From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from fraxinus.osuosl.org (smtp4.osuosl.org [140.211.166.137]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 64B8AC0001 for ; Fri, 19 Feb 2021 22:13:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by fraxinus.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 58ED586CAF for ; Fri, 19 Feb 2021 22:13:14 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org Received: from fraxinus.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id Gz8vNiYNshE7 for ; Fri, 19 Feb 2021 22:13:13 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ej1-f44.google.com (mail-ej1-f44.google.com [209.85.218.44]) by fraxinus.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3651186A2F for ; Fri, 19 Feb 2021 22:13:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-ej1-f44.google.com with SMTP id u20so15682368ejb.7 for ; Fri, 19 Feb 2021 14:13:13 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=F/KThvQREzQSqTjECG31nApt3RU2wnLEQ5xpCNpNJNQ=; b=o/497dgr5/kBXI3ODNqmtgiHXPGv1Mfig0Zb1lNqJRyesUnyuHLCCQHvHJ6I3OSy3K +qCBd50asnAX3FqrRCWwMCo6ISQsnpYuJKU7aQGuOJUDkNGTHnYHMrlTVKeyb8RjuXSE 2fFLLJsBX9V6Ajomg5fQZYztRxF93qBo91o+GBohrKR5sVhIVVJFMetOI7WWFAyL8Y4M z1oMPtBB2Xl4J3pTWEu7FUCHJwIlrJ7715NA1ICwj+cex4+ATlXo1qlmu0XgyqVO57Tm UFr1zXjD+6jk8XGIfSNL0OsAz2eH6cIVh8zMGvyfJWjvOeKStNhmRmiTi9hd2V0aRdql +YZA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=F/KThvQREzQSqTjECG31nApt3RU2wnLEQ5xpCNpNJNQ=; b=g5LQ0nSpXmY19qOS3hISeoTLCjKj7G4MxnUzbOJ6NTS+z17tb+LJKkw8ljKLfKuapv 6y5XL9cu/kAHd/kgNhfgqrgVMoY4vRIc2TDA4g9VhgEIvxSrt+zkX6Jwr9c/zxkze9kp 1rttpHgmR6zzAOO0clxrhRW2ho0hmOa5Iml8wtQejFDWYjQ2WxwLy5tj5yPJ/8Y4+vMA fu2yKgL6pkU53iyAjYt1zWb96ZMKeD3vW/BKZ2UfCDi/FA/7ctKgAY4F7TC0DJPQ5g9q ZAb1p6T0sLOyF+5kIYUBgTAkvu061u6R6UHbU24IysKJeZBkLN8DHMpi3FdEtez5oHkV cjhQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531pDAo9QrScRNUmDRrpDXAx6sKMAG0Db+TRGZm/ccgHn9l90Kgp v0heuPPV3AgXXv79xllOV744DPZaJ0lxwDWAdNAhthmO X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJyVePvQ1O6aV3u9pbW7L3+NupXYMlZI0xhR7r+CxXb+432vCrEGSL6HLE01l8Ap8/9vhzzzu4qV9uFHaltnwTM= X-Received: by 2002:a17:906:958b:: with SMTP id r11mr10461856ejx.23.1613772731251; Fri, 19 Feb 2021 14:12:11 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Matt Hill Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2021 15:12:00 -0700 Message-ID: To: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="00000000000064fdc505bbb7be08" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Fri, 19 Feb 2021 22:43:06 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Yesterday's Taproot activation meeting on lockinontimeout (LOT) X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2021 22:13:17 -0000 --00000000000064fdc505bbb7be08 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Good day all, this is my first post to this mailing list. Per Adam's comment below: > given there are clearly people of both views, or for now don't care but might later, it would minimally be friendly and useful if bitcoin-core has a LOT=true option - and that IMO goes some way to avoid the assumptive control via defaults. Both here and elsewhere, the debate taking place is around the manner of Taproot activation, not whether or not Taproot should be activated. The latter seems to have widespread support. Given this favorable environment, it seems to me this is an incredible opportunity for the developer contingency to "take the high road" while also minimizing time to Taproot activation using political incentives. By offering power on the left hand to miners and and power on the right to users, neither of whom is expressing disapproval of activation, but both of whom are able to activate without the consent of the other, both are incentivized to signal activation as quickly as possible to emerge as the "group that did it". All that must be done is to include a LOT=true option to Bitcoin Core that carries a default of LOT=false. Miners can activate at any time, users can signal their intent to activate should miners renege, and developers emerge as politically neutral in the eyes of both. Extrapolating a bit, I contend this expanded agency of full node operatorship may result in more users running a full node, which is good and healthy. From a miner's point of view, more full nodes only increases the likelihood of future UASFs, and so they are even further incentivized to expedite Taproot activation. Perhaps this is a stretch, perhaps not. To summarize: (1) this positions developers as neutral facilitators who deferred power to the other contingencies; (2) we may see a rise in the popularity of running a full node and the number of full node operators; (3) miners are incentivized to activate quickly to avoid being perceived as the "bad guys" and to avoid the spread of full nodes; and (4) even if miners do not activate, users can organize a UASF in a grass-roots way. Matt Hill --00000000000064fdc505bbb7be08 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Good day all, this is my first post to this mailing list. Per Ad= am's comment below:

> given= there are clearly people of both views, or for now don't care
but m= ight later, it would minimally be friendly and useful if
bitcoin-core ha= s a LOT=3Dtrue option - and that IMO goes some way to
avoid the assumpti= ve control via defaults.

Both here and elsewhere, the de= bate taking place is around the manner of Taproot activation, not whether o= r not Taproot should be activated. The latter seems to have widespread supp= ort. Given this favorable environment, it seems to me this is an incredible= opportunity for the developer contingency to "take the high road"= ; while also minimizing time to Taproot activation using political incentiv= es. By offering power on the left hand to miners and and power on the right= to users, neither of whom is expressing disapproval of activation, but bot= h of whom are able to activate without the consent of the other, both are i= ncentivized to signal activation as quickly as possible to emerge as the &q= uot;group that did it". All that must be done is to include a LOT=3Dtr= ue option to Bitcoin Core that carries a default of LOT=3Dfalse. Miners can= activate at any time, users can signal their intent to activate should min= ers renege, and developers emerge as politically neutral in the eyes of bot= h.

Extrapolating a bit, I contend this expanded agency of full node operat= orship may result in more users running a full node, which is good and heal= thy. From a miner's point of view, more full nodes only increases the l= ikelihood of future UASFs, and so they are even further incentivized to exp= edite Taproot activation. Perhaps this is a stretch, perhaps not.
=

To s= ummarize: (1) this positions developers as neutral facilitators who deferre= d power to the other contingencies; (2) we may see a rise in the popularity= of running a full node and the number of full node operators; (3) miners a= re incentivized to activate quickly to avoid being perceived as the "b= ad guys" and to avoid the spread of full nodes; and (4) even if miners= do not activate, users can organize a UASF in a grass-roots way.

<= div style=3D"font-family:sans-serif;font-size:12.8px" dir=3D"auto">Matt Hil= l
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