From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C86F2AAE for ; Tue, 30 Jun 2015 01:10:25 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-la0-f50.google.com (mail-la0-f50.google.com [209.85.215.50]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1A21932 for ; Tue, 30 Jun 2015 01:10:25 +0000 (UTC) Received: by lagc2 with SMTP id c2so29805597lag.3 for ; Mon, 29 Jun 2015 18:10:23 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=RX0DoVi6X9TYoiVglml/iQHB2C/6vuyAlp8HQtS/BYc=; b=coXOSVxrUbz3qORS+Xden+TKx+d4rlkArKb3gpiqf2RIBi7MU8crT8sFgwoLGF2Ram +TAkWTKphl/p7TIr2XzUO7ZbRHxh4WWenCw5vmZ0RZ0WB7qLsrWwisiUmJUzC/aE7LaT nVlVJwWBM47oN1LVOTnNcsDBI2bkzSTsflH4RoSL5R4/t3EHZ69ThPKFiGb3AHzeGzoN 6Dd7NXSkX4QteVSeXC5B39qXI9Y/ewQVi9/6aNGxYRk1cjknfQwHeTRXLbAxLVtmLCoh x8WJ83eDOqfZE3K9SSir4pn+7So4bLo/VOXc5V2Cnp4iLM3M4cDiTL01S+51vGxdqCxQ qUFw== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.152.43.134 with SMTP id w6mr15313059lal.120.1435626623634; Mon, 29 Jun 2015 18:10:23 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.114.184.175 with HTTP; Mon, 29 Jun 2015 18:10:23 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.114.184.175 with HTTP; Mon, 29 Jun 2015 18:10:23 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <5591EA1B.1050709@thinlink.com> References: <20150629050726.GA502@savin.petertodd.org> <5591E10F.9000008@thinlink.com> <5591EA1B.1050709@thinlink.com> Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2015 03:10:23 +0200 Message-ID: From: Natanael To: Tom Harding Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c1a808ee97620519b1de36 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP: Full Replace-by-Fee deployment schedule X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2015 01:10:25 -0000 --001a11c1a808ee97620519b1de36 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Den 30 jun 2015 03:00 skrev "Tom Harding" : > > On 6/29/2015 5:51 PM, Natanael wrote: >> >> What you ask to see implemented will trivially fall to a sybil attack. It isn't securable. It is running on the honor system exclusively. It will be attacked, it will fail, losses will be had, the attackers will walk away with embarrassingly large sums. > > > Oh please. Checking that a node does relay something is not much different than banning it for relaying garbage. > > It just happens to require that you have two nodes and coordinate them somehow. I didn't offer a complete design, don't claim magical properties, and certainly didn't mean to imply that nodes passing a test could be trusted (as you suggest with your "accountable parties"). But the check means nothing at all to you since no information which you can learn from doing so can be trusted for use in decision making of any kind, so why do it? Unless you pay for hosting of that particular node which you test, you have no reason to care for any reason other than simple statistics. The claims I made is based on simple economic analysis - if *to be able to attack* first requires effort and risk that exceed the payoff, you're unlikely to try. Being legally accountable and identified in advance and having to build reputation before being trusted with attack-worthy sums is strongly discouraging. --001a11c1a808ee97620519b1de36 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


Den 30 jun 2015 03:00 skrev "Tom Harding" <tomh@thinlink.com>:
>
> On 6/29/2015 5:51 PM, Natanael wrote:
>>
>> What you ask to see implemented will trivially fall to a sybil att= ack. It isn't securable. It is running on the honor system exclusively.= It will be attacked, it will fail, losses will be had, the attackers will = walk away with embarrassingly large sums.
>
>
> Oh please.=C2=A0 Checking that a node does relay something is not much= different than banning it for relaying garbage.
>
> It just happens to require that you have two nodes and coordinate them= somehow.=C2=A0 I didn't offer a complete design, don't claim magic= al properties, and certainly didn't mean to imply that nodes passing a = test could be trusted (as you suggest with your "accountable parties&q= uot;).

But the check means nothing at all to you since no informati= on which you can learn from doing so can be trusted for use in decision mak= ing of any kind, so why do it? Unless you pay for hosting of that particula= r node which you test, you have no reason to care for any reason other than= simple statistics.

The claims I made is based on simple economic analysis - if = *to be able to attack* first requires effort and risk that exceed the payof= f, you're unlikely to try. Being legally accountable and identified in = advance and having to build reputation before being trusted with attack-wor= thy sums is strongly discouraging.

--001a11c1a808ee97620519b1de36--