From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1BCB96C for ; Sun, 11 Dec 2016 01:07:09 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-io0-f171.google.com (mail-io0-f171.google.com [209.85.223.171]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BF3ECFD for ; Sun, 11 Dec 2016 01:07:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-io0-f171.google.com with SMTP id d9so117394054ioe.0 for ; Sat, 10 Dec 2016 17:07:07 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=bittorrent-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=D31BgW1hep6XSk3x3B2d+aW9nPYfzyxZYwTQYXFCnqE=; b=QoRe0BPNCiG/uCwXAete7KwIzhYUcAc5Nr5j5fqAiKNbYLE3VMsXLJZGA8m3Af9blg xXpLNudhYwZqg1kRdVv33VqOWtIrcpn2QBbfH4yGUvMrdEUWVYz7/pUQoJ/fvYfjW8XM /HBnBBcNcZj3f32+tptmneOfNjUlZmnx0gqq6+PtXUZOHAaNkWZxauaurub9SLC7h41y hhNdRMAYHYhtkMETkVk88CVlRdGQq2emuACkDL7QYtRtWusfMcJsX4LpBfHuK5sBNaeJ HYj/L/qURk5B1Z9HBEr+8T5QZsV7DCXAmTYW5b+SRNkrfpZiBa85txtQOzVrhlMrVERt XjLQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to; bh=D31BgW1hep6XSk3x3B2d+aW9nPYfzyxZYwTQYXFCnqE=; b=D7HDq+x+yHb2THSjBbViX3jjUJOK79J0gyz0PGWKHdFhYC2NeZGQ5zY49p6Vrbf13y sU3qHDi/OVBDe3R3QI5ZX65ZUBIVyH3gUmUlrUykJil3dNGpdJLurHOwqI/5Hu96/dbM oPo6aay1bLqF6aSy/pHkKc9l9YljyGkzJ/2v+0ZBzPmZZvata3B2NhQhuI5tqBza26oS ISHT1PicESodQoCqIom9JN8nc4Kni9ZJ+Y9dO1kNWMs3GrOXE3MeJqAaWcUmpqaMymbS sJCp4YvA5vaIkyvsAPapR5RT56+st+P/aBIabcTV2W242OocCPp1Z4rOmCH2IgjRcVbj NgeQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AKaTC02XlXkyQsX1OSMt0NmxKs6XabyMYqhrz78H/061PaQg9xsxviFBIK3/a3RHnE4ZBGZEIH20Idh877Qns3tu X-Received: by 10.107.35.147 with SMTP id j141mr23841553ioj.41.1481418427126; Sat, 10 Dec 2016 17:07:07 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.36.224.199 with HTTP; Sat, 10 Dec 2016 17:07:06 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: From: Bram Cohen Date: Sat, 10 Dec 2016 17:07:06 -0800 Message-ID: To: James Hilliard , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a114041f41cedae0543579bc6 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.4 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE, RCVD_IN_SORBS_SPAM autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Managing block size the same way we do difficulty (aka Block75) X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 11 Dec 2016 01:07:09 -0000 --001a114041f41cedae0543579bc6 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Miners individually have an incentive to include every transaction they can when they mine a block, but they also sometimes have an incentive to collectively cooperate to reduce throughput to make more money as a group. Under schemes where limits can be adjusted both possibilities must be taken into account. On Sat, Dec 10, 2016 at 4:40 PM, James Hilliard via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > Miners in general are naturally incentivized to always mine max size > blocks to maximize transaction fees simply because there is very > little marginal cost to including extra transactions(there will always > be a transaction backlog of some sort available to mine since demand > for block space is effectively unbounded as fees approach 0 and they > can even mine their own transactions without any fees). This proposal > would almost certainly cause runaway block size growth and encourage > much more miner centralization. > > On Sat, Dec 10, 2016 at 6:26 PM, t. khan via bitcoin-dev > wrote: > > Miners 'gaming' the Block75 system - > > There is no financial incentive for miners to attempt to game the Block= 75 > > system. Even if it were attempted and assuming the goal was to create > bigger > > blocks, the maximum possible increase would be 25% over the previous > block > > size. And, that size would only last for two weeks before readjusting > down. > > It would cost them more in transaction fees to stuff the network than > they > > could ever make up. To game the system, they'd have to game it forever > with > > no possibility of profit. > > > > Blocks would get too big - > > Eventually, blocks would get too big, but only if bandwidth stopped > > increasing and the cost of disk space stopped decreasing. Otherwise, th= e > > incremental adjustments made by Block75 (especially in combination with > > SegWit) wouldn't break anyone's connection or result in significantly > more > > orphaned blocks. > > > > The frequent and small adjustments made by Block75 have the added > benefit of > > being more easily adapted to, both psychologically and technologically, > with > > regards to miners/node operators. > > > > -t.k > > > > On Sat, Dec 10, 2016 at 5:44 AM, s7r via bitcoin-dev > > wrote: > >> > >> t. khan via bitcoin-dev wrote: > >> > BIP Proposal - Managing Bitcoin=E2=80=99s block size the same way we= do > >> > difficulty (aka Block75) > >> > > >> > The every two-week adjustment of difficulty has proven to be a > >> > reasonably effective and predictable way of managing how quickly > blocks > >> > are mined. Bitcoin needs a reasonably effective and predictable way = of > >> > managing the maximum block size. > >> > > >> > It=E2=80=99s clear at this point that human beings should not be inv= olved in > the > >> > determination of max block size, just as they=E2=80=99re not involve= d in > >> > deciding the difficulty. > >> > > >> > Instead of setting an arbitrary max block size (1MB, 2MB, 8MB, etc.) > or > >> > passing the decision to miners/pool operators, the max block size > should > >> > be adjusted every two weeks (2016 blocks) using a system similar to > how > >> > difficulty is calculated. > >> > > >> > Put another way: let=E2=80=99s stop thinking about what the max bloc= k size > >> > should be and start thinking about how full we want the average bloc= k > to > >> > be regardless of size. Over the last year, we=E2=80=99ve had average= s of 75% > or > >> > higher, so aiming for 75% full seems reasonable, hence naming this > >> > concept =E2=80=98Block75=E2=80=99. > >> > > >> > The target capacity over 2016 blocks would be 75%. If the last 2016 > >> > blocks are more than 75% full, add the difference to the max block > size. > >> > Like this: > >> > > >> > MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE =3D 1000000 > >> > TARGET_CAPACITY =3D 750000 > >> > AVERAGE_OVER_CAP =3D average block size of last 2016 blocks minus > >> > TARGET_CAPACITY > >> > > >> > To check if a block is valid, =E2=89=A4 (MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE + > AVERAGE_OVER_CAP) > >> > > >> > For example, if the last 2016 blocks are 85% full (average block is > 850 > >> > KB), add 10% to the max block size. The new max block size would be > >> > 1,100 KB until the next 2016 blocks are mined, then reset and > >> > recalculate. The 1,000,000 byte limit that exists currently would > >> > remain, but would effectively be the minimum max block size. > >> > > >> > Another two weeks goes by, the last 2016 blocks are again 85% full, > but > >> > now that means they average 935 KB out of the 1,100 KB max block siz= e. > >> > This is 93.5% of the 1,000,000 byte limit, so 18.5% would be added t= o > >> > that to make the new max block size of 1,185 KB. > >> > > >> > Another two weeks passes. This time, the average block is 1,050 KB. > The > >> > new max block size is calculated to 1,300 KB (as blocks were 105% > full, > >> > minus the 75% capacity target, so 30% added to max block size). > >> > > >> > Repeat every 2016 blocks, forever. > >> > > >> > If Block75 had been applied at the difficulty adjustment on November > >> > 18th, the max block size would have been 1,080KB, as the average blo= ck > >> > during that period was 83% full, so 8% is added to the 1,000KB limit= . > >> > The current size, after the December 2nd adjustment would be 1,150K. > >> > > >> > Block75 would allow the max block size to grow (or shrink) in respon= se > >> > to transaction volume, and does so predictably, reasonably quickly, > and > >> > in a method that prevents wild swings in block size or transaction > fees. > >> > It attempts to keep blocks at 75% total capacity over each two week > >> > period, the same way difficulty tries to keep blocks mined every ten > >> > minutes. It also keeps blocks as small as possible. > >> > > >> > Thoughts? > >> > > >> > -t.k. > >> > > >> > >> I like the idea. It is good wrt growing the max. block size > >> automatically without human action, but the main problem (or question) > >> is not how to grow this number, it is what number can the network > >> handle, considering both miners and users. While disk space requiremen= ts > >> might not be a big problem, block propagation time is. The time requir= ed > >> for a block to propagate in the network (or at least to all the miners= ) > >> is directly dependent of its size. If blocks take too much time to > >> propagate in the network, the orphan rate will increase in unpredictab= le > >> ways. For example if the internet speed in China is worse than in > >> Europe, and miners in China have more than 50% of the hashing power, > >> blocks mined by European miners might get orphaned. > >> > >> The system as described can also be gamed, by filling the network with > >> transactions. Miners have the monetary interest to include as many > >> transactions as possible in a block in order to collect the fees. > >> Regardless how you think about it, there has to be a maximum block siz= e > >> that the network will allow as a consensus rule. Increasing it > >> dynamically based on transaction volume will reach a point where the > >> number got big enough that it broke things. Bitcoin, because its > >> fundamental design, can scale by using offchain solutions. > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> bitcoin-dev mailing list > >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > >> > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > bitcoin-dev mailing list > > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > --001a114041f41cedae0543579bc6 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Miners individually have an incentive to include every tra= nsaction they can when they mine a block, but they also sometimes have an i= ncentive to collectively cooperate to reduce throughput to make more money = as a group. Under schemes where limits can be adjusted both possibilities m= ust be taken into account.

On Sat, Dec 10, 2016 at 4:40 PM, James Hilliard via bitcoi= n-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
Miners in general are natura= lly incentivized to always mine max size
blocks to maximize transaction fees simply because there is very
little marginal cost to including extra transactions(there will always
be a transaction backlog of some sort available to mine since demand
for block space is effectively unbounded as fees approach 0 and they
can even mine their own transactions without any fees). This proposal
would almost certainly cause runaway block size growth and encourage
much more miner centralization.

On Sat, Dec 10, 2016 at 6:26 PM, t. khan via bitcoin-dev
<bitcoin-dev@li= sts.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Miners 'gaming' the Block75 system -
> There is no financial incentive for miners to attempt to game the Bloc= k75
> system. Even if it were attempted and assuming the goal was to create = bigger
> blocks, the maximum possible increase would be 25% over the previous b= lock
> size. And, that size would only last for two weeks before readjusting = down.
> It would cost them more in transaction fees to stuff the network than = they
> could ever make up. To game the system, they'd have to game it for= ever with
> no possibility of profit.
>
> Blocks would get too big -
> Eventually, blocks would get too big, but only if bandwidth stopped > increasing and the cost of disk space stopped decreasing. Otherwise, t= he
> incremental adjustments made by Block75 (especially in combination wit= h
> SegWit) wouldn't break anyone's connection or result in signif= icantly more
> orphaned blocks.
>
> The frequent and small adjustments made by Block75 have the added bene= fit of
> being more easily adapted to, both psychologically and technologically= , with
> regards to miners/node operators.
>
> -t.k
>
> On Sat, Dec 10, 2016 at 5:44 AM, s7r via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-d= ev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>
>> t. khan via bitcoin-dev wrote:
>> > BIP Proposal - Managing Bitcoin=E2=80=99s block size the same= way we do
>> > difficulty (aka Block75)
>> >
>> > The every two-week adjustment of difficulty has proven to be = a
>> > reasonably effective and predictable way of managing how quic= kly blocks
>> > are mined. Bitcoin needs a reasonably effective and predictab= le way of
>> > managing the maximum block size.
>> >
>> > It=E2=80=99s clear at this point that human beings should not= be involved in the
>> > determination of max block size, just as they=E2=80=99re not = involved in
>> > deciding the difficulty.
>> >
>> > Instead of setting an arbitrary max block size (1MB, 2MB, 8MB= , etc.) or
>> > passing the decision to miners/pool operators, the max block = size should
>> > be adjusted every two weeks (2016 blocks) using a system simi= lar to how
>> > difficulty is calculated.
>> >
>> > Put another way: let=E2=80=99s stop thinking about what the m= ax block size
>> > should be and start thinking about how full we want the avera= ge block to
>> > be regardless of size. Over the last year, we=E2=80=99ve had = averages of 75% or
>> > higher, so aiming for 75% full seems reasonable, hence naming= this
>> > concept =E2=80=98Block75=E2=80=99.
>> >
>> > The target capacity over 2016 blocks would be 75%. If the las= t 2016
>> > blocks are more than 75% full, add the difference to the max = block size.
>> > Like this:
>> >
>> > MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE =3D 1000000
>> > TARGET_CAPACITY =3D 750000
>> > AVERAGE_OVER_CAP =3D average block size of last 2016 blocks m= inus
>> > TARGET_CAPACITY
>> >
>> > To check if a block is valid, =E2=89=A4 (MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE = + AVERAGE_OVER_CAP)
>> >
>> > For example, if the last 2016 blocks are 85% full (average bl= ock is 850
>> > KB), add 10% to the max block size. The new max block size wo= uld be
>> > 1,100 KB until the next 2016 blocks are mined, then reset and=
>> > recalculate. The 1,000,000 byte limit that exists currently w= ould
>> > remain, but would effectively be the minimum max block size.<= br> >> >
>> > Another two weeks goes by, the last 2016 blocks are again 85%= full, but
>> > now that means they average 935 KB out of the 1,100 KB max bl= ock size.
>> > This is 93.5% of the 1,000,000 byte limit, so 18.5% would be = added to
>> > that to make the new max block size of 1,185 KB.
>> >
>> > Another two weeks passes. This time, the average block is 1,0= 50 KB. The
>> > new max block size is calculated to 1,300 KB (as blocks were = 105% full,
>> > minus the 75% capacity target, so 30% added to max block size= ).
>> >
>> > Repeat every 2016 blocks, forever.
>> >
>> > If Block75 had been applied at the difficulty adjustment on N= ovember
>> > 18th, the max block size would have been 1,080KB, as the aver= age block
>> > during that period was 83% full, so 8% is added to the 1,000K= B limit.
>> > The current size, after the December 2nd adjustment would be = 1,150K.
>> >
>> > Block75 would allow the max block size to grow (or shrink) in= response
>> > to transaction volume, and does so predictably, reasonably qu= ickly, and
>> > in a method that prevents wild swings in block size or transa= ction fees.
>> > It attempts to keep blocks at 75% total capacity over each tw= o week
>> > period, the same way difficulty tries to keep blocks mined ev= ery ten
>> > minutes. It also keeps blocks as small as possible.
>> >
>> > Thoughts?
>> >
>> > -t.k.
>> >
>>
>> I like the idea. It is good wrt growing the max. block size
>> automatically without human action, but the main problem (or quest= ion)
>> is not how to grow this number, it is what number can the network<= br> >> handle, considering both miners and users. While disk space requir= ements
>> might not be a big problem, block propagation time is. The time re= quired
>> for a block to propagate in the network (or at least to all the mi= ners)
>> is directly dependent of its size.=C2=A0 If blocks take too much t= ime to
>> propagate in the network, the orphan rate will increase in unpredi= ctable
>> ways. For example if the internet speed in China is worse than in<= br> >> Europe, and miners in China have more than 50% of the hashing powe= r,
>> blocks mined by European miners might get orphaned.
>>
>> The system as described can also be gamed, by filling the network = with
>> transactions. Miners have the monetary interest to include as many=
>> transactions as possible in a block in order to collect the fees.<= br> >> Regardless how you think about it, there has to be a maximum block= size
>> that the network will allow as a consensus rule. Increasing it
>> dynamically based on transaction volume will reach a point where t= he
>> number got big enough that it broke things. Bitcoin, because its >> fundamental design, can scale by using offchain solutions.
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-d= ev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation= .org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@l= ists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
_______________________________________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org= /mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

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