From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 23EBCDA4 for ; Sat, 29 Aug 2015 09:15:18 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ig0-f180.google.com (mail-ig0-f180.google.com [209.85.213.180]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7D389A7 for ; Sat, 29 Aug 2015 09:15:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: by igcse8 with SMTP id se8so36833011igc.1 for ; Sat, 29 Aug 2015 02:15:17 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=oel4tOfg+PPsY/A+VStLMFhYOSFLOrUfNYXi/6OLrC8=; b=VK/3qOqTJYfxyatLgUCWHwTRr87Y4pGy2zSY39HhTKPatRUgCYpMm4VSb4uXShnVGc oYgNany02rILv9TaYrT94Kp8XAOfF0IAPYl3L13BY2F666x6qqDrpsy385ki0SVmbUE9 fQEMNftb5NM68fhiL4hbywzbZnIX9oYttQZd6EnAeZTXhvcffGug42QTnDqpJiWuPR1V nmkleWBvVzUKBJO1p8vnPBPjFFXf6Oesey4VlmtipADVwKMHzlkmLBlmdk5eLAStRlJ3 yI3MNyc1UW0j8UfSycKPO+1h2RjFlNhOFeOw4u6ofsffGqvzPs8qqh8t1iuBuxMVt4gz wAiA== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.118.39 with SMTP id kj7mr359092igb.24.1440839716956; Sat, 29 Aug 2015 02:15:16 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.79.97.135 with HTTP; Sat, 29 Aug 2015 02:15:16 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <2081355.cHxjDEpgpW@crushinator> Date: Sat, 29 Aug 2015 02:15:16 -0700 Message-ID: From: Elliot Olds To: Bitcoin Dev Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e0116178e81f1f5051e6fa365 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Consensus based block size retargeting algorithm (draft) X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 29 Aug 2015 09:15:18 -0000 --089e0116178e81f1f5051e6fa365 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Fri, Aug 28, 2015 at 4:46 PM, Btc Drak via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > On Sat, Aug 29, 2015 at 12:35 AM, Chris Pacia via bitcoin-dev > > It may be in everyone's collective interest to raise the block size but > not > > their individual interest. > > It is clear from recent events that miners are willing to collaborate > together for the greater good of their industry. Miners have also > publicly shown support for raising the blocksize collaboratively. > When have miners shown a willingness to make sacrifices for miners as a whole when they've been in a "public good"[1] situation? Miners collaborating to release statements to the public about which BIPs they support is very different from miners incurring costs only to themselves in order to help the entire group. They might do so, but it isn't clear. I agree with Jorge and Mark that allowing miners to vote on the block size is not ideal. Miners interests are somewhat aligned with those of the broader community, but not perfectly aligned. The block size level that maximizes miner revenue is not necessarily desirable overall. More miner revenue is only good if the marginal extra security that it buys is worth the extra cost. In addition to the cost of higher user fees, there's another hidden cost. In Bitcoin's early stages trying to maximize revenue too soon can slow growth and result in less revenue when it's more needed (when block rewards are much lower). [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_good --089e0116178e81f1f5051e6fa365 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On F= ri, Aug 28, 2015 at 4:46 PM, Btc Drak via bitcoin-dev <= ;bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
On Sat, Aug 29, 2015 at 12:35 AM, Chris Pacia via bi= tcoin-dev
> It may be in everyone's collective interest to raise the block siz= e but not
> their individual interest.

It is clear from recent events that miners are willing to collaborat= e
together for the greater good of their industry. Miners have also
publicly shown support for raising the blocksize collaboratively.

When have miners shown a willingness to make sac= rifices for miners as a whole when they've been in a "public good&= quot;[1] situation? Miners collaborating to release statements to the publi= c about which BIPs they support is very different from miners incurring cos= ts only to themselves in order to help the entire group. They might do so, = but it isn't clear.

I agree with Jorge and Mar= k that allowing miners to vote on the block size is not ideal. Miners inter= ests are somewhat aligned with those of the broader community, but not perf= ectly aligned. The block size level that maximizes miner revenue is not nec= essarily desirable overall. More miner revenue is only good if the marginal= extra security that it buys is worth the extra cost. In addition to the co= st of higher user fees, there's another hidden cost. In Bitcoin's e= arly stages trying to maximize revenue too soon can slow growth and result = in less revenue when it's more needed (when block rewards are much lowe= r).=C2=A0

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