From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from whitealder.osuosl.org (smtp1.osuosl.org [140.211.166.138]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E2C7CC0171 for ; Sun, 9 Feb 2020 20:24:45 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by whitealder.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D22CE83B2F for ; Sun, 9 Feb 2020 20:24:45 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org Received: from whitealder.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id zedWEzbCDuFE for ; Sun, 9 Feb 2020 20:24:45 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-vk1-f182.google.com (mail-vk1-f182.google.com [209.85.221.182]) by whitealder.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D027D84F12 for ; Sun, 9 Feb 2020 20:24:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-vk1-f182.google.com with SMTP id i78so1247322vke.0 for ; Sun, 09 Feb 2020 12:24:44 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=LevkX+EEdvgCBfPhJyIEzJLd78OSv+Pu3/ykixnt2uw=; b=ax5/xdZh+cfPoxDb/hJk3EP1OKEp2H2ykeywa1PTHGbqhtEB8CX47ZiMTulg4vh9F5 BQWB8mc4xT3ge+1VabmJ4+HLQmdiwMcDfAKo34U1fGtQnO0VM3CdsPxWQz3sVVmjP20j rTY1dq03kZsGf51fklKI0RAPKDCVOTArKFh3BUtBXSDV31a1wEZGVynG1lzhT+u3TKm6 feIQIKokHX9q8gMzeaS52UCxl0gSPppqXiAflRYwmxuyR1lvxcpe5ZsH7nc3NmVRVAqy GvG+b+e6vuL7yon4Uzx7pwzLXUYiyKqiKj8ZOJuwNK6vGUEzl/gPQRjKrXtFaXQnHZz9 06Uw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to; bh=LevkX+EEdvgCBfPhJyIEzJLd78OSv+Pu3/ykixnt2uw=; b=PXsj7ubXZLdNnp3jkeTGyqM1YdGzTfFmUtHOZN/G/Ej+sLmzRHvXE9NuHoXzxvsIgU MKLeg5Wg2jVC7Ud18slqdtcvVDd12jheYiYvt6I3SDt9z48HO13pTVd/bbAJ8VqefeZO 1bx8xJlk+qL3mdtPHVg+MhLiB/jg1JKgEnRXo4kzLkjz/2xmiHBncc537RXnZ2X7qTAl 6y5O4zyw8PpKbAsjjdK5D0AI0AduDPIoSEmqRXIYPicLsnjuIVD3g+u21JEDtDHaLa1E cICXTSpCoowoPAwBuWgs7riKIFlldY1JRw/jnXXyXvVPyu2B0c28UVM5MH7id65t5PyT ky+g== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAVwMGD37Z9HBr26voETCzBhGL1qXebTkcA5mZCY9cGo5VrRUwYN 6seKjy/fgdgGMvt9W+8+yWXSmF3WNxMHlT/hrWl9kqST X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwO0btEiT2iYtlyuzw6MPwJI3qr9Sf+Hb3hprcx2GYoD6f4Ph+KiIpF/SlaQ8Qvl8CJPXaXJfK790t6RxkcrBE= X-Received: by 2002:a1f:434b:: with SMTP id q72mr4560850vka.53.1581279883487; Sun, 09 Feb 2020 12:24:43 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Bryan Bishop Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2020 14:24:32 -0600 Message-ID: To: Bitcoin Dev , Bryan Bishop Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000beef85059e2a695a" Subject: [bitcoin-dev] Taproot public NUMS optimization (Re: Taproot (and graftroot) complexity) X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 09 Feb 2020 20:24:46 -0000 --000000000000beef85059e2a695a Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" The following is a message forwarded from an anonymous email that, for whatever reason, couldn't be relayed through the mailing list without my assistance. This is message (3/3). This email is the third of a collection of sentiments from a group of developers who in aggregate prefer to remain anonymous. These emails have been sent under a pseudonym so as to keep the focus of discussion on the merits of the technical issues, rather than miring the discussion in personal politics. Our goal isn't to cause a schism, but rather to help figure out what the path forward is with Taproot. To that end, we: 1) Discuss the merits of Taproot's design versus simpler alternatives (see thread subject, "Taproot (and Graftroot) Complexity"). 2) Propose an alternative path to deploying the technologies described in BIP-340, BIP-341, and BIP-342 (see thread subject, "An Alternative Deployment Path for Taproot Technologies"). 3) Suggest a modification to Taproot to reduce some of the overhead (see thread subject, "Taproot Public NUMS Optimization"). We propose to modify Taproot's specification in BIP-341 by adding the rule: If there is one element on the witness stack: 1) Attempt hashing it to see if it's equal to the witness program. The first byte is the control byte for leaf versioning. 2) If it's not the witness program, and it's 65 bytes, try signature validation If there is more than one element on the witness stack: If the control block is even, treat it as a non-Taproot MAST and get the leaf version as the last byte of the script (so you can pop it off before hashing). If greater anonymity is required, a NUMS point can still be used in Taproot, at the expense of the additional data. However, if NUMS points are just a couple well known constants this could actually decrease privacy as then the NUMS points could differ from application to application fingerprinting wallets. Instead, the NUMS point should only be used when a single use nonce can be sent, so that NUMS cannot be distinguished from a normal Taproot to a third party who doesn't know the setup (e.g., that the NUMS is H(X) for known X). Great thanks, The Group - Bryan http://heybryan.org/ 1 512 203 0507 --000000000000beef85059e2a695a Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
The following is a message forwarded from= an anonymous email that, for whatever reason, couldn't be relayed thro= ugh the mailing list without my assistance. This is message (3/3).

This email is the third of a collection of sentiments from = a group of developers
who in aggregate prefer to remain anonymous. These= emails have been sent under a
pseudonym so as to keep the focus of disc= ussion on the merits of the technical
issues, rather than miring the dis= cussion in personal politics. Our goal isn't
to cause a schism, but = rather to help figure out what the path forward is with
Taproot. To that= end, we:

1) Discuss the merits of Taproot's design versus simpl= er alternatives (see
thread subject, "Taproot (and Graftroot) Compl= exity").
2) Propose an alternative path to deploying the technologi= es described in
BIP-340, BIP-341, and BIP-342 (see thread subject, "= ;An Alternative Deployment
Path for Taproot Technologies").
3) S= uggest a modification to Taproot to reduce some of the overhead (see thread=
subject, "Taproot Public NUMS Optimization").

We propo= se to modify Taproot's specification in BIP-341 by adding the rule:
=
If there is one element on the witness stack:

1) Attempt hashing= it to see if it's equal to=C2=A0 the witness program. The first
byt= e is the control byte for leaf versioning.
2) If it's not the witnes= s program, and it's 65 bytes, try signature validation

If there = is more than one element on the witness stack:

If the control block = is even, treat it as a non-Taproot MAST and get the leaf
version as the = last byte of the script (so you can pop it off before hashing).


= If greater anonymity is required, a NUMS point can still be used in Taproot= , at
the expense of the additional data. However, if NUMS points are jus= t a couple
well known constants this could actually decrease privacy as = then the NUMS
points could differ from application to application finger= printing wallets.
Instead, the NUMS point should only be used when a sin= gle use nonce can be
sent, so that NUMS cannot be distinguished from a n= ormal Taproot to a third
party who doesn't know the setup (e.g., tha= t the NUMS is H(X) for known X).


Great thanks,

The Group<= br>

- Bryan
http://heybryan.org/
1 512 = 203 0507
--000000000000beef85059e2a695a--