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charset="Windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > Nodes are by design not supposed to be identifiable in any way I feel you're conflating social identifiability with technical identifiabil= ity. Sure, a node operator must always be able to remain anonymous, but nod= es themselves require a certain level of identifiability otherwise there wo= uld be no means to communicate between them. I agree that absolute node counts have their limitations, but that doesn't = stop them being used as a measure and even propaganda tool. If something li= ke this is a way to help highlight the latter when it is occurring I think = it has value. I 'm not convinced that node identifiers or identity persiste= nce would have any meaningful impact on privacy, though am open to being co= nvinced otherwise. ________________________________ From: Btc Drak Sent: Sunday, March 5, 2017 1:27 PM To: John Hardy; Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Unique node identifiers Nodes are by design not supposed to be identifiable in any way, including p= ersisting identities across IPs changes or when connecting over different n= etworks (e.g. clearnet/tor). Anything that makes Bitcoin less private is a = step backwards. Also absolute node count is pretty meaningless since only f= ully validating nodes that participate in economic activity really matter. As a side note, this should probably have started out as a bitcoin-discuss = post. On Sat, Mar 4, 2017 at 4:04 PM, John Hardy via bitcoin-dev > wrote= : The discussion of UASF got me thinking about whether such a method might le= ad to sybil attacks, with new nodes created purely to inflate the node coun= t for a particular implementation in an attempt at social engineering. I had an idea for an anonymous, opt-in, unique node identification mechanis= m to help counter this. This would give every node the opportunity to create a node =91address=92/u= nique identifier. This could even come in the form of a Bitcoin address. The node on first installation generates and backs up a private key. The co= rresponding public key becomes that node=92s unique identifier. If the node= switches to a new software version or a new IP, the identifier can remain = constant if the node operator chooses. Asking a node for its identifier can be done by sending a message the comma= nd =91identify=92 and a challenge. The node can then respond with its uniqu= e identifier and a signature for the challenge to prove it. The node can al= so include what software it is running and sign this information so it can = be verified as legitimate by third parties. Why would we do this? Well, it adds a small but very useful piece of data when compiling lists of= active nodes. Any register of active nodes can have a record of when a node identifier wa= s =93first seen=94, and how many IPs the same identifier has broadcast from= . Also, crucially, we could see what software the node operator has been se= en running historically. This information would make it easy to identify patterns. For example if a = huge new group of nodes appeared on the network with no history for their i= dentifier they could likely be dismissed as sybil attacks. If a huge number= of nodes that had been reporting as Bitcoin Core for an extended period of= time started switching to a rival implementation, this would add credibili= ty but not certainty (keys could be traded), that the shift was more organi= c. This would be trivial to implement, is (to me?) non-controversial, and woul= d give a way for a node to link itself to a pseudo-anonymous identity, but = with the freedom to opt-out at any time. Keen to hear any thoughts? Thanks, John Hardy john@seebitcoin.com _______________________________________________ bitcoin-dev mailing list bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev --_000_BL2PR03MB435029A0856DC7077D4AD68EE2D0BL2PR03MB435namprd_ Content-Type: text/html; charset="Windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

> Nodes are by design not supposed to be identifiable in = any way

I feel you're conflating social identifiability with technical identif= iability. Sure, a node operator must always be able to remain anonymous, bu= t nodes themselves require a certain level of identifiability otherwise the= re would be no means to communicate between them.

I agree that absolute node counts have their limitations, but that doe= sn't stop them being used as a measure and even propaganda tool. If somethi= ng like this is a way to help highlight the latter when it is occurring I t= hink it has value. I 'm not convinced that node identifiers or identity persistence would have any meaningful im= pact on privacy, though am open to being convinced otherwise.



From: Btc Drak <btcdrak@= gmail.com>
Sent: Sunday, March 5, 2017 1:27 PM
To: John Hardy; Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Unique node identifiers
 
Nodes are by design not supposed to be identifiable in any= way, including persisting identities across IPs changes or when connecting= over different networks (e.g. clearnet/tor). Anything that makes Bitcoin l= ess private is a step backwards. Also absolute node count is pretty meaningless since only fully validating node= s that participate in economic activity really matter.

As a side note, this should probably have started out as a bitcoin-dis= cuss post.

On Sat, Mar 4, 2017 at 4:04 PM, John Hardy via b= itcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> = wrote:

The discussion of UAS= F got me thinking about whether such a method might lead to sybil attacks, with new nodes created purely to infla= te the node count for a particular implementation in an attempt at social e= ngineering.


I had an idea for an = anonymous, opt-in, unique node identification mechanism to help counter this.


This would give every= node the opportunity to create a node =91address=92/unique identifier. This could even come in the form of a Bit= coin address.


The node on first ins= tallation generates and backs up a private key. The corresponding public key becomes that node=92s unique identifier.= If the node switches to a new software version or a new IP, the identifier= can remain constant if the node operator chooses.


Asking a node for its= identifier can be done by sending a message the command =91identify=92 and a challenge. The node can then respond with= its unique identifier and a signature for the challenge to prove it. The n= ode can also include what software it is running and sign this information = so it can be verified as legitimate by third parties.


Why would we do this?=


Well, it adds a small= but very useful piece of data when compiling lists of active nodes.


Any register of activ= e nodes can have a record of when a node identifier was =93first seen=94, and how many IPs the same identifier has = broadcast from. Also, crucially, we could see what software the node operat= or has been seen running historically.


This information woul= d make it easy to identify patterns. For example if a huge new group of nodes appeared on the network with no histo= ry for their identifier they could likely be dismissed as sybil attacks. If= a huge number of nodes that had been reporting as Bitcoin Core for an exte= nded period of time started switching to a rival implementation, this would add credibility but not certainty (k= eys could be traded), that the shift was more organic.


This would be trivial= to implement, is (to me?) non-controversial, and would give a way for a node to link itself to a pseudo-anonymous ident= ity, but with the freedom to opt-out at any time.


Keen to hear any thou= ghts?


Thanks,


John Hardy

john@seebitcoin.com


_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org= /mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


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