From: Greg Sanders <gsanders87@gmail.com>
To: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>,
Bitcoin Protocol Discussion
<bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Playing with full-rbf peers for fun and L2s security
Date: Fri, 8 Jul 2022 11:09:33 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAB3F3DtCuEBXo9r+UoS2z8npvVeR0hU-R7ZHcngPNdE6Jr+Zgw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YshE2QKBEVnbf+Bg@petertodd.org>
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The attacker isn't guaranteed to spend *any* funds to disrupt the protocol
indefinitely, that's the issue here. In this scenario, her input double
spend is at an impractical feerate, and is never included in a block,
sitting at the bottom of the mempool.
The other users' only practical choice is to double-spend their own input
to get their money back(at competitive rates much higher than the
attacker), or wait and hope you win a propagation race somewhere.
On Fri, Jul 8, 2022 at 10:53 AM Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Jul 05, 2022 at 08:46:51PM +0000, alicexbt wrote:
> > Hi Peter,
> >
> > > Note that Wasabi already has a DoS attack vector in that a participant
> can stop
> > > participating after the first phase of the round, with the result that
> the
> > > coinjoin fails. Wasabi mitigates that by punishing participating in
> future
> > > rounds. Double-spends only create additional types of DoS attack that
> need to
> > > be detected and punished as well - they don't create a fundamentally
> new
> > > vulerability.
> >
> > I agree some DoS vectors are already mitigated however punishment in
> this case will be difficult because the transaction is broadcasted after
> signing and before coinjoin tx broadcast.
> >
> > Inputs are already checked multiple times for double spend during
> coinjoin round: https://github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasabi/pull/6460
> >
> > If all the inputs in the coinjoin transaction that failed to relay are
> checked and one or more are found to be spent later, what will be punished
> and how does this affect the attacker with thousands of UTXOs or normal
> users?
>
> Point is, the attacker is thousands of UTXOs can also DoS rounds by simply
> failing to complete the round. In fact, the double-spend DoS attack
> requires
> more resources, because for a double-spend to be succesful, BTC has to be
> spent
> on fees.
>
> It's just a fact of life that a motivated attacker can DoS attack Wasabi by
> spending money. That's a design choice that's serving them well so far.
>
> --
> https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-07-08 15:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-06-14 0:25 [bitcoin-dev] Playing with full-rbf peers for fun and L2s security Antoine Riard
2022-06-15 2:27 ` Peter Todd
2022-06-15 2:53 ` Luke Dashjr
2022-06-15 3:18 ` Peter Todd
2022-06-16 0:16 ` alicexbt
2022-06-16 1:02 ` Greg Sanders
2022-06-16 1:45 ` alicexbt
2022-06-16 5:43 ` linuxfoundation.cndm1
2022-06-16 12:47 ` alicexbt
2022-06-16 13:24 ` Greg Sanders
[not found] ` <gmDNbfrrvaZL4akV2DFwCuKrls9SScQjqxeRoEorEiYlv24dPt1j583iOtcB2lFrxZc59N3kp7T9KIM4ycl4QOmGBfDOUmO-BVHsttvtvDc=@protonmail.com>
2022-06-17 1:34 ` Antoine Riard
2022-06-17 4:54 ` alicexbt
2022-06-19 10:42 ` Peter Todd
2022-06-21 23:43 ` Antoine Riard
2022-06-26 16:40 ` alicexbt
2022-06-27 0:43 ` Peter Todd
2022-06-27 12:03 ` Greg Sanders
2022-06-27 13:46 ` Peter Todd
2022-07-05 20:46 ` alicexbt
2022-07-08 14:53 ` Peter Todd
2022-07-08 15:09 ` Greg Sanders [this message]
2022-07-08 19:44 ` alicexbt
2022-07-09 15:06 ` Antoine Riard
2022-06-20 23:49 ` Peter Todd
2022-06-21 23:45 ` Antoine Riard
2022-06-23 19:13 ` Peter Todd
2022-08-24 1:56 ` Antoine Riard
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