Good day all, this is my first post to this mailing list. Per Adam's comment below:

Both here and elsewhere, the debate taking place is around the manner of Taproot activation, not whether or not Taproot should be activated. The latter seems to have widespread support. Given this favorable environment, it seems to me this is an incredible opportunity for the developer contingency to "take the high road" while also minimizing time to Taproot activation using political incentives. By offering power on the left hand to miners and and power on the right to users, neither of whom is expressing disapproval of activation, but both of whom are able to activate without the consent of the other, both are incentivized to signal activation as quickly as possible to emerge as the "group that did it". All that must be done is to include a LOT=true option to Bitcoin Core that carries a default of LOT=false. Miners can activate at any time, users can signal their intent to activate should miners renege, and developers emerge as politically neutral in the eyes of both.

Extrapolating a bit, I contend this expanded agency of full node operatorship may result in more users running a full node, which is good and healthy. From a miner's point of view, more full nodes only increases the likelihood of future UASFs, and so they are even further incentivized to expedite Taproot activation. Perhaps this is a stretch, perhaps not.

To summarize: (1) this positions developers as neutral facilitators who deferred power to the other contingencies; (2) we may see a rise in the popularity of running a full node and the number of full node operators; (3) miners are incentivized to activate quickly to avoid being perceived as the "bad guys" and to avoid the spread of full nodes; and (4) even if miners do not activate, users can organize a UASF in a grass-roots way.

Matt Hill