From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1YzzTK-0003jq-Md for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 03 Jun 2015 03:36:06 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.160.171 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.160.171; envelope-from=stephencalebmorse@gmail.com; helo=mail-yk0-f171.google.com; Received: from mail-yk0-f171.google.com ([209.85.160.171]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1YzzTJ-0007Rd-Rk for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 03 Jun 2015 03:36:06 +0000 Received: by yken206 with SMTP id n206so60091631yke.2 for ; Tue, 02 Jun 2015 20:36:00 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.236.0.161 with SMTP id 21mr32026075yhb.141.1433302560428; Tue, 02 Jun 2015 20:36:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.13.245.70 with HTTP; Tue, 2 Jun 2015 20:36:00 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 23:36:00 -0400 Message-ID: From: Stephen Morse To: Vincent Truong Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e016345c4f859a5051794c1c0 X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (stephencalebmorse[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1YzzTJ-0007Rd-Rk Cc: bitcoin-development Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Max Block Size: Simple Voting Procedure X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 03 Jun 2015 03:36:06 -0000 --089e016345c4f859a5051794c1c0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Vincent, > Some changes: > > Votes need to be 100%, not 50.01%. That way small miners have a fair > chance. A 50.01% vote means large miners call the shots. > While I like the idea of possibly requiring more than 50%, you wouldn't want to have a situation where a minority of uncooperative (or just lazy) miners don't add their votes and hold up progress. Maybe 2/3 instead of 1/2, though. > Users (people who make transactions) need to vote. A vote by a miner > shouldn't count without user votes. Fee incentives should attract > legitimate votes from miners. A cheating miner will be defeated by another > miner who includes those votes, and take the fees. > > This lets wallet providers and exchanges cast votes (few wallets will > implement prompts and will just auto vote, so if you don't agree, switch > wallets. Vote with your wallet). > The idea of voting with your wallet, while appealing, is technically infeasible. Miners can fill their blocks with any type of transactions, including their own specially designed transactions. And any fees from these transactions can be collected right back into their coinbase transaction. - Stephen --089e016345c4f859a5051794c1c0 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Vincent,

Some changes:

Votes need to be 100%, not 50.01%. That way small miners hav= e a fair chance. A 50.01% vote means large miners call the shots.

While I like the idea of possibly requiring more than 50%, you = wouldn't want to have a situation where a minority of uncooperative (or= just lazy) miners don't add their votes and hold up progress. Maybe 2/= 3 instead of 1/2, though. =C2=A0=C2=A0

Users (people who make transactions) need to vote. A vote by= a miner shouldn't count without user votes. Fee incentives should attr= act legitimate votes from miners. A cheating miner will be defeated by anot= her miner who includes those votes, and take the fees.

This lets wallet providers and exchanges cast votes (few wal= lets will implement prompts and will just auto vote, so if you don't ag= ree, switch wallets. Vote with your wallet).

The idea = of voting with your wallet, while appealing, is technically infeasible. Min= ers can fill their blocks with any type of transactions, including their ow= n specially designed transactions. And any fees from these transactions can= be collected right back into their coinbase transaction.=C2=A0
<= br>
- Stephen
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