From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A8C1B411 for ; Fri, 4 Dec 2015 08:26:27 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ig0-f169.google.com (mail-ig0-f169.google.com [209.85.213.169]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 75BFC8F for ; Fri, 4 Dec 2015 08:26:23 +0000 (UTC) Received: by igcph11 with SMTP id ph11so28327025igc.1 for ; Fri, 04 Dec 2015 00:26:23 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:sender:date:message-id:subject:from:to:content-type; bh=ieYwut4f/ThACvTfljao0mXYPKU9w1kHiMPLEztKZ+c=; b=KV1yEYx2yDoyZDaPMLBLre8iUWG9N6ShGbTFBH3vJaEi8ZYJbo0TrMl4CwlKRc62j9 ibja4v4Hl8IWXX6C1l4KwrbKasaqVvIGudEqDREMfSxgCyMu2Fv9cXBAyYxIR5izfTiy P4JWotdpLyBU+65fFYH4/lJXKLZnGLGzgtOyZJNL+HVVW+PCcYVUwpcmRR6F4umqHU8w Opz5tkSTTSpCA2HO6AIx9Nn+FtHwvrXSpVGIrBoc7WLeFTrmun1gK4a10yf5BHJu+H44 awAdoFMvVKsD2vvzGlBKUtFNKzjOSiM/pByM9B6qjhIOvEmO3EZ3bEgcmk02AVn6k4Ao BHsQ== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.107.3 with SMTP id gy3mr2819679igb.48.1449217582993; Fri, 04 Dec 2015 00:26:22 -0800 (PST) Sender: gmaxwell@gmail.com Received: by 10.107.192.70 with HTTP; Fri, 4 Dec 2015 00:26:22 -0800 (PST) Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2015 08:26:22 +0000 X-Google-Sender-Auth: kwymZw0bjQ-jVqhX1Rdmyv9OkfU Message-ID: From: Gregory Maxwell To: Bitcoin Dev Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.6 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, FREEMAIL_FROM, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 04 Dec 2015 11:35:29 +0000 Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Blockchain verification flag (BIP draft) X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 04 Dec 2015 08:26:27 -0000 For discussion, A significant fraction of hashrate currently mines blocks without verifying them for a span of time after a new block shows up on the network for economically rational reasons. This otherwise harmful behavior can be made a beneficial to the whole network; but only if it is communicated. This BIP proposal suggests a communication channel and describes its use and the motivations for it. I wrote it in response to suggestions that Bitcoin Core add explicit support for this kind of mining, which could also implement best in class risk mitigations. I believe signaling the behavior is a necessary component for risk mitigation here. ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
  BIP: draft-maxwell-flagverify
  Title: Blockchain verification flag
  Author: Greg Maxwell 
  Status: Draft
  Type: Standards Track
  Created: 2015-12-02
==Abstract== This BIP describes a flag that the authors of blocks can use to voluntarily signal that they have completely validated the content of their block and the blocks before it. Correct use of this signaling is not enforced internally to the network but if used it can act as a hint allowing more intelligent risk analysis. If deployed and adhered to, this mechanism turns otherwise harmful validation skipping by miners into a behavior which benefits the public. ==Summary== The version field in a Bitcoin block header is a 32-bit signed integer. The most significant bit (30) of the block version is defined to signal that the author of the block has validated the whole chain up to and including the content of the block. Conforming miners MUST NOT set this flag when they have not completely validated the prior block(s) or the content of their own block. Miners should continue to try to minimize the amount of time spent mining on a non-validated chain. Blocks which extend an invalid chain will continue to be rejected and ultimately orphaned as validation catches up. It is recommended, but not required, that miners also not set the flag on blocks created by the same device which created the block immediately prior. This will reduce the incorrect implication of independent validation when the two most recent blocks are both the product of the same, single, faulty system. The set state for the bit is defined as verified so that that un(der)maintained systems do not falsely signal validation. Non-verifying clients of the network may check this bit (e.g. checking that the version is >= 1073741824) and use it as an input to their risk modeling. It is recommended that once this BIP is widely accepted by the network that non-full-node wallets refrain from counting confirmations on blocks where the bit is not set. The authors of non-verifying clients should keep in mind that this flag is only correct with the cooperation of the block author, and even then a validating miner may still accidentally accept or produce an invalid block due to faulty hardware or software. Additionally, any miner which correctly uses this flag could stop doing so at any time, and might do so intentionally in order to increase the effectiveness of an attack. As a result of misunderstanding, misconfiguration, laziness, or other human factors some miners may falsely set the flag. Because invalid blocks are rare it may take a long time to detect misuse of the flag. As such, the accuracy of this field MUST NOT be strongly relied upon. Especially due to the non-enforceability of the flag, the user community should keep in mind that both setting the flag correctly and mining without verification (for brief periods of time) are healthy for the network. If participants are punished for following this specification they will simply lie, and its utility will be diminished. ==Motivation== Some applications of the Bitcoin system such as thin-client wallets make a strong assumption that all the authors of the blocks have faithfully verified the blockchain. Because many of these applications also take irreversible actions based on only one or two confirmations and the time between blocks is often very short, these clients are vulnerable to even small and short-duration violations of this assumption. Processing and propagation delays resulting from increased transaction load contribute to block orphaning when multiple blocks are found at close to the same time. This has caused some miners to work on extending the chain with the most proof-of-work prior to validating the latest block(s). Although this validation skipping undermines the security assumptions of thin clients, it also has a beneficial effect: these delays also make the mining process unfair and cause increased rewards for the largest miners relative to other miners, resulting in a centralization pressure. Deferring validation can reduce this pressure and improve the security of the Bitcoin system long term. This BIP seeks to mitigate the harm of breaking the thin client assumption by allowing miners to efficiently provide additional information on their level of validation. By doing so the network can take advantage of the benefits of bypassed validation with minimal collateral damage. ==Deployment== Because there is no consensus enforced behavior there is no special deployment strategy required. [BIP 9 will need to be updated.] ==Credits== Thanks goes to Jeremy Rubin for his two-phase mining suggestion which inspired this simplified proposal. ==Copyright== This document is placed in the public domain.