From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E66728A5 for ; Sat, 28 Jan 2017 10:36:18 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-yw0-f182.google.com (mail-yw0-f182.google.com [209.85.161.182]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A81B288 for ; Sat, 28 Jan 2017 10:36:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-yw0-f182.google.com with SMTP id u68so31720513ywg.0 for ; Sat, 28 Jan 2017 02:36:17 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=821aY9B5JOBzOJ/DI8cqODdfOw3jHSqDumxyKUIgyY0=; b=dK6Xo9NazFljBZdSAmfnfFpBDP1lk0ZnNlH+FS1PL+Ca/ad+pY/ErpA8eTDB9MGwup PmyDzmqh2fHisWDfLa9KkizE1p0bi76BNQ6/nnAw/qmhPHUJCwouhdzFnC1RFo2CIgl9 mHkMBIPm4DmbT/EJLOI7Kv5wcRAa2F1H9gvRSS55qHaX+XQOGV7h7B2GmEkjqCAudF+e tacS9OJs9Ok/nkfRWFJJ0H4GdXDvp55If7TClpNRxEB9U6NUcKuIyqxe37ZE2w0jdrGM cQzlhNBa1HFKh3grETm+TBuS6VjQu2RsCadhoCYE/tXsqWY8+bJYBAQR4hNKrf+9KaSc /TiQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=821aY9B5JOBzOJ/DI8cqODdfOw3jHSqDumxyKUIgyY0=; b=hixnnNoJgmuB1TPt4dijYGDSY9T99CpZx7R1DqxjNbTfCAtx0b++i3bodW4WxQQ8yY Qag6ywgvwgJFFCllbdNtyZOfMILJe/rI+nK+yyqoijgoqqShB1l0xHMcYZzT11zSrUO8 LYVXDPwJilbv0jD2XRD3VSynviaN4MGbFGm+Fd9++0UQHzLK0dUeFGIBZkOgnNyEw4Xv JyRoLxnzgwg9UPrsZpgs+dQbyUcYu8XjIpr+kySmDtDGTDpRyKhZhlJArzH1bEjK+Ll7 CbT5gtOzZS4KLd4dYNzL59WJqWc3kNZttoe1FRazsxHQ9HGuJGYFo06T6XMXMAE1Iw+j QHgg== X-Gm-Message-State: AIkVDXJ1OFlZdx072kGlvDujBN0juIeztG0fWcGKMbllRXHegDzbT4vmPVMHS6fexIjhhL5XfxdBQji0yMF0SQ== X-Received: by 10.13.222.68 with SMTP id h65mr8139323ywe.197.1485599776940; Sat, 28 Jan 2017 02:36:16 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.37.75.67 with HTTP; Sat, 28 Jan 2017 02:36:16 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.37.75.67 with HTTP; Sat, 28 Jan 2017 02:36:16 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: <201701280403.05558.luke@dashjr.org> References: <201701270107.01092.luke@dashjr.org> <20170127212810.GA5856@nex> <201701280403.05558.luke@dashjr.org> From: Natanael Date: Sat, 28 Jan 2017 11:36:16 +0100 Message-ID: To: Luke Dashjr , Bitcoin Dev Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=94eb2c07cfc0fbaa92054725269e X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.5 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE, RCVD_IN_SORBS_SPAM autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Three hardfork-related BIPs X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 28 Jan 2017 10:36:19 -0000 --94eb2c07cfc0fbaa92054725269e Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Den 28 jan. 2017 05:04 skrev "Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev" < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>: Satoshi envisioned a system where full nodes could publish proofs of invalid blocks that would be automatically verified by SPV nodes and used to ensure even they maintained the equivalent of full node security so long as they were not isolated. But as a matter of fact, this vision has proven impossible, and there is to date no viable theory on how it might be fixed. As a result, the only way for nodes to have full-node-security is to actually be a true full node, and therefore the plan of only having full nodes in datacenters is simply not realistic without transforming Bitcoin into a centralised system. Beside Zero-knowledge proofs, which is capable of proving much so more than just validity, there are multi types of fraud proofs that only rely on the format of the blocks. Such as publishing the block header + the two colliding transactions included in it (in the case of double spending), or if the syntax or logic is broken then you just publish that single transaction. There aren't all that many cases where fraud proofs are unreasonably large for a networked system like in Bitcoin. If Zero-knowledge proofs can be applied securely, then I can't think of any exceptions at all for when the proofs would be unmanageable. (Remember that full Zero-knowledge proofs can be chained together!) --94eb2c07cfc0fbaa92054725269e Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


Den 28 jan. 2017 05:04 skrev "Luke Dashjr via bitcoi= n-dev" <bi= tcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>:
Satosh= i envisioned a system where full nodes could publish proofs of invalid
blocks that would be automatically verified by SPV nodes and used to ensure=
even they maintained the equivalent of full node security so long as they w= ere
not isolated. But as a matter of fact, this vision has proven impossible, a= nd
there is to date no viable theory on how it might be fixed. As a result, th= e
only way for nodes to have full-node-security is to actually be a true full=
node, and therefore the plan of only having full nodes in datacenters is simply not realistic without transforming Bitcoin into a centralised system= .

Beside Zero-knowledge proofs, which is capable= of proving much so more than just validity, there are multi types of fraud= proofs that only rely on the format of the blocks. Such as publishing the = block header + the two colliding transactions included in it (in the case o= f double spending), or if the syntax or logic is broken then you just publi= sh that single transaction.=C2=A0

There aren't all =C2=A0that many cases where fraud proofs are= unreasonably large for a networked system like in Bitcoin. If Zero-knowled= ge proofs can be applied securely, then I can't think of any exceptions= at all for when the proofs would be unmanageable. (Remember that full Zero= -knowledge proofs can be chained together!)=C2=A0

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