please go ahead and write a paper = that shows under what network configuration my results don't hold. =  I'd love to read it!  This is how we make progress in = science!!

Sincerely, 
Peter
<= div>
[1] For example, if--in order to achieve such a = configuration with infinite coding gain--miners can no longer choose how = to structure their blocks according to their own volition, then I would = classify those miners as slaves rather than as peers, and the network as = already centralized.


Link = to forwarded email pastebin: http://pastebin.com/jFgkk8M3

= --Apple-Mail=_5C3FA3B5-06DC-4E74-BD41-9EBB07B21A3B--