Thanks for your comments Luke.

> Are you saying your proposal is intentionally not intended to reflect the
reality?

That's right. I want to be able to include more voices and be able to get a clearer idea of acceptance then the process currently has available.

This process should work alongside the current one; not replace it.

> conditions under which a proposal is *known to be* accepted by the community

*known to be* Is what I'm working towards; yes; but I think we need additional tools/processes to determine that then what we currently have available.

> As mentioned, IMO a committee shouldn't be indicating acceptance, as much as
it should be *determining* acceptance.

The committee determine acceptance when taking their opinions in aggregate. The source of their indication might be similar to what we currently have (esp for Core Devs, etc.)

> That sounds very time consuming

Ok

> And what happens if these committees don't represent the community?

The committee structures are fluid-- that is users are able to re-organize at any time.

> What about when only part of the community - let's say 10% - decides to adopt a BIP that doesn't require consensus

This might happen, but is not a flaw in my process. My process makes it clear they are going against the acceptance of the rest of the community. I don't intend to "force" anyone to implement or use an accepted BIP. If that is desired that's outside the scope of this BIP.

> But the Bitcoin user base is completely unknown, and tracking software user base is a privacy violation.

I made a suggestion for this here: https://gist.github.com/andychase/dddb83c294295879308b

If there are other ways for honest but anonymous voting mechanisms (that aren't proof-of-stake since that's proof-of-most-money) I'd be all ears.

> Bitcoin economic activity is also unknown
> This needs a proper specification. How do miners express their positions?

I agree these are flaws in the proposal. I'm not sure that one way of indicating should be considered valid forever, but may have to change over time.

> Chosen how, and by whom?

I think the process could be used to determine this.

> but I don't think we can just let the author set any conditions they like either

I'm not sure what you mean here but would love more information.

On Mon, Jan 18, 2016 at 6:12 PM, Luke Dashjr <luke@dashjr.org> wrote:
On Saturday, September 05, 2015 9:19:51 PM Andy Chase wrote:
> Okay for sure yeah writing another proposal that reflects the current state
> of affairs as people see it might provide some interesting perspective on
> this proposal. I would welcome that.

Are you saying your proposal is intentionally not intended to reflect the
reality? I wasn't talking about a "current state of affairs" for BIPs as much
as that that the acceptance of BIPs is *defined by* the state of affairs.

Overall, I think something *similar to* this proposal is a good idea, but I
disagree with how this proposal currently approaches the problem. Instead,
what I would recommend is a specification based on BIP 123 that specifies the
conditions under which a proposal is *known to be* accepted by the community
(ie, discerning, not deciding), and establishes a way for a committee to
review the BIP and *determine* if these conditions have been met. This would
avoid a "disconnect" between the "official status" and reality, making the BIP
process more useful to everyone.

Reviewing your current proposal:

> * It sets up '''committees''' for reviewing comments and indicating
> acceptance under precise conditions.

As mentioned, IMO a committee shouldn't be indicating acceptance, as much as
it should be *determining* acceptance.

> ** Committees are authorized groups that represent client authors, miners,
> merchants, and users (each as a segment). Each one must represent at least
> 1% stake in the Bitcoin ecosystem.

1% seems like an awful lot to dedicate to BIP status changes.

> A committee system is used to organize the essential concerns of each
> segment of the Bitcoin ecosystem. Although each segment may have many
> different viewpoints on each BIP, in order to seek a decisive yes/no on a
> BIP, a representational authoritative structure is sought. This structure
> should be fluid, allowing people to move away from committees that do not
> reflect their views and should be re-validated on each BIP evaluation.

That sounds very time consuming. And what happens if these committees don't
represent the community? What about when only part of the community - let's
say 10% - decides to adopt a BIP that doesn't require consensus? Logically
that BIP should still proceed...

> ** Proof of claim and minimum 1% stake via:
> *** Software: proof of ownership and user base (Min 1% of Bitcoin userbase)

But the Bitcoin user base is completely unknown, and tracking software user
base is a privacy violation.

> ** Merchant: proof of economic activity (Min 1% of Bitcoin economic
> activity)

Bitcoin economic activity is also unknown, and it seems likely that merchants
consider their own activity confidential.

> Mining: proof of work (Min 1% of Hashpower)

This needs a proper specification. How do miners express their positions?

> A BIP Process Manager should be chosen who is in charge of:

Chosen how, and by whom?

> == Conditions for activation ==
>
> In order for this process BIP to become active, it must succeed by its own
> rules. At least a 4% sample of the Bitcoin community must be represented,
> with at least one committee in each segment included. Once at least one
> committee has submitted a declaration, a request for comments will be called
> and the process should be completed from there.

Until this BIP is active, its rules do not apply, so this would be a form of
circular reasoning. I like the idea of putting conditions for activation in
the BIP text, but I don't think we can just let the author set any conditions
they like either...

Luke