From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 71C70EFD for ; Sat, 27 Jan 2018 19:06:44 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-vk0-f48.google.com (mail-vk0-f48.google.com [209.85.213.48]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D6F31E7 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 2018 19:06:43 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-vk0-f48.google.com with SMTP id j204so2232531vke.12 for ; Sat, 27 Jan 2018 11:06:43 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id :subject:to:content-transfer-encoding; bh=3R+f1EvhoCEV03adjGoUGiAHDHFoAyQh1OwpOAzx6Ss=; b=hZGht4qkYKkRLgcwX57ATm+FAtMQLzdFiWGO/ZypCMS6SgQc2E1Wz6znqHx1peAvSL MHtQx1z18X0euQ/3juxIa7DklR0SiyDm9jZEFW1euemgp2aeT5drWDJzSNglxr5mPpeL Q3zsFBTkw3HK+GYeXD4XgFaPPSD0SS/T2UzGy/s3PLm1FdfSGnDFxg38B4VcgF2v8ZuR d4I6Pk5dTVufBCZbVRrdq7Wx7R0rVfqxNzMpMbbIuiMC1cdSqCUkvi6qaEDe/mgt+mFC aakuj9hiS18sHioW00OB5ktF2CEPJovlNu8is/rVrw6BwklsyTdtj1kHbuE3Wh8Oqowq vEyA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:from :date:message-id:subject:to:content-transfer-encoding; bh=3R+f1EvhoCEV03adjGoUGiAHDHFoAyQh1OwpOAzx6Ss=; b=THJa+0uoBvuEaEXtuuTrQ+6EKtty5nJM1HJboJBQXdeu3TsPV82jg7xF0w4+Bs8q+0 PXaDnMxPA3wYC0aZWpZGZQRjtU7pu+vAowNRgsRaKhMohTKVrdU4rTmuruPL6hR7GMg2 9SvqgiwUf4u380N01+UNH91KDXE028gf/OiG5OAUhNxKOBPu7jgeE04lnBlMFr/Gkmc5 UgSVtEgpZMLsE9x5LGzkL4R1C3NIIxobA1Hh/lBNdod6FPiQTXoywNvfTfa0r+ZPK9Kz E2an2tZ1SB2NlaOqc7PLf0tzWpul/fMqh/zWlXOVSZjtL8EdsdCOS61LSkiawNqKya9+ eWuQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AKwxytc3OHK9GrGY9cI0r7K2kXinsPxS+BMYzWrilVT7fEVp5QWYNh+g oM55+5vwv173E2ft+jpSj4bBtpiGB/DtdXnDZhs= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AH8x227lPsmDnUsw39LFqtHdML61E4j8wPCQBIeUE4eNjIKbu5c1XkH1CI6EbwGnOeNaBqPHxafK9RW44GgdR81q7qw= X-Received: by 10.31.195.196 with SMTP id t187mr13138595vkf.182.1517080002953; Sat, 27 Jan 2018 11:06:42 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: gmaxwell@gmail.com Received: by 10.103.78.155 with HTTP; Sat, 27 Jan 2018 11:06:41 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: From: Gregory Maxwell Date: Sat, 27 Jan 2018 19:06:41 +0000 X-Google-Sender-Auth: Ht2aOHBFr7Yn_hVHuXb2oHZDw7Y Message-ID: To: Nathan Parker , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, FREEMAIL_FROM, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal: rewarding fees to next block miner X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 27 Jan 2018 19:06:44 -0000 Not incentive compatible. Miners would prefer to include transactions paying fees via alternative mechanisms (anyone can spend outputs, direct pay to miner outputs, or completely out of band), if they even paid attention to internal fees at all they would give a lot more weight to direct payment fees. Users would accordingly pay much lower fees if they used these alternatives instead of directly, so the equlibrium state is almost everyone bypassing. Bypass fee mechenisms have been supported by miners since 2011 too, so it isn't just conjecture. On Sat, Jan 27, 2018 at 8:45 AM, Nathan Parker via bitcoin-dev wrote: > Miners can fill their blocks with transactions paying very high fees at n= o > cost because they get the fees back to themselves. They can do this for > different purposes, like trying to increase the recommended fee. Here I > propose a backwards-compatible solution to this problem. > > The solution would be to reward the fees of the current block to the mine= r > of the next block (or X blocks after the current one). That way, if a min= er > floods its own block with very high fee transactions, those fees are no > longer given back to itself, but to the miner of future blocks which coul= d > potentially be anyone. Flooding blocks with fake txs is now discouraged. > However, filling blocks with real transactions paying real fees is still > encouraged because you could be the one to mine the block that would clai= m > this reward. > > The way to implement this in a backwards-compatible fashion would be to > enforce miners to set an anyone-can-spend output in the coinbase transact= ion > of the block (by adding this as a rule for verifying new blocks). The min= er > of 100 blocks after the current one can add a secondary transaction spend= ing > this block's anyone-can-spend coinbase transaction (due to the coinbase > needing 100 blocks to mature) and thus claiming the funds. This way, the > block reward of a block X is always transferred to the miner of block X+1= 00. > > Implementing this would require a soft-fork. Since that secondary > transaction needs no signature whatsoever, the overhead caused by that ex= tra > transaction is negligible. > > Possible Downside: When the fork is activated, the miners won=E2=80=99t g= et any > reward for mining blocks for a period of 100 blocks. They could choose to > power off the mining equipment for maintenance or to save power over that > period, so the hashrate could drop temporarily. However, if the hashrate > drops too much, blocks would take much longer to mine, and miners wouldn= =E2=80=99t > want that either since they want to go through those 100 reward-less bloc= ks > as soon as possible so they can start getting rewards from mining again. > > > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >