From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.194] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1VdkfH-0008Hr-FZ for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 05 Nov 2013 17:43:44 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.215.49 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.215.49; envelope-from=stanga@gmail.com; helo=mail-la0-f49.google.com; Received: from mail-la0-f49.google.com ([209.85.215.49]) by sog-mx-4.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1VdkfG-0000Qv-GU for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 05 Nov 2013 17:43:43 +0000 Received: by mail-la0-f49.google.com with SMTP id ev20so5010583lab.22 for ; Tue, 05 Nov 2013 09:43:35 -0800 (PST) X-Received: by 10.112.51.101 with SMTP id j5mr15974564lbo.17.1383673415760; Tue, 05 Nov 2013 09:43:35 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Sender: stanga@gmail.com Received: by 10.112.105.35 with HTTP; Tue, 5 Nov 2013 09:43:15 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: <20131105171445.GA13710@petertodd.org> References: <20131105170541.GA13660@petertodd.org> <20131105171445.GA13710@petertodd.org> From: Ittay Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2013 12:43:15 -0500 X-Google-Sender-Auth: pgl6G9EX1E9RJIt_Pm4OPNw6Xa4 Message-ID: To: Peter Todd Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a113364606e80fd04ea7192de X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. 0.0 URIBL_BLOCKED ADMINISTRATOR NOTICE: The query to URIBL was blocked. See http://wiki.apache.org/spamassassin/DnsBlocklists#dnsbl-block for more information. [URIs: petertodd.org] -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (stanga[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1VdkfG-0000Qv-GU Cc: Ittay , Gavin Andresen , =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Emin_G=FCn_Sirer?= , Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] BIP proposal - patch to raise selfish mining threshold. X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 05 Nov 2013 17:43:45 -0000 --001a113364606e80fd04ea7192de Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 On Tue, Nov 5, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Peter Todd wrote: > On Tue, Nov 05, 2013 at 12:05:41PM -0500, Peter Todd wrote: > > On Tue, Nov 05, 2013 at 11:56:53AM -0500, Ittay wrote: > > Oh, and I don't want to give the wrong impression: there's no need to > rush to get this problem fixed. Even if someone wanted to launch an > attack right now, with a fair amount of resources, there's a lot of > counter-measures based on human intervention that can definitely stop > the attack in the short-term The attack can be easily hidden. And be sure that before today, today, and after today, very smart people are at their computer planning attacks on Bitcoin. Exploits must be published and fixed FAST. Nevertheless, I agree that, as you say, we must not rush it. Look at the BIP, find if we missed anything, and let's discuss it. > In addition, keep in mind > that this attack is very easy to detect, so if one is actually launched > we will know immediately and can start taking direct counter-measures at > that time. > Not really. Please see the discussion section in our paper. > That Gregory Maxwell so quickly identified a flaw in this proposed > solution suggests we should proceed carefully. > There is no flaw. You were just reiterating that the solution does not give us the 51% percent security you thought you had before. We showed that we're not getting this back, I'm afraid. Best, Ittay --001a113364606e80fd04ea7192de Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On Tue, Nov 5, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Peter Todd <pete@petert= odd.org> wrote:
On T= ue, Nov 05, 2013 at 12:05:41PM -0500, Peter Todd wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 05, 2013 at 11:56:53AM -0500, Ittay wrote:

Oh, and I don't want to give the wrong impression: there= 9;s no need to
rush to get this problem fixed. Even if someone wanted to launch an
attack right now, with a fair amount of resources, there's a lot of
counter-measures based on human intervention that can definitely stop
the attack in the short-term

The attack can= be easily hidden. And be sure that before today, today,=A0
and a= fter today, very smart people are at their computer planning attacks=A0
on Bitcoin. Exploits must be published and fixed FAST.=A0
Nevertheless, I agree =A0that, as you say, we must not rush it= . Look at the=A0
BIP, find if we missed anything, and let's d= iscuss it.=A0
=A0
In addition, keep in mind
that this attack is very easy to detect, so if one is actually launched
we will know immediately and can start taking direct counter-measures at that time.

Not really. Please see the d= iscussion section in our paper.=A0
=A0
That Gregory Maxwell so quickly identified a flaw in this proposed
solution suggests we should proceed carefully.

There is no flaw. You were just reiterating that the solution does = not give=A0
us the 51% percent security you thought you had befor= e. We showed that=A0
we're not getting this back, I'm afraid.=A0
=A0
Best,=A0
Ittay=A0

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