From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.osuosl.org (smtp1.osuosl.org [140.211.166.138]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id DA56AC0001 for ; Sat, 8 May 2021 15:22:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp1.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B1DE183D62 for ; Sat, 8 May 2021 15:22:09 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: 0.112 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.112 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_50=0.8, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, T_SPF_PERMERROR=0.01] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no Received: from smtp1.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp1.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id YP74__ZsfIOR for ; Sat, 8 May 2021 15:22:08 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 Received: from smtp.hosts.co.uk (smtp.hosts.co.uk [85.233.160.19]) by smtp1.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3728883D51 for ; Sat, 8 May 2021 15:22:07 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-lf1-f48.google.com ([209.85.167.48]) by smtp.hosts.co.uk with esmtpsa (TLS1.3:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim) (envelope-from ) id 1lfOmL-00045x-Di for bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org; Sat, 08 May 2021 16:22:06 +0100 Received: by mail-lf1-f48.google.com with SMTP id 124so16989763lff.5 for ; Sat, 08 May 2021 08:22:04 -0700 (PDT) X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533HP1dmjXFE74EjNNbWmeq5wUIlG7mRASEjUmel1eym9EZlFHAV 8oyRywGQivozyLd6R96p+TtOLpz2uijN1MYURMY= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJz1tErqTft4+IOhALoWKx3ajzPKz9FonyN98fZdWN6O/K5T/4b7rTZevUCrifUjyvvhyJvmg1uRyo0EETz5Wek= X-Received: by 2002:a05:6512:104d:: with SMTP id c13mr10355228lfb.59.1620487324019; Sat, 08 May 2021 08:22:04 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 From: =?UTF-8?Q?BitPLATES=C2=AE_=28Chris=29?= Date: Sat, 8 May 2021 16:21:51 +0100 X-Gmail-Original-Message-ID: Message-ID: To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000004fb17b05c1d31bc0" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Sat, 08 May 2021 15:24:00 +0000 Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Proposal for an Informational BIP X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 08 May 2021 15:22:10 -0000 --0000000000004fb17b05c1d31bc0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi, I'd like to submit an idea for review, as a potential informational BIP (Bitcoin Improvement Proposal), describing an optional method of producing a BIP39 passphrase, using only BIP39 'mnemonic' seed words. The idea specifically refers to a method of introducing two-factor authentication, to protect a Bitcoin wallet using only 24 seed words, and therefore, providing plausible deniability about the existence of this separate 2nd layer passphrase. I've suggested the name 'quantum' passphrase to be used casually as a unique identifier. The data stored within a 'quantum' passphrase, is simultaneously the minimum required data for reproducing a BIP39-compatible 24-word seed mnemonic... hence, the name 'quantum' seems fitting, to reflect the multiple simultaneous states of data. Abstract... This improvement proposal describes the use of twenty four, newly generated BIP39 seed words, to produce a '25th-word' BIP39-compatible 'quantum' passphrase. Two-factor authentication (2FA) or (2 of 2 multi-signature) can be implemented with a two-wallet setup: The 1st Bitcoin wallet is protected by the seed words of the 2nd Bitcoin wallet; inversely, the 2nd Bitcoin wallet is protected by the seed words of the 1st Bitcoin wallet. The 'quantum' passphrase offers an exponential increase in the level of protection, as that offered by the original BIP39 mnemonic seed words (=E2=89=882048^23 possible combinations). ie. A Bitcoin wallet with a 2nd layer 'quantum'passphrase is protected by 2048^23 to the power of 2048^23 possible combinations. With existing computer capabilities, this level of protection is far greater than required; however, this does provide a sufficient level of protection for each separate layer of a two-factor Bitcoin wallet, should any one layer be accidentally exposed. This method of passphrase generation, consists of two parts: 1st - generating the BIP39 mnemonic seed words, using a BIP39-compatible hardware wallet. 2nd - Converting these seed words into the 'quantum' passphrase, following four simple rules, which most importantly, do not destroy the integrity of the initial data. Motivation... The well established practice of preserving up to 24 seed words for the purpose of reproduction of a Bitcoin wallet, suffers from a major flaw... Exposure of these mnemonic seed words can cause catastrophic loss of funds without adequate multi-factor protection. Whilst it is recognised that a number of multi-factor solutions are available (including the standard BIP39 passphrase, and hardware wallet multi-signature functionality), this proposal aims to provide an extremely safe and secure 'low-tech' option, that requires minimal (non-destructive) adjustments to the seed words. Furthermore, the 'quantum' passphrase offers a number advantages over the existing methods of multi-factor protection: Firstly, this method of creating a passphrase leaves no evidence of its existence on any backup devices, providing plausible deniability in case of coercion. This is because the passphrase is easily created from a genuine 24 seed word mnemonic; therefore, the physical backup of the passphrase can be disguised as a simple Bitcoin wallet on a metal backup plate. It presents a way of discouraging user-created words or sentences (also known as 'brain-wallets'), which often provide a drastically reduced level of passphrase security, unbeknown to many users. The large amount of data required to produce a 'quantum' passphrase (up to 96 characters long), encourages the physical backup of the passphrase. Furthermore, the use of BIP39-only words provides a higher degree of standardization, which can help to avoid potential mistakes made by creating unnecessarily complicated combinations of letters, numbers and symbols. Increased complication (disorderly, and non-human-friendly), does not always equal increased complexity (orderly, and more human-friendly), or increased security. As previously mentioned, a two-wallet configuration provides the user an opportunity to safely split the two factors of protection (equivalent to a 2 of 2 'multi-sig' setup). If a BIP39-compatible passphrase is created using a new set of 24 seed words, it provides 76 degrees of extra complexity (ie. 1 with 76 zeros, or 10=E2=81=B7=E2=81=B6 possible combinations of words). The strength of this 2nd factor solution, provides adequate risk-management, when considering the production of multiple backup devices, strategically stored in multiple geographical locations. Generating the 'quantum' passphrase... Following just four (non-destructive) BIP39-compatible rules, the 24 seed words can also function as a 'quantum' passphrase: 1 . Only BIP39 words (Standard list of 2048 English words - other languages should be compatible= ) 2 . Only the first four letters of each word (BIP39 words require only this data for reproduction) 3 . Only upper case letters (All alphabet references use this standard format) 4 . No spaces between words (Spaces represent an additional unit of data, that is not recorded) In essence, the 'quantum' passphrase is simply a single string of all 24 seed words, set out using the above rules. I welcome a productive technical discussion. Thanks, Chris Johnston --0000000000004fb17b05c1d31bc0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi,

I'd = like to submit an idea for review, as a potential informational BIP (Bitcoi= n Improvement Proposal), describing an optional method of producing a BIP39= passphrase, using only BIP39 'mnemonic' seed words.

The idea specifically refers to a met= hod of introducing two-factor authentication, to protect a Bitcoin wallet u= sing only 24 seed words, and therefore, providing plausible deniability abo= ut the existence of this separate 2nd layer passphrase.

I've suggested the name 'quantum= 9; passphrase to be used casually as a unique identifier.

The data stored within a 'quantum'= ; passphrase, is simultaneously the minimum required data for reproducing a= BIP39-compatible 24-word seed mnemonic... hence, the name 'quantum'= ; seems fitting, to reflect the multiple simultaneous states of data.
=

Abstract...=

This improvement propos= al describes the use of twenty four, newly generated BIP39 seed words, to p= roduce a '25th-word' BIP39-compatible 'quantum' passphrase.=

Two-factor authenticati= on (2FA) or (2 of 2 multi-signature) can be implemented with a two-wallet s= etup:

The 1st Bitcoin wa= llet is protected by the seed words of the 2nd Bitcoin wallet; inversely, t= he 2nd Bitcoin wallet is protected by the seed words of the 1st Bitcoin wal= let.

The 'quantum= 9; passphrase offers an exponential increase in the level of protection, as= that offered by the original BIP39 mnemonic seed words (=E2=89=882048^23 p= ossible combinations).

i= e. A Bitcoin wallet with a 2nd layer 'quantum'passphrase is protect= ed by 2048^23 to the power of 2048^23 possible combinations.

With existing computer capabilities, = this level of protection is far greater than required; however, this does p= rovide a sufficient level of protection for each separate layer of a two-fa= ctor Bitcoin wallet, should any one layer be accidentally exposed.

This method of passphrase genera= tion, consists of two parts:

1st - generating the BIP39 mnemonic seed words, using a BIP39-compatib= le hardware wallet.

2nd = - Converting these seed words into the 'quantum' passphrase, follow= ing four simple rules, which most importantly, do not destroy the integrity= of the initial data.

Mo= tivation...

The well est= ablished practice of preserving up to 24 seed words for the purpose of repr= oduction of a Bitcoin wallet, suffers from a major flaw... Exposure of thes= e mnemonic seed words can cause catastrophic loss of funds without adequate= multi-factor protection.

Whilst it is recognised that a number of multi-factor solutions are avail= able (including the standard BIP39 passphrase, and hardware wallet multi-si= gnature functionality), this proposal aims to provide an extremely safe and= secure 'low-tech' option, that requires minimal (non-destructive) = adjustments to the seed words.

Furthermore, the 'quantum' passphrase offers a number advant= ages over the existing methods of multi-factor protection:

Firstly, this method of creating a passp= hrase leaves no evidence of its existence on any backup devices, providing = plausible deniability in case of coercion.

This is because the passphrase is easily created from a = genuine 24 seed word mnemonic; therefore, the physical backup of the passph= rase can be disguised as a simple Bitcoin wallet on a metal backup plate.

It presents a way of disc= ouraging user-created words or sentences (also known as 'brain-wallets&= #39;), which often provide a drastically reduced level of passphrase securi= ty, unbeknown to many users.

The large amount of data required to produce a 'quantum' passp= hrase (up to 96 characters long), encourages the physical backup of the pas= sphrase.

Furthermore, th= e use of BIP39-only words provides a higher degree of standardization, whic= h can help to avoid potential mistakes made by creating unnecessarily compl= icated combinations of letters, numbers and symbols. Increased complication= (disorderly, and non-human-friendly), does not always equal increased comp= lexity (orderly, and more human-friendly), or increased security.

As previously mentioned, a two-wa= llet configuration provides the user an opportunity to safely split the two= factors of protection (equivalent to a 2 of 2 'multi-sig' setup).<= /div>

If a BIP39-compatible pa= ssphrase is created using a new set of 24 seed words, it provides 76 degree= s of extra complexity (ie. 1 with 76 zeros, or 10=E2=81=B7=E2=81=B6 possibl= e combinations of words).

The strength of this 2nd factor solution, provides adequate risk-manageme= nt, when considering the production of multiple backup devices, strategical= ly stored in multiple geographical locations.

Generating the 'quantum' passphrase...
<= div dir=3D"auto">
Following just four (non-destr= uctive) BIP39-compatible rules, the 24 seed words can also function as a &#= 39;quantum' passphrase:

1 . Only BIP39 words
(Standard list of 2048 Engl= ish words - other languages should be compatible)
2 . Only the first four letters of each word
(BIP39 words require only this data for reproduction)

3 . Only upper case letter= s
(All alphabet references use this standard format)=

4 . No spaces between w= ords
(Spaces represent an additional unit of data, t= hat is not recorded)

In = essence, the 'quantum' passphrase is simply a single string of all = 24 seed words, set out using the above rules.

I welcome a productive technical discussion.

Thanks,
<= br>
Chris Johnston

=

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