From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [IPv6:2605:bc80:3010::133]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1D9C1C000E for ; Tue, 29 Jun 2021 19:28:32 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0899C40134 for ; Tue, 29 Jun 2021 19:28:32 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Spam-Score: -0.92 X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.92 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, FROM_EXCESS_BASE64=0.979, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001] autolearn=no autolearn_force=no Authentication-Results: smtp2.osuosl.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=jtimon-cc.20150623.gappssmtp.com Received: from smtp2.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (smtp2.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id D-OLj56N8J7N for ; Tue, 29 Jun 2021 19:28:29 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.8.0 Received: from mail-yb1-xb2c.google.com (mail-yb1-xb2c.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::b2c]) by smtp2.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9BE3C40105 for ; Tue, 29 Jun 2021 19:28:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-yb1-xb2c.google.com with SMTP id g19so690106ybe.11 for ; Tue, 29 Jun 2021 12:28:29 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=jtimon-cc.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=/wJQ/XNG0kHWM4qZJYd2gLPYqXod6d4cAAh0Oct0eE8=; b=WI30YpNzXSW/oeOPLz+j/FKN5SxyZhxtZTAH3b8wSVrZzIUwhL4w5Q1w5UqYg4ZjZs IIacAT/EZWF//9U8IcHs6T8yrOrcub/A2ytoCdOGbq0u/fXnJ1LrWpZCLlZrJ9JLUFu0 jDNqJoV8DJXDObFQUqCLzLddrjL4oGT0MH5NN94y0vmPj+QvLkqUEiRYC7dzesTTAIs2 XhvXNt/53DFQy5+jDhzLPSB9ezVbUvapS/A3t3RMtzGnbXiG7dF7CUeuf/kCzglnjElL rR4x2zdOxby9Lc48py5MskprDxZNTdnsfjYRmkModKvjVxCX8NnUiDYd+gLyUVGLkRkE p3zQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=/wJQ/XNG0kHWM4qZJYd2gLPYqXod6d4cAAh0Oct0eE8=; b=XrejM3It/xkfMFlBljAI6Zpi5x3uvfk1mUM7xt7aLvK6Yy4st8gq1mS4J7Ehfe4KJW Tfg+8YpF+WWdhQ5O4Rw8w/nypczsXGeo43RwTneROKvoWRT+f09D5Hmkm7e0xi24VpfZ b6EP6lSuTDA2Xwy0aJy0CTIbOf0tKkGKcM70saikgBF4/SinLvpIVaHgMOIthcKWgrqJ 9JYmgTLX9S3xcFK5/zQUh/UUxnWynoCWDDcfOLxAFylZRp8Ia1RpLnT6uazHxpGZ+Yuf O8FC9JbB9Uor2aisSfWy3oYJSOC5MGvBdj1vbWIn/CAAvedBLc5XhrVe3e7+YTsrOLdN jNPA== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM532TZ03OHJIDlGVLx+WHg2PP4JgHK6bUtjhQXFy0RfroSFL4lWj0 zIY6uXMvN1ZwzC9TynS6xbZ1aPqkfdqWYAaEyoLzJw== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwCFNXhNKcP6P8HsZcnFh1G6VRMX83Vz+x93PjLRNBzXTrFvPKx2tbjhrpRDA3ZVWJG3DzXvKVOEUvS0rKS9pk= X-Received: by 2002:a25:e756:: with SMTP id e83mr19967558ybh.133.1624994908102; Tue, 29 Jun 2021 12:28:28 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <202106291755.11926.luke@dashjr.org> In-Reply-To: From: =?UTF-8?B?Sm9yZ2UgVGltw7Nu?= Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 20:28:20 +0100 Message-ID: To: Eric Voskuil Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="00000000000042709205c5ec9c42" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 21:16:54 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion , Billy Tetrud Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Trinary Version Signaling for softfork upgrades X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 19:28:32 -0000 --00000000000042709205c5ec9c42 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable "Confirmation" isn't needed for softforks. Miners controlling confirmation doesn't mean miners control the rules, they never did. Read section 11 of the bitcoin paper "even with a majority of hashrate one cannot arbitrarily change rules or forge signatures. You may say users chosing the rules is "politicial". Isn't miners deciding them for users more political? Whatever you call it, it is still how free software works: users decide what to run. It is extremely disappointing to see how few developers seem to ubderstand this, or even care about users deciding or miners not deciding the rules. How can we expect users to understand bitcoin when most developers don't seem to understand it? It is really sad. On Tue, Jun 29, 2021, 19:17 Eric Voskuil wrote: > > > On Jun 29, 2021, at 10:55, Luke Dashjr wrote: > > > > =EF=BB=BFThe only alternative to a split in the problematic scenarios a= re 1) > concede > > centralised miner control over the network, > > Miners control confirmation, entirely. > > This is the nature of bitcoin. And merchants control validation, entirely= . > Anyone can be a miner or a merchant. Neither is inherently =E2=80=9Cbette= r=E2=80=9D than > the other. The largest merchants are likely a handful of exchanges, likel= y > at least as centralized as miners are pooled. > > Splitting does not change this. > > > and 2) have inconsistent > > enforcement of rules by users who don't agree on what the correct rules > are, > > There are no =E2=80=9Ccorrect=E2=80=9D rules. Whatever rules one enforces= determine what > network he chooses to participate in. > > > again leading to centralised miner control over the network. > > Leading to? Miners control confirmation, always. Whether that is > centralized, just as with merchanting, is up to individuals. > > > In other words, in this context, accepting a split between disagreeing > users > > is the ONLY way Bitcoin can possibly continue as a decentralised > currency. > > No, it is not. You are proposing splitting as the method of censorship > resistance inherent to Bitcoin. Coordinating this split requires > coordinated action. The whole point of bitcoin is coordinate that action > based on mining (proof of work). Replacing that with a political process = is > just a reversion to political money. > > > Making that split as clean and well-defined as possible not only ensure= s > the > > best opportunity for both sides of the disagreement, > > Trivially accomplished, just change a rule. This isn=E2=80=99t about that= . It=E2=80=99s > about how one gets others to go along with the new coin, or stay with the > old. An entirely political process, which is clearly evident from the > campaigns around such attempts. > > > but also minimises the > > risk that the split occurs at all (since the "losing" side needs to > concede, > > rather than passively continue the disagreement ongoing after the > attempted > > protocol change). > > Nobody =E2=80=9Cneeds to=E2=80=9D concede once a split has occurred, whic= h is evident in > existing splits. > > e > > > Luke > > > > > >> On Tuesday 29 June 2021 08:44:56 Eric Voskuil wrote: > >> At least we are now acknowledging that splitting is what it=E2=80=99s = about. > That=E2=80=99s > >> progress. > >> > >> e > >> > >>>> On Jun 29, 2021, at 01:32, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n wrote= : > >>> > >>> =EF=BB=BF > >>> I think the option of "permanent failure because miners veto" should > >>> actually be abandoned. No, I don't think we should avoid splits when > >>> possible, I don't think we should avoid splits at all costs. > >>> > >>>> On Sun, Jun 27, 2021, 19:12 Billy Tetrud > wrote: > >>>> @Luke > >>>> > >>>>> They can still slow it down. > >>>> > >>>> Absolutely. However I think that the option of permanent failure is > >>>> important. It certainly would be ideal to ensure that enough bitcoin > >>>> users support the upgrade *before* releasing it, however realistical= ly > >>>> this can never be more than an estimate, and estimates can sometimes > be > >>>> wildly wrong. It would be unfortunate if miners had a substantially > >>>> different estimate of user support than the people putting in the wo= rk > >>>> to release bitcoin upgrades. Even if upgrades are never released > before > >>>> it becomes clear that a large supermajority of users want the upgrad= e, > >>>> if miners don't agree with the estimate a harmful chain split could > >>>> occur. And I agree with Eric that the goal here is to prevent a chai= n > >>>> split during an upgrade when possible. This includes permanent failu= re > >>>> of an upgrade when there is unexpectedly large miner opposition. > >>>> > >>>> This of course does not prevent a UASF-style deployment to be done > after > >>>> an initial failure to deploy occurs. My proposal is essentially a > >>>> mechanism to improve upon the speedy-trial idea, allowing for even > >>>> speedier releases (than speedy trial) without adding additional risk > of > >>>> undesired chain splits. > >>>> > >>>>> [BIP8] already has the trinary state you seem to be describing > >>>> > >>>> It sounds like you're saying the trinary state of BIP8 is A. Follow > the > >>>> longest chain, B. Follow the upgrade chain, or C. follow the > >>>> non-upgraded chain. I agree. However the trinary state in my proposa= l > is > >>>> materially different - it is the signaling itself that is trinary, n= ot > >>>> just which chain is being followed. This allows others to know and > make > >>>> programmatic decisions (in software) based on that signaling. I'm su= re > >>>> you can agree that does not exist in BIP8. > >>>> > >>>>> No additional bit is needed, as softforks are coordinated between > >>>>> users, NOT miners > >>>> > >>>> And yet there is miner involvement, as you rightly pointed out. Mine= rs > >>>> are needed to set the nVersion in the header. So when you say "no > >>>> additional bit is needed", could you please be clearer as to what yo= u > >>>> mean? Do you mean that signaling of opposition in a block can be don= e > >>>> without any "additional bit"? Or are you just saying that it is > >>>> redundant to consider what miners might be opposing an upgrade? > >>>> > >>>> @Jorge > >>>> > >>>>> If different users want different incompatible things... there's no > >>>>> way to avoid the split > >>>> > >>>> I agree. This happened with bcash, and that's fine. It was painful, > but > >>>> there were a significant amount of users that disagreed, and they ha= ve > >>>> the chain they want now. > >>>> > >>>> But we generally all want to avoid a chain split when possible. > Because > >>>> chain splits have a cost, and that cost can be high, its likely that > >>>> many users would rather choose the chain with the most support rathe= r > >>>> than choosing the chain with their preferred rules. > >>>> > >>>> However, the question here is: how do we estimate what fraction of > users > >>>> wants which rules? We don't have a divining rod to determine with > >>>> certainty what users want. We can only make polls of various levels = of > >>>> inaccuracy. The methods bitcoin has been using is community discussi= on > >>>> and social consensus estimation as well as miner signaling during th= e > >>>> actual deployment period. Neither of these are perfect, but they are > >>>> both reasonable enough mechanisms. However, because both of these > >>>> mechanisms are very rough estimates of user sentiment, we need to > >>>> consider the possibility that sometimes the estimate may be > >>>> substantially inaccurate when we design deployment procedures. This > >>>> inaccuracy is why we need multiple barriers in place for an upgrade, > and > >>>> why we need to have higher thresholds of success (require larger > >>>> supermajorities in both consensus and miner signaling). > >>>> > >>>> Developers obviously care about bitcoin and have an incentive > (personal > >>>> and probably financial) to do it right. And miners have both an > >>>> incentive to keep the system healthy, as well as an incentive to min= e > on > >>>> the chain that the economic majority of users is using. But measurin= g > >>>> the consensus of the bitcoin community can be extraordinarily > difficult > >>>> to do with consistent accuracy, and so I think miner signaling as it > has > >>>> been used as a second barrier to entry for an upgrade is quite > >>>> appropriate. > >>>> > >>>>> On Sun, Jun 27, 2021 at 2:22 AM Eric Voskuil > wrote: > >>>>> I have not objected to anyone splitting. As I said, a split is alwa= ys > >>>>> possible, and of course has been done on a large scale. It is only > the > >>>>> misleading statements about inherent soft fork =E2=80=9Ccompatibili= ty=E2=80=9D and > the > >>>>> implication that activation without hash power enforcement does not > >>>>> create a split that I object to. People who know better should be > >>>>> honest about it. > >>>>> > >>>>> Far too many people have been led to believe there is some sort of > >>>>> activation choice with =E2=80=9Censured=E2=80=9D equal outcomes (ma= ybe =E2=80=9Cslowed > down=E2=80=9D). > >>>>> There is only a choice between creating a split and hash power > >>>>> enforcement. Soft forks are rule changes, and thereby incompatible = - > >>>>> unless enforced by majority hash power. > >>>>> > >>>>> The statements below are grossly misleading and need to be called o= ut > >>>>> as such so that people can actually make this decision you speak of= . > >>>>> This idea that =E2=80=9Cusers=E2=80=9D decide the rules is not the = question. The > >>>>> question is only how to avoid a split. If one does not care he can > >>>>> split at any time, no discussion required. > >>>>> > >>>>> e > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Jun 27, 2021, at 01:47, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n wro= te: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> =EF=BB=BFIf different users want different incompatible things (en= ough on > >>>>>> each side), there's no way to avoid the split. We shouldn't try to > >>>>>> avoid such a split. > >>>>>> Users decide the rules, not miners nor developers. > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Sun, Jun 27, 2021 at 12:05 AM Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Ultimately there is only one answer to this question. Get majorit= y > >>>>>>> hash power support. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Soft fork enforcement is the same act as any other censorship > >>>>>>> enforcement, the difference is only a question of what people wan= t. > >>>>>>> Given that there is no collective =E2=80=9Cwe=E2=80=9D, those wan= ts differ. Bitcoin > >>>>>>> resolves this question of conflicting wants, but it is not a > >>>>>>> democracy, it=E2=80=99s a market. One votes by trading. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> If one wants to enforce a soft fork (or otherwise censor) this is > >>>>>>> accomplished by mining (or paying others to do so). Anyone can > mine, > >>>>>>> so everyone gets a say. Mining is trading capital now for more > >>>>>>> later. If enough people want to do that, they can enforce a soft > >>>>>>> fork. It=E2=80=99s time Bitcoiners stop thinking of miners as oth= er people. > >>>>>>> Anyone can mine, and that=E2=80=99s your vote. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Otherwise, as mentioned below, anyone can start a new coin. But > it=E2=80=99s > >>>>>>> dishonest to imply that one can do this and all others will surel= y > >>>>>>> follow. This cannot be known, it=E2=80=99s merely a gamble. And i= t=E2=80=99s one > >>>>>>> that has been shown to not always pay off. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> e > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Jun 26, 2021, at 14:43, Eric Voskuil > wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> =EF=BB=BFFor some definitions of =E2=80=9Cblock=E2=80=9D. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Without majority hash power support, activation simply means you > >>>>>>>> are off on a chain split. Anyone can of course split off from a > >>>>>>>> chain by changing a rule (soft or otherwise) at any time, so thi= s > >>>>>>>> is a bit of an empty claim. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Nobody can stop a person from splitting. The relevant question i= s > >>>>>>>> how to *prevent* a split. And activation without majority hash > >>>>>>>> power certainly does not =E2=80=9Censure=E2=80=9D this. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> e > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Jun 26, 2021, at 14:13, Luke Dashjr via bitcoin-dev > >>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> =EF=BB=BFBIP8 LOT=3DTrue just ensures miners cannot block an up= grade > >>>>>>>>> entirely. They can still slow it down. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> It also already has the trinary state you seem to be describing > >>>>>>>>> (although perhaps this could be better documented in the BIP): > >>>>>>>>> users who oppose the softfork can and should treat the successf= ul > >>>>>>>>> signal (whether MASF or UASF) as invalid, thereby ensuring they > do > >>>>>>>>> not follow a chain with the rules in force. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> No additional bit is needed, as softforks are coordinated betwe= en > >>>>>>>>> users, NOT miners (who have no particular say in them, aside fr= om > >>>>>>>>> their role as also being users). The miner involvement is only > out > >>>>>>>>> of necessity (to set the bit in the header, which users > coordinate > >>>>>>>>> with) and potentially to accelerate activation by protecting > >>>>>>>>> upgrade-lagging users. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Luke > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On Saturday 26 June 2021 20:21:52 Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-de= v > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Given the recent controversy over upgrade mechanisms for the > >>>>>>>>>> non-controversial taproot upgrade, I have been thinking about > >>>>>>>>>> ways to solve the problems that both sides brought up. In shor= t, > >>>>>>>>>> BIP8 LOT=3Dtrue proponents make the point that lazy miners fai= ling > >>>>>>>>>> to upgrade in a timely manner slow down releases of bitcoin > >>>>>>>>>> upgrades, and BIP9 / BIP8 LOT=3Dfalse proponents make the poin= t > >>>>>>>>>> that LOT=3Dtrue can lead to undesirable forks that might cause= a > >>>>>>>>>> lot of chaos. I believe both points are essentially correct an= d > >>>>>>>>>> have created a proposal > >>>>>>>>>> < > https://github.com/fresheneesz/bip-trinary-version-signaling/blo > >>>>>>>>>> b/master/b ip-trinary-version-bits.md> for soft fork upgrades > that > >>>>>>>>>> solve both problems. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> The proposal uses trinary version signaling rather than binary > >>>>>>>>>> signaling. For any particular prospective soft fork upgrade, > this > >>>>>>>>>> allows for three signaling states: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> * Actively support the change. > >>>>>>>>>> * Actively oppose the change. > >>>>>>>>>> * Not signaling (neither support or oppose). This is the defau= lt > >>>>>>>>>> state. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Using this additional information, we can release > non-contentious > >>>>>>>>>> upgrades much quicker (with a much lower percent of miners > >>>>>>>>>> signaling support). For contentious upgrades, miners who oppos= e > >>>>>>>>>> the change are incentivized to update their software to a > version > >>>>>>>>>> that can actively signal opposition to the change. The more > >>>>>>>>>> opposition there is, the higher the threshold necessary to loc= k > >>>>>>>>>> in the upgrade. With the parameters I currently recommended in > >>>>>>>>>> the proposal, this chart shows how much support signaling woul= d > >>>>>>>>>> be necessary given a particular amount of active opposition > >>>>>>>>>> signaling: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> [image: thresholdChart.png] > >>>>>>>>>> If literally no one signals opposition, a 60% threshold should > be > >>>>>>>>>> relatively safe because it is a supermajority amount that is > >>>>>>>>>> unlikely to change significantly very quickly (ie if 60% of > >>>>>>>>>> miners support the change today, its unlikely that less than a > >>>>>>>>>> majority of miners would support the change a year or two from > >>>>>>>>>> now), and if no one is signaling opposition, chances are that > the > >>>>>>>>>> vast majority of the other 40% would also eventually signal > >>>>>>>>>> support. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> This both gives an incentive for "lazy" miners to upgrade if > they > >>>>>>>>>> actually oppose the change while at the same time allowing the= se > >>>>>>>>>> lazy miners to remain lazy without slowing down the soft fork > >>>>>>>>>> activation much. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I think now is the right time to discuss new soft fork upgrade > >>>>>>>>>> mechanisms, when there are no pressing soft fork upgrades read= y > >>>>>>>>>> to deploy. Waiting until we need to deploy a soft fork to > discuss > >>>>>>>>>> this will only delay things and cause contention again like it > >>>>>>>>>> did with taproot. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I'm very curious to know what people think of this mechanism. = I > >>>>>>>>>> would appreciate any comments here, or written as github issue= s > >>>>>>>>>> on the proposal repo itself. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Thanks, > >>>>>>>>>> BT > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>>>>>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list > >>>>>>>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > >>>>>>>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>>>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list > >>>>>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > >>>>>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > > --00000000000042709205c5ec9c42 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
"Confirmation" isn't needed for softforks. = Miners controlling confirmation doesn't mean miners control the rules, = they never did. Read section 11 of the bitcoin paper "even with a majo= rity of hashrate one cannot arbitrarily change rules or forge signatures.
You may say users chosing the r= ules is "politicial". Isn't miners deciding them for users mo= re political? Whatever you call it, it is still how free software works: us= ers decide what to run.
It is extremely disappointin= g to see how few developers seem to ubderstand this, or even care about use= rs deciding or miners not deciding the rules.
How ca= n we expect users to understand bitcoin when most developers don't seem= to understand it?

It is= really sad.

On Tue, Jun 29, 2021, 19:17 Eric Voskuil <eric@voskuil.org> wrote:

> On Jun 29, 2021, at 10:55, Luke Dashjr <luke@dashjr.org> wrote:=
>
> =EF=BB=BFThe only alternative to a split in the problematic scenarios = are 1) concede
> centralised miner control over the network,

Miners control confirmation, entirely.

This is the nature of bitcoin. And merchants control validation, entirely. = Anyone can be a miner or a merchant. Neither is inherently =E2=80=9Cbetter= =E2=80=9D than the other. The largest merchants are likely a handful of exc= hanges, likely at least as centralized as miners are pooled.

Splitting does not change this.

> and 2) have inconsistent
> enforcement of rules by users who don't agree on what the correct = rules are,

There are no =E2=80=9Ccorrect=E2=80=9D rules. Whatever rules one enforces d= etermine what network he chooses to participate in.

> again leading to centralised miner control over the network.

Leading to? Miners control confirmation, always. Whether that is centralize= d, just as with merchanting, is up to individuals.

> In other words, in this context, accepting a split between disagreeing= users
> is the ONLY way Bitcoin can possibly continue as a decentralised curre= ncy.

No, it is not. You are proposing splitting as the method of censorship resi= stance inherent to Bitcoin. Coordinating this split requires coordinated ac= tion. The whole point of bitcoin is coordinate that action based on mining = (proof of work). Replacing that with a political process is just a reversio= n to political money.

> Making that split as clean and well-defined as possible not only ensur= es the
> best opportunity for both sides of the disagreement,

Trivially accomplished, just change a rule. This isn=E2=80=99t about that. = It=E2=80=99s about how one gets others to go along with the new coin, or st= ay with the old. An entirely political process, which is clearly evident fr= om the campaigns around such attempts.

> but also minimises the
> risk that the split occurs at all (since the "losing" side n= eeds to concede,
> rather than passively continue the disagreement ongoing after the atte= mpted
> protocol change).

Nobody =E2=80=9Cneeds to=E2=80=9D concede once a split has occurred, which = is evident in existing splits.

e

> Luke
>
>
>> On Tuesday 29 June 2021 08:44:56 Eric Voskuil wrote:
>> At least we are now acknowledging that splitting is what it=E2=80= =99s about. That=E2=80=99s
>> progress.
>>
>> e
>>
>>>> On Jun 29, 2021, at 01:32, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n <jtimon@jti= mon.cc> wrote:
>>>
>>> =EF=BB=BF
>>> I think the option of "permanent failure because miners v= eto" should
>>> actually be abandoned. No, I don't think we should avoid s= plits when
>>> possible, I don't think we should avoid splits at all cost= s.
>>>
>>>> On Sun, Jun 27, 2021, 19:12 Billy Tetrud <billy.tet= rud@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> @Luke
>>>>
>>>>> They can still slow it down.
>>>>
>>>> Absolutely. However I think that the option of permanent f= ailure is
>>>> important. It certainly would be ideal to ensure that enou= gh bitcoin
>>>> users support the upgrade *before* releasing it, however r= ealistically
>>>> this can never be more than an estimate, and estimates can= sometimes be
>>>> wildly wrong. It would be unfortunate if miners had a subs= tantially
>>>> different estimate of user support than the people putting= in the work
>>>> to release bitcoin upgrades. Even if upgrades are never re= leased before
>>>> it becomes clear that a large supermajority of users want = the upgrade,
>>>> if miners don't agree with the estimate a harmful chai= n split could
>>>> occur. And I agree with Eric that the goal here is to prev= ent a chain
>>>> split during an upgrade when possible. This includes perma= nent failure
>>>> of an upgrade when there is unexpectedly large miner oppos= ition.
>>>>
>>>> This of course does not prevent a UASF-style deployment to= be done after
>>>> an initial failure to deploy occurs. My proposal is essent= ially a
>>>> mechanism to improve upon the speedy-trial idea, allowing = for even
>>>> speedier releases (than speedy trial) without adding addit= ional risk of
>>>> undesired chain splits.
>>>>
>>>>> [BIP8] already has the trinary state you seem to be de= scribing
>>>>
>>>> It sounds like you're saying the trinary state of BIP8= is A. Follow the
>>>> longest chain, B. Follow the upgrade chain, or C. follow t= he
>>>> non-upgraded chain. I agree. However the trinary state in = my proposal is
>>>> materially different - it is the signaling itself that is = trinary, not
>>>> just which chain is being followed. This allows others to = know and make
>>>> programmatic decisions (in software) based on that signali= ng. I'm sure
>>>> you can agree that does not exist in BIP8.
>>>>
>>>>> No additional bit is needed, as softforks are coordina= ted between
>>>>> users, NOT miners
>>>>
>>>> And yet there is miner involvement, as you rightly pointed= out. Miners
>>>> are needed to set the nVersion in the header. So when you = say "no
>>>> additional bit is needed", could you please be cleare= r as to what you
>>>> mean? Do you mean that signaling of opposition in a block = can be done
>>>> without any "additional bit"? Or are you just sa= ying that it is
>>>> redundant to consider what miners might be opposing an upg= rade?
>>>>
>>>> @Jorge
>>>>
>>>>> If different users want different incompatible things.= .. there's no
>>>>> way to avoid the split
>>>>
>>>> I agree. This happened with bcash, and that's fine. It= was painful, but
>>>> there were a significant amount of users that disagreed, a= nd they have
>>>> the chain they want now.
>>>>
>>>> But we generally all want to avoid a chain split when poss= ible. Because
>>>> chain splits have a cost, and that cost can be high, its l= ikely that
>>>> many users would rather choose the chain with the most sup= port rather
>>>> than choosing the chain with their preferred rules.
>>>>
>>>> However, the question here is: how do we estimate what fra= ction of users
>>>> wants which rules? We don't have a divining rod to det= ermine with
>>>> certainty what users want. We can only make polls of vario= us levels of
>>>> inaccuracy. The methods bitcoin has been using is communit= y discussion
>>>> and social consensus estimation as well as miner signaling= during the
>>>> actual deployment period. Neither of these are perfect, bu= t they are
>>>> both reasonable enough mechanisms. However, because both o= f these
>>>> mechanisms are very rough estimates of user sentiment, we = need to
>>>> consider the possibility that sometimes the estimate may b= e
>>>> substantially inaccurate when we design deployment procedu= res. This
>>>> inaccuracy is why we need multiple barriers in place for a= n upgrade, and
>>>> why we need to have higher thresholds of success (require = larger
>>>> supermajorities in both consensus and miner signaling). >>>>
>>>> Developers obviously care about bitcoin and have an incent= ive (personal
>>>> and probably financial) to do it right. And miners have bo= th an
>>>> incentive to keep the system healthy, as well as an incent= ive to mine on
>>>> the chain that the economic majority of users is using. Bu= t measuring
>>>> the consensus of the bitcoin community can be extraordinar= ily difficult
>>>> to do with consistent accuracy, and so I think miner signa= ling as it has
>>>> been used as a second barrier to entry for an upgrade is q= uite
>>>> appropriate.
>>>>
>>>>> On Sun, Jun 27, 2021 at 2:22 AM Eric Voskuil <eric@vo= skuil.org> wrote:
>>>>> I have not objected to anyone splitting. As I said, a = split is always
>>>>> possible, and of course has been done on a large scale= . It is only the
>>>>> misleading statements about inherent soft fork =E2=80= =9Ccompatibility=E2=80=9D and the
>>>>> implication that activation without hash power enforce= ment does not
>>>>> create a split that I object to. People who know bette= r should be
>>>>> honest about it.
>>>>>
>>>>> Far too many people have been led to believe there is = some sort of
>>>>> activation choice with =E2=80=9Censured=E2=80=9D equal= outcomes (maybe =E2=80=9Cslowed down=E2=80=9D).
>>>>> There is only a choice between creating a split and ha= sh power
>>>>> enforcement. Soft forks are rule changes, and thereby = incompatible -
>>>>> unless enforced by majority hash power.
>>>>>
>>>>> The statements below are grossly misleading and need t= o be called out
>>>>> as such so that people can actually make this decision= you speak of.
>>>>> This idea that =E2=80=9Cusers=E2=80=9D decide the rule= s is not the question. The
>>>>> question is only how to avoid a split. If one does not= care he can
>>>>> split at any time, no discussion required.
>>>>>
>>>>> e
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Jun 27, 2021, at 01:47, Jorge Tim=C3=B3n <jt= imon@jtimon.cc> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> =EF=BB=BFIf different users want different incompa= tible things (enough on
>>>>>> each side), there's no way to avoid the split.= We shouldn't try to
>>>>>> avoid such a split.
>>>>>> Users decide the rules, not miners nor developers.=
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Sun, Jun 27, 2021 at 12:05 AM Eric Voskuil = via bitcoin-dev
>>>>>>> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linux= foundation.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Ultimately there is only one answer to this qu= estion. Get majority
>>>>>>> hash power support.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Soft fork enforcement is the same act as any o= ther censorship
>>>>>>> enforcement, the difference is only a question= of what people want.
>>>>>>> Given that there is no collective =E2=80=9Cwe= =E2=80=9D, those wants differ. Bitcoin
>>>>>>> resolves this question of conflicting wants, b= ut it is not a
>>>>>>> democracy, it=E2=80=99s a market. One votes by= trading.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If one wants to enforce a soft fork (or otherw= ise censor) this is
>>>>>>> accomplished by mining (or paying others to do= so). Anyone can mine,
>>>>>>> so everyone gets a say. Mining is trading capi= tal now for more
>>>>>>> later. If enough people want to do that, they = can enforce a soft
>>>>>>> fork. It=E2=80=99s time Bitcoiners stop thinki= ng of miners as other people.
>>>>>>> Anyone can mine, and that=E2=80=99s your vote.=
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Otherwise, as mentioned below, anyone can star= t a new coin. But it=E2=80=99s
>>>>>>> dishonest to imply that one can do this and al= l others will surely
>>>>>>> follow. This cannot be known, it=E2=80=99s mer= ely a gamble. And it=E2=80=99s one
>>>>>>> that has been shown to not always pay off.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> e
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Jun 26, 2021, at 14:43, Eric Voskui= l <eric@voskuil.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> =EF=BB=BFFor some definitions of =E2=80=9C= block=E2=80=9D.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Without majority hash power support, activ= ation simply means you
>>>>>>>> are off on a chain split. Anyone can of co= urse split off from a
>>>>>>>> chain by changing a rule (soft or otherwis= e) at any time, so this
>>>>>>>> is a bit of an empty claim.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Nobody can stop a person from splitting. T= he relevant question is
>>>>>>>> how to *prevent* a split. And activation w= ithout majority hash
>>>>>>>> power certainly does not =E2=80=9Censure= =E2=80=9D this.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> e
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Jun 26, 2021, at 14:13, Luke Dashjr= via bitcoin-dev
>>>>>>>>> <bitcoin-dev@lis= ts.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> =EF=BB=BFBIP8 LOT=3DTrue just ensures = miners cannot block an upgrade
>>>>>>>>> entirely. They can still slow it down.=
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It also already has the trinary state = you seem to be describing
>>>>>>>>> (although perhaps this could be better= documented in the BIP):
>>>>>>>>> users who oppose the softfork can and = should treat the successful
>>>>>>>>> signal (whether MASF or UASF) as inval= id, thereby ensuring they do
>>>>>>>>> not follow a chain with the rules in f= orce.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> No additional bit is needed, as softfo= rks are coordinated between
>>>>>>>>> users, NOT miners (who have no particu= lar say in them, aside from
>>>>>>>>> their role as also being users). The m= iner involvement is only out
>>>>>>>>> of necessity (to set the bit in the he= ader, which users coordinate
>>>>>>>>> with) and potentially to accelerate ac= tivation by protecting
>>>>>>>>> upgrade-lagging users.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Luke
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Saturday 26 June 2021 20:21= :52 Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Given the recent controversy over = upgrade mechanisms for the
>>>>>>>>>> non-controversial taproot upgrade,= I have been thinking about
>>>>>>>>>> ways to solve the problems that bo= th sides brought up. In short,
>>>>>>>>>> BIP8 LOT=3Dtrue proponents make th= e point that lazy miners failing
>>>>>>>>>> to upgrade in a timely manner slow= down releases of bitcoin
>>>>>>>>>> upgrades, and BIP9 / BIP8 LOT=3Dfa= lse proponents make the point
>>>>>>>>>> that LOT=3Dtrue can lead to undesi= rable forks that might cause a
>>>>>>>>>> lot of chaos. I believe both point= s are essentially correct and
>>>>>>>>>> have created a proposal
>>>>>>>>>> <https://github.com/fresheneesz/bip-trinary-version-sign= aling/blo
>>>>>>>>>> b/master/b ip-trinary-version-bits= .md> for soft fork upgrades that
>>>>>>>>>> solve both problems.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The proposal uses trinary version = signaling rather than binary
>>>>>>>>>> signaling. For any particular pros= pective soft fork upgrade, this
>>>>>>>>>> allows for three signaling states:=
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> * Actively support the change.
>>>>>>>>>> * Actively oppose the change.
>>>>>>>>>> * Not signaling (neither support o= r oppose). This is the default
>>>>>>>>>> state.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Using this additional information,= we can release non-contentious
>>>>>>>>>> upgrades much quicker (with a much= lower percent of miners
>>>>>>>>>> signaling support). For contentiou= s upgrades, miners who oppose
>>>>>>>>>> the change are incentivized to upd= ate their software to a version
>>>>>>>>>> that can actively signal oppositio= n to the change. The more
>>>>>>>>>> opposition there is, the higher th= e threshold necessary to lock
>>>>>>>>>> in the upgrade. With the parameter= s I currently recommended in
>>>>>>>>>> the proposal, this chart shows how= much support signaling would
>>>>>>>>>> be necessary given a particular am= ount of active opposition
>>>>>>>>>> signaling:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> [image: thresholdChart.png]
>>>>>>>>>> If literally no one signals opposi= tion, a 60% threshold should be
>>>>>>>>>> relatively safe because it is a su= permajority amount that is
>>>>>>>>>> unlikely to change significantly v= ery quickly (ie if 60% of
>>>>>>>>>> miners support the change today, i= ts unlikely that less than a
>>>>>>>>>> majority of miners would support t= he change a year or two from
>>>>>>>>>> now), and if no one is signaling o= pposition, chances are that the
>>>>>>>>>> vast majority of the other 40% wou= ld also eventually signal
>>>>>>>>>> support.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> This both gives an incentive for &= quot;lazy" miners to upgrade if they
>>>>>>>>>> actually oppose the change while a= t the same time allowing these
>>>>>>>>>> lazy miners to remain lazy without= slowing down the soft fork
>>>>>>>>>> activation much.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I think now is the right time to d= iscuss new soft fork upgrade
>>>>>>>>>> mechanisms, when there are no pres= sing soft fork upgrades ready
>>>>>>>>>> to deploy. Waiting until we need t= o deploy a soft fork to discuss
>>>>>>>>>> this will only delay things and ca= use contention again like it
>>>>>>>>>> did with taproot.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I'm very curious to know what = people think of this mechanism. I
>>>>>>>>>> would appreciate any comments here= , or written as github issues
>>>>>>>>>> on the proposal repo itself.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>>>>>> BT
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> ______________________________________= _________
>>>>>>>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>>>>>>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.l= inuxfoundation.org
>>>>>>>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev<= /a>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ______________________________________________= _
>>>>>>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>>>>>>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoun= dation.org
>>>>>>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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