From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5CD1B89E for ; Wed, 5 Aug 2015 10:52:00 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-la0-f47.google.com (mail-la0-f47.google.com [209.85.215.47]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8444230 for ; Wed, 5 Aug 2015 10:51:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: by labjt7 with SMTP id jt7so8428155lab.0 for ; Wed, 05 Aug 2015 03:51:57 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc:content-type; bh=3cNAj24PKLNg84afvRfrMltHf2984HHfOZi9gW9CI9s=; b=ncV755gBbU5iBk0FleyANx7sYhq4DgsA9DDHIXswPNFxSKFg7UDNxxEl9lS5uIQJ0Y zz2iXivYZD2Rof0aQ6Skb0QNkR1PxiK1hbMub0XvD6tng5nNIvHeyDl7X0bMbOot/jDS +2hZ55shdjSVsiGDARmR4ohxoSF4hkHyNqLC4aLBI4ZLDZwOjD1VkldyCih+VRpOyhiL jYxU8qwbw106YkdS3/I/syrlrcIJ6huYKjOHGulrm6H+ntT77TVVK4OO+60ctKOVr+Zs Zd9QtyE2u1MvoNd8dhwrQwYRvXD9k3AH2DDshwt0Eixwp51ZnCzttxkItBLlgLPe9H6G ZkpA== X-Received: by 10.112.148.130 with SMTP id ts2mr8692466lbb.17.1438771917579; Wed, 05 Aug 2015 03:51:57 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.25.22.25 with HTTP; Wed, 5 Aug 2015 03:51:37 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <1438640036.2828.0.camel@auspira.com> From: Hector Chu Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2015 11:51:37 +0100 Message-ID: To: Adam Back Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7b3a81ea0f6f71051c8e3192 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] "A Transaction Fee Market Exists Without a Block Size Limit"--new research paper suggests X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 05 Aug 2015 10:52:00 -0000 --047d7b3a81ea0f6f71051c8e3192 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On 5 August 2015 at 10:57, Adam Back wrote: > You may find the flexcap idea summarised in outline by Greg Maxwell > and Mark Friedenbach a month or so back interesting in showing that > one can achieve such effects without handing over a free vote to > miners and hence avoid many (though probably not all) of the > side-effects inherent in giving miners control. > The market I am thinking of would be open to all, not just miners. But miners would probably be best placed to profit from such a market, as it is their business to know about the revenue/costs tradeoff. About side-effects, I think we can make argument that there are limits > because other than in an extremis sense, miners are not necessarily in > alignment with security, nor maximising user utility and value > delivered. > If the block size was increasing at every settlement date (the dates on which, every 3 months say, the block size would be adjusted to the level indicated by the market) and users were getting concerned about centralization, the natural tendency would be for: a) The block size prediction market would tend to go back down. b) BTC/USD would tend to go down, reducing miner profit and indicating to them that the block size is too high. c) Transaction rate would decrease as some users stop using Bitcoin, also decreasing miner profit. --047d7b3a81ea0f6f71051c8e3192 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On 5= August 2015 at 10:57, Adam Back <adam@cypherspace.org> w= rote:
You may find the flexcap idea summa= rised in outline by Greg Maxwell
and Mark Friedenbach a month or so back interesting in showing that
one can achieve such effects without handing over a free vote to
miners and hence avoid many (though probably not all) of the
side-effects inherent in giving miners control.

The market I am thinking of would be open to all, not just miners.= But miners would probably be best placed to profit from such a market, as = it is their business to know about the revenue/costs tradeoff.
About side-effects, I think we can make argument that there are limits
because other than in an extremis sense, miners are not necessarily in
alignment with security, nor maximising user utility and value
delivered.

If the block size was increa= sing at every settlement date (the dates on which, every 3 months say, the = block size would be adjusted to the level indicated by the market) and user= s were getting concerned about centralization, the natural tendency would b= e for:
a) The block size prediction market would tend to go back = down.
b) BTC/USD would tend to go down, reducing miner profit and= indicating to them that the block size is too high.
c) Transacti= on rate would decrease as some users stop using Bitcoin, also decreasing mi= ner profit.
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