public inbox for bitcoindev@googlegroups.com
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell@gmail.com>
To: Luke-Jr <luke@dashjr.org>
Cc: Bitcoin Development <bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net>
Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] New side channel attack that can recover Bitcoin keys
Date: Sat, 8 Mar 2014 17:57:46 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAAS2fgTAwsXBZ-guU32KC4RL0ZKwmqW-TqqDS=qswSb88mgRMA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201403081934.12035.luke@dashjr.org>

On Sat, Mar 8, 2014 at 11:34 AM, Luke-Jr <luke@dashjr.org> wrote:
> On Wednesday, March 05, 2014 4:21:52 PM Kevin wrote:
>> How can we patch this issue?
> No need, it is not an issue for Bitcoin.
> Properly used, there is only ever one signature per public key.

Security shouldn't depend on perfect use.  There are many things that
result in multiple key use: Bitcoin address authentication (something
which the pool you created uses!), someone spamming you with multiple
payments to a common address which you didn't solicit (what, are you
just going to ignore the extra coins?), ... or just practical
considerations— I note the mining pool you founded continually pays a
single address for 'fall back' payments when it can't pay in the
coinbase transact, I know you consider that a bug, but its the reality
today.

Most security issues aren't the result of one problem but several
problems combined, so it's important to make each layer strong even if
the strength shouldn't be important due to proper use in other layers.

Fortunately, libsecp256k1 has a nearly constant time/constant memory
access multiply for signing which should reduce exposure substantially
(and is generally built in a way that reduces vulnerabilities).



  reply	other threads:[~2014-03-09  1:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-03-05 12:49 [Bitcoin-development] New side channel attack that can recover Bitcoin keys Mike Hearn
2014-03-05 12:56 ` Pieter Wuille
2014-03-05 13:18   ` Jean-Paul Kogelman
2014-03-05 14:04     ` Pieter Wuille
2014-03-05 16:21 ` Kevin
2014-03-05 19:39   ` Peter Todd
2014-03-05 19:51     ` Gregory Maxwell
2014-03-05 20:32       ` Peter Todd
2014-03-05 20:54         ` Gregory Maxwell
2014-03-12  9:44           ` Peter Todd
2014-03-05 22:17     ` James Hartig
2014-03-05 22:26       ` Eric Lombrozo
2014-03-06  7:02     ` Odinn Cyberguerrilla
2014-03-08 19:34   ` Luke-Jr
2014-03-09  1:57     ` Gregory Maxwell [this message]
2014-03-05 21:31 ` Eric Lombrozo
2014-03-05 21:44   ` Gregory Maxwell
2014-03-05 22:14     ` Eric Lombrozo
2014-03-05 22:25       ` Gregory Maxwell
2014-03-06  8:38         ` Mike Hearn
2014-03-06 10:00           ` Natanael
2014-03-25 13:39             ` Troy Benjegerdes
2014-03-25 13:50               ` Gavin Andresen
2014-03-08 19:29           ` Gustav Simonsson

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to='CAAS2fgTAwsXBZ-guU32KC4RL0ZKwmqW-TqqDS=qswSb88mgRMA@mail.gmail.com' \
    --to=gmaxwell@gmail.com \
    --cc=bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net \
    --cc=luke@dashjr.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox