From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DB3F9516 for ; Fri, 22 Dec 2017 18:07:55 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-wr0-f177.google.com (mail-wr0-f177.google.com [209.85.128.177]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4C43352B for ; Fri, 22 Dec 2017 18:07:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-wr0-f177.google.com with SMTP id v21so17867407wrc.0 for ; Fri, 22 Dec 2017 10:07:52 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=7PgTTLf1sqoqzbJfGJMc6no2Z4zp6SndMhnsg9t8qow=; b=Bk0rQcBguVlYGE7JXQngwgPpehDxy/TpGY0upT33xkYxqkQ9F8ZYkmg9N22Vr+11he VJft761JvQEjJN4lnvMpw80WOm1C2C/GsPufAy5LPhegzgkSO4Gda9V0CWXDRB9+cObU KZ5H9+yl5fzEpXKpeWxxWRTb7zSLh6Z9eWW9JAz+ithf0RVLK7iKxE4pTc/x6N0jl6wB BKeXWFIISJYEu9KG22kjhu258H/3NFEM2rMCtpIjO5Wm385fDfSkRpMV/dgO0c4BgUVW 0RShJLrw+XeZGGpaMCKK07wfquVrNE9PxLPfUOkOyd19U2zV5irUgW3XKkuUwR/N8Wdd KmjA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to; bh=7PgTTLf1sqoqzbJfGJMc6no2Z4zp6SndMhnsg9t8qow=; b=epRID7fi5kCY67v8x0SbirLlrhTyxEmGR5rp12BKaQ7/rViFuiBi09Swa8IUNalYwT M5Y1axIaGg2a2WPZHxxbdv+9gi7CerWL1hNFaAQuAPUzuLTHsxieUKwATt/v6bqrBhPi l3uLkqT4Et9pL10Ht+77CoPlkuzqzL/u7Mh490hGQgKsdDYvBMKRkKWY7QH0W5tEiFZb lGX4pd4Lm19O+00SMcEf5gP2vKei9ef4xF6rx1Tmg6ZvWVOF3JvHS1zSu3wzahpL5KeL 3rqgiOmLOy7RPdoZiOgpJv2sY2ay1W/gHaW1yB5BGLQ8p/jHbedTiS3Cz6vICye9Ihsr 8A1A== X-Gm-Message-State: AKGB3mIrhVZo/gCY29TKuj6fcBirBSowc8+NzNvZF88QdNKWazbpXg7F VpWp9uyZLWeqzWfLrVPAcoEbh7ndASxkJItp8II= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ACJfBosUYkB1PLBdWc+ZXnCAMm0yszOLsp1yadia0Aat+hdnC7ZZYlcvS+fbMVbeRFTnCNUUuy3L4qsCOHsZ9fX19jw= X-Received: by 10.223.134.76 with SMTP id 12mr17056507wrw.137.1513966070693; Fri, 22 Dec 2017 10:07:50 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.28.210.209 with HTTP; Fri, 22 Dec 2017 10:07:49 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.28.210.209 with HTTP; Fri, 22 Dec 2017 10:07:49 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: <5upGmF0IhXUWhcikhdV-e9Pqg-kXfUuXe0kOpGxumie_TO2jLvCgTZ5c6vgBRtaqkL6DmOJb1YftK0osufB5RkhW7YhAhhCI0zBTH3YcORY=@protonmail.com> From: Spartacus Rex Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2017 18:07:49 +0000 Message-ID: To: Damian Williamson , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="001a11491a40d8868f0560f1b1a4" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_ENVFROM_END_DIGIT,FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 22 Dec 2017 18:36:58 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Revised: UTPFOTIB - Use Transaction Priority For Ordering Transactions In Blocks X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2017 18:07:56 -0000 --001a11491a40d8868f0560f1b1a4 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi Damian, Thought I'd chip in. This is a hard fork scenario. This system has flaws, they all do. If you had a fixed fee per block, so that every txn in that block paid the same fee, that might make it easier to include all txns eventually, as you envisage. The fee could be calculated as the average of the amount txns are prepared to pay in the last 1000 blocks. A txn would say ' I'll pay up to X bitcoins ' and as long as that is more than the value required for the block your txn can be added. This is to ensure you don't pay more than you are willing. It also ensures that putting an enormous fee will not ensure your txn is processed quickly.. Calculating what the outputs are given a variable fee needs a new mechanism all of it's own, but I'm sure it's possible. The simple fact is that there is currently no known system that works as well as the current system.. But there are other systems. On Dec 22, 2017 15:09, "Damian Williamson via bitcoin-dev" < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > If the cash value of Bitcoin was high enough and zero fee transactions > were never accepted and not counted when calculating the transaction pool > size then I do not think it would be such an issue. Why is it even possib= le > to create zero fee transactions? > > > Regards, > > Damian Williamson > > ------------------------------ > *From:* bitcoin-dev-bounces@lists.linuxfoundation.org < > bitcoin-dev-bounces@lists.linuxfoundation.org> on behalf of Damian > Williamson via bitcoin-dev > *Sent:* Tuesday, 19 December 2017 6:51 PM > *To:* Mark Friedenbach > *Cc:* bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > *Subject:* [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Revised: UTPFOTIB - Use > Transaction Priority For Ordering Transactions In Blocks > > > Thank you for your constructive feedback. I now see that the proposal > introduces a potential issue. > > > >Finally in terms of the broad goal, having block size based on the numbe= r > of transactions is NOT something desirable in the first place, even if it > did work. That=E2=80=99s effectively the same as an infinite block size s= ince > anyone anywhere can create transactions in the mempool at no cost. > > > Do you have any critical suggestion as to how transaction bandwidth limit > could be addressed, it will eventually become an issue if nothing is > changed regardless of how high fees go? > > > Regards, > Damian Williamson > > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Mark Friedenbach > *Sent:* Tuesday, 19 December 2017 3:08 AM > *To:* Damian Williamson > *Subject:* Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Revised: UTPFOTIB - Use > Transaction Priority For Ordering Transactions In Blocks > > Damian, you seem to be misunderstanding that either > > (1) the strong form of your proposal requires validating the commitment t= o > the mempool properties, in which case the mempool becomes consensus > critical (an impossible requirement); or > > (2) in the weak form where the current block is dependent on the > commitment in the last block only it is becomes a miner-selected field th= ey > can freely parameterize with no repercussions for setting values totally > independent of the actual mempool. > > If you want to make the block size dependent on the properties of the > mempool in a consensus critical way, flex cap achieves this. If you want = to > make the contents or properties of the mempool known to well-connected > nodes, weak blocks achieves that. But you can=E2=80=99t stick the mempool= in > consensus because it fundamentally is not something the nodes have > consensus over. That=E2=80=99s a chicken-and-the-egg assumption. > > Finally in terms of the broad goal, having block size based on the number > of transactions is NOT something desirable in the first place, even if it > did work. That=E2=80=99s effectively the same as an infinite block size s= ince > anyone anywhere can create transactions in the mempool at no cost. > > On Dec 16, 2017, at 8:14 PM, Damian Williamson via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > I do not know why people make the leap that the proposal requires a > consensus on the transaction pool. It does not. > > It may be helpful to have the discussion from the previous thread linked > here. > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/ > 2017-December/015370.html > > Where I speak of validating that a block conforms to the broadcast next > block size, I do not propose validating the number broadcast for the next > block size itself, only that the next generated block is that size. > > Regards, > Damian Williamson > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Damian Williamson > *Sent:* Saturday, 16 December 2017 7:59 AM > *To:* Rhavar > *Cc:* Bitcoin Protocol Discussion > *Subject:* Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Revised: UTPFOTIB - Use > Transaction Priority For Ordering Transactions In Blocks > > There are really two separate problems to solve. > > > 1. How does Bitcoin scale with fixed block size? > 2. How do we ensure that all valid transactions are eventually > included in the blockchain? > > > Those are the two issues that the proposal attempts to address. It makes > sense to resolve these two problems together. Using the proposed system f= or > variable block sizes would solve the first problem but there would still = be > a whole bunch of never confirming transactions. I am not sure how to > reliably solve the second problem at scale without first solving the firs= t. > > >* Every node has a (potentially) different mempool, you can't use it to > decide consensus values like the max block size. > > I do not suggest a consensus. Depending on which node solves a block the > value for next block size will be different. The consensus would be that > blocks will adhere to the next block size value transmitted with the > current block. It is easy to verify that the consensus is being adhered t= o > once in place. > > >* Increasing the entropy in a block to make it more unpredictable doesn'= t > really make sense. > > Not a necessary function, just an effect of using a probability-based > distribution. > > >* Bitcoin should be roughly incentive compatible. Your proposal explicit= s > asks miners to ignore their best interests, and confirm transactions by > "priority". What are you going to do if a "malicious" miner decides to g= o > after their profits and order by what makes them the most money. Add > "ordered by priority" as a consensus requirement? And even if you miners > can still sort their mempool by fee, and then order the top 1MB by priori= ty. > > I entirely agree with your sentiment that Bitcoin must be incentive > compatible. It is necessary. > > It is in only miners immediate interest to make the most profitable block > from the available transaction pool. As with so many other things, it is > necessary to partially ignore short-term gain for long-term benefit. It i= s > in miners and everybody's long-term interest to have a reliable transacti= on > service. A busy transaction service that confirms lots of transactions pe= r > hour will become more profitable as demand increases and more users are > prepared to pay for priority. As it is there is currently no way to fully > scale because of the transaction bandwidth limit and that is problematic. > If all valid transactions must eventually confirm then there must be a wa= y > to resolve that problem. > > Bitcoin deliberately removes traditional scale by ensuring blocks take te= n > minutes on average to solve, an ingenious idea and, incentive compatible > but, fixed block sizes leaves us with a problem to solve when we want to > scale. > > >If you could find a good solution that would allow you to know if miners > were following your rule or not (and thus ignore it if it doesn't) then y= ou > wouldn't even need bitcoin in the first place. > > I am confident that the math to verify blocks based on the proposal can b= e > developed (and I think it will not be too complex for a mathematician wit= h > the relevant experience), however, I am nowhere near experienced enough > with probability and statistical analysis to do it. Yes, if Bitcoin doesn= 't > then it might make another great opportunity for an altcoin but I am not > even nearly interested in promoting any altcoins. > > > If not the proposal that I have put forward, then, hopefully, someone can > come up with a better solution. The important thing is that the issues ar= e > resolved. > > Regards, > Damian Williamson > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Rhavar > *Sent:* Saturday, 16 December 2017 3:38 AM > *To:* Damian Williamson > *Cc:* Bitcoin Protocol Discussion > *Subject:* Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Revised: UTPFOTIB - Use > Transaction Priority For Ordering Transactions In Blocks > > > I understand that there would be technical issues to resolve in > implementation, but, are there no fundamental errors? > > Unfortunately your proposal is really fundamentally broken, on a few > levels. I think you might need to do a bit more research into how bitcoin > works before coming up with such improvements =3D) > > But just some quick notes: > > * Every node has a (potentially) different mempool, you can't use it to > decide consensus values like the max block size. > > * Increasing the entropy in a block to make it more unpredictable doesn't > really make sense. > > * Bitcoin should be roughly incentive compatible. Your proposal explicits > asks miners to ignore their best interests, and confirm transactions by > "priority". What are you going to do if a "malicious" miner decides to g= o > after their profits and order by what makes them the most money. Add > "ordered by priority" as a consensus requirement? And even if you miners > can still sort their mempool by fee, and then order the top 1MB by priori= ty. > > If you could find a good solution that would allow you to know if miners > were following your rule or not (and thus ignore it if it doesn't) then y= ou > wouldn't even need bitcoin in the first place. > > > > > -Ryan > > > -------- Original Message -------- > Subject: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Revised: UTPFOTIB - Use Transaction > Priority For Ordering Transactions In Blocks > Local Time: December 15, 2017 3:42 AM > UTC Time: December 15, 2017 9:42 AM > From: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion > > > > I should not take it that the lack of critical feedback to this revised > proposal is a glowing endorsement. I understand that there would be > technical issues to resolve in implementation, but, are there no > fundamental errors? > > I suppose that it if is difficult to determine how long a transaction has > been waiting in the pool then, each node could simply keep track of when = a > transaction was first seen. This may have implications for a verify > routine, however, for example, if a node was offline, how should it > differentiate how long each transaction was waiting in that case? If a no= de > was restarted daily would it always think that all transactions had been > waiting in the pool less than one day If each node keeps the current > transaction pool in a file and updates it, as transactions are included i= n > blocks and, as new transactions appear in the pool, then that would go so= me > way to alleviate the issue, apart from entirely new nodes. There should b= e > no reason the contents of a transaction pool files cannot be shared witho= ut > agreement as to the transaction pool between nodes, just as nodes > transmit new transactions freely. > > It has been questioned why miners could not cheat. For the question of ho= w > many transactions to include in a block, I say it is a standoff and miner= s > will conform to the proposal, not wanting to leave transactions with vali= d > fees standing, and, not wanting to shrink the transaction pool. In any > case, if miners shrink the transaction pool then I am not immediately > concerned since it provides a more efficient service. For the question of > including transactions according to the proposal, I say if it is possible > to keep track of how long transactions are waiting in the pool so that th= ey > can be included on a probability curve then it is possible to verify that > blocks conform to the proposal, since the input is a probability, the > output should conform to a probability curve. > > > If someone has the necessary skill, would anyone be willing to develop th= e > math necessary for the proposal? > > Regards, > Damian Williamson > > > ------------------------------ > > *From:* bitcoin-dev-bounces@lists.linuxfoundation.org coin-dev-bounces@lists.linuxfoundation.org> on behalf of Damian > Williamson via bitcoin-dev > *Sent:* Friday, 8 December 2017 8:01 AM > *To:* bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > *Subject:* [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Revised: UTPFOTIB - Use > Transaction Priority For Ordering Transactions In Blocks > > > Good afternoon, > > The need for this proposal: > > We all must learn to admit that transaction bandwidth is still lurking as > a serious issue for the operation, reliability, safety, consumer > acceptance, uptake and, for the value of Bitcoin. > > I recently sent a payment which was not urgent so; I chose three-day > target confirmation from the fee recommendation. That transaction has sti= ll > not confirmed after now more than six days - even waiting twice as long > seems quite reasonable to me. That transaction is a valid transaction; it > is not rubbish, junk or, spam. Under the current model with transaction > bandwidth limitation, the longer a transaction waits, the less likely it = is > ever to confirm due to rising transaction numbers and being pushed back b= y > transactions with rising fees. > > I argue that no transactions are rubbish or junk, only some zero fee > transactions might be spam. Having an ever-increasing number of valid > transactions that do not confirm as more new transactions with higher fee= s > are created is the opposite of operating a robust, reliable transaction > system. > > Business cannot operate with a model where transactions may or may not > confirm. Even a business choosing a modest fee has no guarantee that thei= r > valid transaction will not be shuffled down by new transactions to the > realm of never confirming after it is created. Consumers also will not > accept this model as Bitcoin expands. If Bitcoin cannot be a reliable > payment system for confirmed transactions then consumers, by and large, > will simply not accept the model once they understand. Bitcoin will be a > dirty payment system, and this will kill the value of Bitcoin. > > Under the current system, a minority of transactions will eventually be > the lucky few who have fees high enough to escape being pushed down the > list. > > Once there are more than x transactions (transaction bandwidth limit) > every ten minutes, only those choosing twenty-minute confirmation (2 > blocks) will have initially at most a fifty percent chance of ever having > their payment confirm. Presently, not even using fee recommendations can > ensure a sufficiently high fee is paid to ensure transaction confirmation= . > > I also argue that the current auction model for limited transaction > bandwidth is wrong, is not suitable for a reliable transaction system and= , > is wrong for Bitcoin. All transactions must confirm in due time. Currentl= y, > Bitcoin is not a safe way to send payments. > > I do not believe that consumers and business are against paying fees, eve= n > high fees. What is required is operational reliability. > > This great issue needs to be resolved for the safety and reliability of > Bitcoin. The time to resolve issues in commerce is before they become gre= at > big issues. The time to resolve this issue is now. We must have the > foresight to identify and resolve problems before they trip us over. > Simply doubling block sizes every so often is reactionary and is not a > reliable permanent solution. I have written a BIP proposal for a technica= l > solution but, need your help to write it up to an acceptable standard to = be > a full BIP. > > I have formatted the following with markdown which is human readable so, = I > hope nobody minds. I have done as much with this proposal as I feel that = I > am able so far but continue to take your feedback. > > # BIP Proposal: UTPFOTIB - Use Transaction Priority For Ordering > Transactions In Blocks > > ## The problem: > Everybody wants value. Miners want to maximize revenue from fees (and we > presume, to minimize block size). Consumers need transaction reliability > and, (we presume) want low fees. > > The current transaction bandwidth limit is a limiting factor for both. As > the operational safety of transactions is limited, so is consumer > confidence as they realize the issue and, accordingly, uptake is limited. > Fees are artificially inflated due to bandwidth limitations while failing > to provide a full confirmation service for all transactions. > > Current fee recommendations provide no satisfaction for transaction > reliability and, as Bitcoin scales, this will worsen. > > Bitcoin must be a fully scalable and reliable service, providing full > transaction confirmation for every valid transaction. > > The possibility to send a transaction with a fee lower than one that is > acceptable to allow eventual transaction confirmation should be removed > from the protocol and also from the user interface. > > ## Solution summary: > Provide each transaction with an individual transaction priority each tim= e > before choosing transactions to include in the current block, the priorit= y > being a function of the fee paid (on a curve), and the time waiting in th= e > transaction pool (also on a curve) out to n days (n=3D60 ?). The transact= ion > priority to serve as the likelihood of a transaction being included in th= e > current block, and for determining the order in which transactions are > tried to see if they will be included. > > Use a target block size. Determine the target block size using; current > transaction pool size x ( 1 / (144 x n days ) ) =3D number of transaction= s to > be included in the current block. Broadcast the next target block size wi= th > the current block when it is solved so that nodes know the next target > block size for the block that they are building on. > > The curves used for the priority of transactions would have to be > appropriate. Perhaps a mathematician with experience in probability can > develop the right formulae. My thinking is a steep curve. I suppose that > the probability of all transactions should probably account for a > sufficient number of inclusions that the target block size is met althoug= h, > it may not always be. As a suggestion, consider including some zero fee > transactions to pad, highest BTC value first? > > **Explanation of the operation of priority:** > > If transaction priority is, for example, a number between one (low) and > one-hundred (high) it can be directly understood as the percentage chance > in one-hundred of a transaction being included in the block. Using > probability or likelihood infers that there is some function of random. I= f > random (100) < transaction priority then the transaction is included. > > >To break it down further, if both the fee on a curve value and the time > waiting on a curve value are each a number between one and one-hundred, a > rudimentary method may be to simply multiply those two numbers, to find t= he > priority number. For example, a middle fee transaction waiting thirty day= s > (if n =3D 60 days) may have a value of five for each part (yes, just fiv= e, > the values are on a curve). When multiplied that will give a priority val= ue > of twenty-five, or, a twenty-five percent chance at that moment of being > included in the block; it will likely be included in one of the next four > blocks, getting more likely each chance. If it is still not included then > the value of time waiting will be higher, making for more probability. A > very low fee transaction would have a value for the fee of one. It would > not be until near sixty-days that the particular low fee transaction has = a > high likelihood of being included in the block. > > I am not concerned with low (or high) transaction fees, the primary reaso= n > for addressing the issue is to ensure transactional reliability and > scalability while having each transaction confirm in due time. > > ## Pros: > * Maximizes transaction reliability. > * Fully scalable. > * Maximizes possibility for consumer and business uptake. > * Maximizes total fees paid per block without reducing reliability; > because of reliability, in time confidence and overall uptake are greater= ; > therefore, more transactions. > * Market determines fee paid for transaction priority. > * Fee recommendations work all the way out to 30 days or greater. > * Provides additional block entropy; greater security since there is less > probability of predicting the next block. > > ## Cons: > * Could initially lower total transaction fees per block. > * Must be first be programmed. > > ## Solution operation: > This is a simplistic view of the operation. The actual operation will nee= d > to be determined in a spec for the programmer. > > 1. Determine the target block size for the current block. > 2. Assign a transaction priority to each transaction in the pool. > 3. Select transactions to include in the current block using probability > in transaction priority order until the target block size is met. > 5. Solve block. > 6. Broadcast the next target block size with the current block when it is > solved. > 7. Block is received. > 8. Block verification process. > 9. Accept/reject block based on verification result. > 10. Repeat. > > ## Closing comments: > It may be possible to verify blocks conform to the proposal by showing > that the probability for all transactions included in the block > statistically conforms to a probability distribution curve, *if* the > individual transaction priority can be recreated. I am not that deep into > the mathematics; however, it may also be possible to use a similar method > to do this just based on the fee, that statistically, the blocks conform = to > a fee distribution. Any zero fee transactions would have to be ignored. > This solution needs a clever mathematician. > > I implore, at the very least, that we use some method that validates full > transaction reliability and enables scalability of block sizes. If not th= is > proposal, an alternative. > > Regards, > Damian Williamson > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --001a11491a40d8868f0560f1b1a4 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi Damian,

T= hought I'd chip in.=C2=A0 This is a hard fork scenario. This system has= flaws, they all do.

If = you had a fixed fee per block, so that every txn in that block paid the sam= e fee, that might make it easier to include all txns eventually, as you env= isage.

The fee could be = calculated as the average of the amount txns are prepared to pay in the las= t 1000 blocks.

A txn wou= ld say ' I'll pay up to X bitcoins ' and as long as that is mor= e than the value required for the block your txn can be added. This is to e= nsure you don't pay more than you are willing.=C2=A0 It also ensures th= at putting an enormous fee will not ensure your txn is processed quickly..<= /div>

Calculating what the out= puts are given a variable fee needs a new mechanism all of it's own, bu= t I'm sure it's possible.

The simple fact is that there is currently no known system that w= orks as well as the current system..=C2=A0

But there are other systems.=C2=A0


On Dec 22, 2017 15:09, "Damian Williamson via bitcoin-dev" <<= a href=3D"mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org" target=3D"_blank">b= itcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

If the cash value of Bitcoi= n was high enough and zero fee transactions were never accepted and not cou= nted when calculating the transaction pool size then I do not think it woul= d be such an issue. Why is it even possible to create zero fee transactions?


Regards,

Damian Williamson


From: = bitcoin-dev-bounces@lists.linuxfoundation.org <bitcoin-dev-bounces@lists.linuxfoundation.org> on behalf of Da= mian Williamson via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Sent: Tuesday, 19 December 2017 6:51 PM
To: Mark Friedenbach
Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Revised: UTPFOTIB - Use Transac= tion Priority For Ordering Transactions In Blocks
=C2=A0

Thank you for your constructive f= eedback. I now see that the proposal introduces a potential issue.


>Finally in terms of the= broad goal, having block size based on the number of transactions is NOT s= omething desirable in the first place, even if it did work. That=E2=80=99s = effectively the same as an infinite block size since anyone anywhere can create transactions in the mempool at no cost.


Do you have any critical suggesti= on as to how transaction bandwidth limit could be addressed, it will eventu= ally become an issue if nothing is changed regardless of how high fees go?<= br>


Regards,

Damian Williamson



From: Mark Friedenbach <mark@friedenbach.org>
Sent: Tuesday, 19 December 2017 3:08 AM
To: Damian Williamson
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Revised: UTPFOTIB - Use Tra= nsaction Priority For Ordering Transactions In Blocks
=C2=A0
Damian, yo= u seem to be misunderstanding that either

(1) the strong form of your proposal requires validating the commitmen= t to the mempool properties, in which case the mempool becomes consensus cr= itical (an impossible requirement); or

(2) in the weak form where the current block is dependent on the commi= tment in the last block only it is becomes a miner-selected field they can = freely parameterize with no repercussions for setting values totally indepe= ndent of the actual mempool.

If you want to make the block size dependent on the properties of the = mempool in a consensus critical way, flex cap achieves this. If you want to= make the contents or properties of the mempool known to well-connected nod= es, weak blocks achieves that. But you can=E2=80=99t stick the mempool in consensus because it fund= amentally is not something the nodes have consensus over. That=E2=80=99s a = chicken-and-the-egg assumption.

Finally in terms of the broad goal, having block size based on the num= ber of transactions is NOT something desirable in the first place, even if = it did work. That=E2=80=99s effectively the same as an infinite block size = since anyone anywhere can create transactions in the mempool at no cost.

On Dec 16, 2017, at 8:14 PM, Damian Williamson via bitcoin-dev <bit= coin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

I do not know why people ma= ke the leap that the proposal requires a consensus on the transaction pool.= It does not.

It may be helpful to have t= he discussion from the previous thread linked here.

Where I speak of validating= that a block conforms to the broadcast next block size, I do not propose v= alidating the number broadcast for the next block size itself, only that th= e next generated block is that size.

Regards,
Damian Williamson


From:=C2=A0Damian Willia= mson <willtech= @live.com.au>
Sent:= =C2=A0Saturday, 16 December 2017 7:59 AM
To:= =C2=A0Rhavar
Cc:= =C2=A0Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
Subject:=C2=A0Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Revised: UTPFOTIB - Use Tra= nsaction Priority For Ordering Transactions In Blocks
=C2=A0
There are really two separa= te problems to solve.

  1. How does Bitcoin scale with fixed block size?
  2. How do we ensure = that all valid transactions are eventually included in the blockchain?
    3. =

Those are the two issues th= at the proposal attempts to address. It makes sense to resolve these two pr= oblems together. Using the proposed system for variable block sizes would s= olve the first problem but there would still be a whole bunch of never confirming transactions. I am = not sure how to reliably solve the second problem at scale without first so= lving the first.

>* Every node has a (pot= entially) different mempool, you can't use it to decide consensus value= s like the max block size.=C2=A0

I do not suggest a consensus. Depending on which node solves a block the va= lue for next block size will be different. The consensus would be that bloc= ks will adhere to the next block size value transmitted with the current bl= ock. It is easy to verify that the consensus is being adhered to once in place.
=C2=A0
>* Increasing the entropy in a block to make it more unpredictable = doesn't really make sense.=C2=A0

Not a necessary function, just an effect of using a probability-based distr= ibution.=C2= =A0

>* Bitcoin should be roughly incentive compatible. Your proposal ex= plicits asks miners to ignore their best interests, and confirm transaction= s by "priority".=C2=A0 What are you going to do if a "malici= ous" miner decides to go after their profits and order by what makes them the most money. Add "ordered by priority&quo= t; as a consensus requirement? And even if you miners can still sort their = mempool by fee, and then order the top 1MB by priority.

I entirely agree with your sentiment that Bitcoin must be incentive compati= ble. It is necessary.

It is in only miners immediate interest to make the most profitable block f= rom the available transaction pool. As with so many other things, it is nec= essary to partially ignore short-term gain for long-term benefit. It is in = miners and everybody's long-term interest to have a reliable transaction service. A busy transaction servic= e that confirms lots of transactions per hour will become more profitable a= s demand increases and more users are prepared to pay for priority. As it i= s there is currently no way to fully scale because of the transaction bandwidth limit and that is problematic. = If all valid transactions must eventually confirm then there must be a way = to resolve that problem.

Bitcoin deliberately removes traditional scale by ensuring blocks take ten = minutes on average to solve, an ingenious idea and, incentive compatible bu= t, fixed block sizes leaves us with a problem to solve when we want to scal= e.

>If you could find a good solution that would allow you to know if = miners were following your rule or not (and thus ignore it if it doesn'= t) then you wouldn't even need bitcoin in the first place.

I am confident that the math to verify blocks based on the proposal can be = developed (and I think it will not be too complex for a mathematician with = the relevant experience), however, I am nowhere near experienced enough wit= h probability and statistical analysis to do it. Yes, if Bitcoin doesn't then it might make another great opp= ortunity for an altcoin but I am not even nearly interested in promoting an= y altcoins.


If not the proposal that I = have put forward, then, hopefully, someone can come up with a better soluti= on. The important thing is that the issues are resolved.

Regards,
Damian Williamson


From:=C2=A0Rhavar <= ;rhavar@protonma= il.com>
Sent:= =C2=A0Saturday, 16 December 2017 3:38 AM
To:= =C2=A0Damian Williamson
Cc:= =C2=A0Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
Subject:=C2=A0Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Revised: UTPFOTIB - Use Tra= nsaction Priority For Ordering Transactions In Blocks
=C2=A0
>=C2=A0I understand that there would be technical issues to resolve= in implementation, but, are there no fundamental errors?

Unfortunately your proposal is really fundamentally broken, on a few l= evels. I think you might need to do a bit more research into how bitcoin wo= rks before coming up with such improvements =3D)

But just some quick notes:

* Every node has a (potentially) different mempool, you can't use = it to decide consensus values like the max block size.=C2=A0

* Increasing the entropy in a block to make it more unpredictable does= n't really make sense.=C2=A0

* Bitcoin should be roughly incentive compatible. Your proposal explic= its asks miners to ignore their best interests, and confirm transactions by= "priority".=C2=A0 What are you going to do if a "malicious&= quot; miner decides to go after their profits and order by what makes them the most money. Add "ordered by priority&quo= t; as a consensus requirement? And even if you miners can still sort their = mempool by fee, and then order the top 1MB by priority.

If you could find a good solution that would allow you to know if mine= rs were following your rule or not (and thus ignore it if it doesn't) t= hen you wouldn't even need bitcoin in the first place.




-Ryan


-------- Original Message --------
Subject: [bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Revised: UTPFOTIB - Use Transacti= on Priority For Ordering Transactions In Blocks
Local Time: December 15, 2017 3:42 AM
UTC Time: December 15, 2017 9:42 AM
To: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfounda= tion.org>



I should not take it that the lack of critical feedback to this revise= d proposal is a glowing endorsement. I understand that there would be techn= ical issues to resolve in implementation, but, are there no fundamental err= ors?

I suppose that it if is difficult to determine how long a transaction = has been waiting in the pool then, each node could simply keep track of whe= n a transaction was first seen. This may have implications for a verify rou= tine, however, for example, if a node was offline, how should it differentiate how long each transacti= on was waiting in that case? If a node was restarted daily would it always = think that all transactions had been waiting in the pool less than one day = If each node keeps the current transaction pool in a file and updates it, as transactions are included in blocks and,= as new transactions appear in the pool, then that would go some way to all= eviate the issue, apart from entirely new nodes. There should be no reason = the contents of a transaction pool files cannot be shared without agreement as to the transaction pool=C2=A0= between nodes, just as nodes transmit new transactions freely.

It has been questioned why miners could not cheat. For the question of= how many transactions to include in a block, I say it is a standoff and mi= ners will conform to the proposal, not wanting to leave transactions with v= alid fees standing, and, not wanting to shrink the transaction pool. In any case, if miners shrink = the transaction pool then I am not immediately concerned since it provides = a more efficient service. For the question of including transactions accord= ing to the proposal, I say if it is possible to keep track of how long transactions are waiting in the pool= so that they can be included on a probability curve then it is possible to= verify that blocks conform to the proposal, since the input is a probabili= ty, the output should conform to a probability curve.


If someone has the necessary skill, would anyone be willing to develop= the math necessary for the proposal?

Regards,
Damian Williamson


=C2=A0
From:= =C2=A0bitcoin-dev-bounces@lists.linuxfoundation.org= =C2=A0<bitcoin-dev-bounces@lists.linuxfoundation.org>= ; on behalf of Damian Williamson via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org>
Sent:= =C2=A0Friday, 8 December 2017 8:01 AM
To:= =C2=A0bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
Subject:=C2=A0[bitcoin-dev] BIP Proposal: Revised: UTPFOTIB - Use Transac= tion Priority For Ordering Transactions In Blocks
=C2=A0

Good afternoon,

The need for this proposal:

We all must learn to admit that transaction bandwidth is still lurking= as a serious issue for the operation, reliability, safety, consumer accept= ance, uptake and, for the value of Bitcoin.

I recently sent a payment which was not urgent so; I chose three-day t= arget confirmation from the fee recommendation. That transaction has still = not confirmed after now more than six days - even waiting twice as long see= ms quite reasonable to me. That transaction is a valid transaction; it is not rubbish, junk or, s= pam. Under the current model with transaction bandwidth limitation, the lon= ger a transaction waits, the less likely it is ever to confirm due to risin= g transaction numbers and being pushed back by transactions with rising fees.

I argue that no transactions are rubbish or junk, only some zero fee t= ransactions might be spam. Having an ever-increasing number of valid transa= ctions that do not confirm as more new transactions with higher fees are cr= eated is the opposite of operating a robust, reliable transaction system.

Business cannot operate with a model where transactions may or may not= confirm. Even a business choosing a modest fee has no guarantee that their= valid transaction will not be shuffled down by new transactions to the rea= lm of never confirming after it is created. Consumers also will not accept this model as Bitcoin = expands. If Bitcoin cannot be a reliable payment system for confirmed trans= actions then consumers, by and large, will simply not accept the model once= they understand. Bitcoin will be a dirty payment system, and this will kill the value of Bitcoin.

Under the current system, a minority of transactions will eventually b= e the lucky few who have fees high enough to escape being pushed down the l= ist.

Once there are more than x transactions (transaction bandwidth limit) = every ten minutes, only those choosing twenty-minute confirmation (2 blocks= ) will have initially at most a fifty percent chance of ever having their p= ayment confirm. Presently, not even using fee recommendations can ensure a sufficiently high fee is p= aid to ensure transaction confirmation.

I also argue that the current auction model for limited transaction ba= ndwidth is wrong, is not suitable for a reliable transaction system and, is= wrong for Bitcoin. All transactions must confirm in due time. Currently, B= itcoin is not a safe way to send payments.

I do not believe that consumers and business are against paying fees, = even high fees. What is required is operational reliability.

This great issue needs to be resolved for the safety and reliability o= f Bitcoin. The time to resolve issues in commerce is before they become gre= at big issues. The time to resolve this issue is now. We must have the fore= sight to identify and resolve problems before they trip us over.=C2=A0 Simply doubling block sizes every= so often is reactionary and is not a reliable permanent solution. I have w= ritten a BIP proposal for a technical solution but, need your help to write= it up to an acceptable standard to be a full BIP.

I have formatted the following with markdown which is human readable s= o, I hope nobody minds. I have done as much with this proposal as I feel th= at I am able so far but continue to take your feedback.

# BIP Proposal: UTPFOTIB - Use Transaction Priority For Ordering Trans= actions In Blocks

## The problem:
Everybody wants value. Miners want to maximize revenue from fees (and = we presume, to minimize block size). Consumers need transaction reliability= and, (we presume) want low fees.

The current transaction bandwidth limit is a limiting factor for both.= As the operational safety of transactions is limited, so is consumer confi= dence as they realize the issue and, accordingly, uptake is limited. Fees a= re artificially inflated due to bandwidth limitations while failing to provide a full confirmation = service for all transactions.

Current fee recommendations provide no satisfaction for transaction re= liability and, as Bitcoin scales, this will worsen.

Bitcoin must be a fully scalable and reliable service, providing full = transaction confirmation for every valid transaction.

The possibility to send a transaction with a fee lower than one that i= s acceptable to allow eventual transaction confirmation should be removed f= rom the protocol and also from the user interface.

## Solution summary:
Provide each transaction with an individual transaction priority each = time before choosing transactions to include in the current block, the prio= rity being a function of the fee paid (on a curve), and the time waiting in= the transaction pool (also on a curve) out to n days (n=3D60 ?). The transaction priority to serve as= the likelihood of a transaction being included in the current block, and f= or determining the order in which transactions are tried to see if they wil= l be included.=C2=A0

Use a target block size. Determine the target block size using; curren= t transaction pool size x ( 1 / (144 x n days ) ) =3D number of transaction= s to be included in the current block. Broadcast the next target block size= with the current block when it is solved so that nodes know the next target block size for the block t= hat they are building on.

The curves used for the priority of transactions would have to be appr= opriate. Perhaps a mathematician with experience in probability can develop= the right formulae. My thinking is a steep curve. I suppose that the proba= bility of all transactions should probably account for a sufficient number of inclusions that the tar= get block size is met although, it may not always be. As a suggestion, cons= ider including some zero fee transactions to pad, highest BTC value first?<= br>

**Explanation of the operation of priority:**
> If transaction priority is, for example, a number between one (lo= w) and one-hundred (high) it can be directly understood as the percentage c= hance in one-hundred of a transaction being included in the block. Using pr= obability or likelihood infers that there is some function of random. If random (100) < transaction pr= iority then the transaction is included.

>To break it down further, if both the fee on a curve value and the= time waiting on a curve value are each a number between one and one-hundre= d, a rudimentary method may be to simply multiply those two numbers, to fin= d the priority number. For example, a middle fee transaction waiting thirty days (if n =3D 60 days) m= ay have a value of five for each part=C2=A0 (yes, just five, the values are= on a curve). When multiplied that will give a priority value of twenty-fiv= e, or,=C2=A0 a twenty-five percent chance at that moment of being included in the block; it will likely be included in = one of the next four blocks, getting more likely each chance. If it is stil= l not included then the value of time waiting will be higher, making for mo= re probability. A very low fee transaction would have a value for the fee of one. It would not be until near sixty-da= ys that the particular low fee transaction has a high likelihood of being i= ncluded in the block.

I am not concerned with low (or high) transaction fees, the primary re= ason for addressing the issue is to ensure transactional reliability and sc= alability while having each transaction confirm in due time.

## Pros:
* Maximizes transaction reliability.
* Fully scalable.
* Maximizes possibility for consumer and business uptake.
* Maximizes total fees paid per block without reducing reliability; be= cause of reliability, in time confidence and overall uptake are greater; th= erefore, more transactions.
* Market determines fee paid for transaction priority.
* Fee recommendations work all the way out to 30 days or greater.
* Provides additional block entropy; greater security since there is l= ess probability of predicting the next block.

## Cons:
* Could initially lower total transaction fees per block.
* Must be first be programmed.

## Solution operation:
This is a simplistic view of the operation. The actual operation will = need to be determined in a spec for the programmer.

1. Determine the target block size for the current block.
2. Assign a transaction priority to each transaction in the pool.
3. Select transactions to include in the current block using probabili= ty in transaction priority order until the target block size is met.
5. Solve block.
6. Broadcast the next target block size with the current block when it= is solved.
7. Block is received.
8. Block verification process.
9. Accept/reject block based on verification result.
10. Repeat.

## Closing comments:
It may be possible to verify blocks conform to the proposal by showing= that the probability for all transactions included in the block statistica= lly conforms to a probability distribution curve, *if* the individual trans= action priority can be recreated. I am not that deep into the mathematics; however, it may also b= e possible to use a similar method to do this just based on the fee, that s= tatistically, the blocks conform to a fee distribution. Any zero fee transa= ctions would have to be ignored. This solution needs a clever mathematician.

I implore, at the very least, that we use some method that validates f= ull transaction reliability and enables scalability of block sizes. If not = this proposal, an alternative.

Regards,
Damian Williamson


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