From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-4.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Xqt9F-0006IL-PZ for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 19 Nov 2014 00:29:29 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.218.43 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.218.43; envelope-from=ctpacia@gmail.com; helo=mail-oi0-f43.google.com; Received: from mail-oi0-f43.google.com ([209.85.218.43]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Xqt9D-0003nJ-Dt for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 19 Nov 2014 00:29:29 +0000 Received: by mail-oi0-f43.google.com with SMTP id a3so6811530oib.16 for ; Tue, 18 Nov 2014 16:29:22 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.202.227.73 with SMTP id a70mr9992313oih.59.1416349992842; Tue, 18 Nov 2014 14:33:12 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.60.155.103 with HTTP; Tue, 18 Nov 2014 14:33:12 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.60.155.103 with HTTP; Tue, 18 Nov 2014 14:33:12 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: <201411161724.19573.luke@dashjr.org> <5469692F.9030702@gmail.com> <5469EAA5.1020606@gmail.com> Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2014 17:33:12 -0500 Message-ID: From: Chris Pacia To: Pieter Wuille Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a114093d2337c92050829ae85 X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (ctpacia[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1Xqt9D-0003nJ-Dt Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Increasing the OP_RETURN maximum payload size X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2014 00:29:30 -0000 --001a114093d2337c92050829ae85 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Nov 17, 2014 7:39 AM, "Pieter Wuille" wrote: > That is inevitable for any wallet that offers any functionality beyond > just maintaining a balance and the ability to send coins. In > particular, anything that wishes to list previous transaction (with > timestamps, history, metadata, messages sent using t > What HD wallets (or any type of deterministic derivation scheme) offer > is the fact that you can separate secret data and public data. You > only need one safe backup of the master secret key - all the rest can > at most result in privacy loss and not in lost coins. > > -- > Pieter I agree but right now wallets not using stealth will only lose metadata, not coins, if their computer crashes and they have the seed backed up. But if a user wants to upgrade to stealth, they then risk losing metadata AND coins if they either didn't manually back up after every transaction or use a centralized cloud backup service. That's if OP_RETURN is not utilized for storage. --001a114093d2337c92050829ae85 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8


On Nov 17, 2014 7:39 AM, "Pieter Wuille" <pieter.wuille@gmail.com> wrote:

> That is inevitable for any wallet that offers any functionality beyond
> just maintaining a balance and the ability to send coins. In
> particular, anything that wishes to list previous transaction (with
> timestamps, history, metadata, messages sent using t
> What HD wallets (or any type of deterministic derivation scheme) offer
> is the fact that you can separate secret data and public data. You
> only need one safe backup of the master secret key - all the rest can
> at most result in privacy loss and not in lost coins.
>
> --
> Pieter

I agree but right now wallets not using stealth will only lose metadata, not coins, if their computer crashes and they have the seed backed up.

But if a user wants to upgrade to stealth, they then risk losing metadata AND coins if they either didn't manually back up after every transaction or use a centralized cloud backup service.

That's if OP_RETURN is not utilized for storage.

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