From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Y6Nxs-000336-Hc for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 31 Dec 2014 18:25:48 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.212.172 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.212.172; envelope-from=stephencalebmorse@gmail.com; helo=mail-wi0-f172.google.com; Received: from mail-wi0-f172.google.com ([209.85.212.172]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Y6Nxr-0004Ep-5G for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Wed, 31 Dec 2014 18:25:48 +0000 Received: by mail-wi0-f172.google.com with SMTP id n3so25882722wiv.11 for ; Wed, 31 Dec 2014 10:25:41 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.181.12.100 with SMTP id ep4mr115301762wid.62.1420050341125; Wed, 31 Dec 2014 10:25:41 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.194.0.209 with HTTP; Wed, 31 Dec 2014 10:25:41 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: <54A1A99E.1020604@certimix.com> <54A2D1F4.9050306@certimix.com> Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2014 13:25:41 -0500 Message-ID: From: Stephen Morse To: Gregory Maxwell Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=f46d0435c61425619c050b873c66 X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (stephencalebmorse[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1Y6Nxr-0004Ep-5G Cc: bitcoin-development Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP: Voluntary deposit bonds X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2014 18:25:48 -0000 --f46d0435c61425619c050b873c66 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 I agree with Gregory Maxwell, I don't think it would be as easy as just changing IsCoinBase(), since there are places where the code assumes that the coinbase's vin doesn't spend any prevouts and/or has size 1. For example, here and here . I think the motivation behind the original suggestion is to have a way to pay specific miners upon solving a block without risking possibly paying other miners through pay-to-fee. What I'm not sure about, though, is why not just send them a transaction once you see that the miner has solved a block? Not a pay-to-fee transaction, a pay to pubkeyhash or whatever type of transaction you need to make to send the miner some coins. Although I don't completely understand the motivation for making such transactions, maybe this would this work. Have outputs in the coinbase transaction which have nValue == 0, then only apply the COINBASE_MATURITY rule to spending coinbase outputs which have non-zero value. That way you could make a transactions which is only valid after the miner specified solves a block with the coinbase having the same TxID referenced by the new transaction's input. It's still a hard fork, but might be easier than allowing the coinbase to spend prevouts. I guess, at that point though, why not just hard fork to allow the coinbase to spend prevouts... Best, Stephen On Tue, Dec 30, 2014 at 1:28 PM, Gregory Maxwell wrote: > On Tue, Dec 30, 2014 at 4:25 PM, Sergio Lerner > wrote: > > Slight off-topic: > > That looks like an abuse of the VM. Even P2SH is an abuse of the VM. > > Gavin's OP_EVAL (hard-fork) should had been chosen. I'm taking about a > > simple change that goes along the lines of Satoshi's original design. > > Bitcoin was a beautiful design, and extra complexity is making it ugly. > > We need Bitcoin to be simple to understand for new programmers so they > > can keep the project going. It doesn't help the project that one needs > > to be a guru to code for Bitcoin. > > Sergio there is no "abuse" there, OP_NOP3 in that case would be > redefined to OP_COINBASE_FOO_CONSISTENCY. > > (I say FOO because it's not clear what rule you actually hope to apply > there.) > > What you suggested has no purpose by itself: it would need an > additional change which overlays functionality in order to actually do > something. Such a change would likely be "ugly"-- it's easy to be > elegant when you do nothing. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Dive into the World of Parallel Programming! The Go Parallel Website, > sponsored by Intel and developed in partnership with Slashdot Media, is > your > hub for all things parallel software development, from weekly thought > leadership blogs to news, videos, case studies, tutorials and more. Take a > look and join the conversation now. http://goparallel.sourceforge.net > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > --f46d0435c61425619c050b873c66 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
I agree with Gregory Maxwell, I don't think it would b= e as easy as just changing IsCoinBase(), since there are places where the c= ode assumes that the coinbase's vin doesn't spend any prevouts and/= or has size 1. For example, here=C2=A0and here.=C2=A0<= div>
I think the motivation behind the original suggestion is to ha= ve a way to pay specific miners upon solving a block without risking possib= ly paying other miners through pay-to-fee. What I'm not sure about, tho= ugh, is why not just send them a transaction once you see that the miner ha= s solved a block? Not a pay-to-fee transaction, a pay to pubkeyhash or what= ever type of transaction you need to make to send the miner some coins.

Although I don't completely understand the motivat= ion for making such transactions, maybe this would this work. Have outputs = in the coinbase transaction which have nValue =3D=3D 0, then only apply the= COINBASE_MATURITY rule to spending coinbase outputs which have non-zero va= lue. That way you could make a transactions which is only valid after the m= iner specified solves a block with the coinbase having the same TxID refere= nced by the new transaction's input. It's still a hard fork, but mi= ght be easier than allowing the coinbase to spend prevouts. I guess, at tha= t point though, why not just hard fork to allow the coinbase to spend prevo= uts...

Best,
Stephen

On Tue,= Dec 30, 2014 at 1:28 PM, Gregory Maxwell <gmaxwell@gmail.com> wrote:
On Tue, Dec 3= 0, 2014 at 4:25 PM, Sergio Lerner
<sergiolerner@certimix.com<= /a>> wrote:
> Slight off-topic:
> That looks like an abuse of the VM. Even P2SH is an abuse of the VM. > Gavin's OP_EVAL (hard-fork) should had been chosen. I'm taking= about a
> simple change that goes along the lines of Satoshi's original desi= gn.
> Bitcoin was a beautiful design, and extra complexity is making it ugly= .
> We need Bitcoin to be simple to understand for new programmers so they=
> can keep the project going. It doesn't help the project that one n= eeds
> to be a guru to code for Bitcoin.

Sergio there is no "abuse" there,=C2=A0 OP_NOP3 in that ca= se would be
redefined to OP_COINBASE_FOO_CONSISTENCY.

(I say FOO because it's not clear what rule you actually hope to apply = there.)

What you suggested has no purpose by itself: it would need an
additional change which overlays functionality in order to actually do
something. Such a change would likely be "ugly"-- it's easy t= o be
elegant when you do nothing.

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