Re: [bitcoin-dev] What to do when contentious soft fork activations are attempted

["Jorge Timón" <jtimon@jtimon.cc>]

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On Tue, May 3, 2022 at 4:36 PM Ryan Grant <bitcoin-dev@rgrant.org> wrote:

> On Sun, May 1, 2022 at 8:49 PM Jorge Timón via bitcoin-dev
> <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > On Sun, May 1, 2022, 09:22 alicexbt via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> >> [...] Andreas is clueless about BIP 119 and other covenant
> >> proposals.  He is spreading misinformation and [...]
>
> > Clueless and spreading disinformation, you say?  What
> > misinformation, could you explain?
>
> First, OP_CTV covenants cannot restrict any address that the sender
> does not control.  OP_CTV just delivers auditable presigned
> transactions.  That's it!  OP_CTV's primary design constraint is to
> NOT empower new ways to do blacklists (which are already possible
> using unwanted-multisig).  That's not a statement about what Bitcoin
> should ultimately become, but rather what Bitcoin is likely ready for.
> Much like Bitcoin's design, the simplest possible covenant solution
> was chosen, so that it would be "dirt simple" to audit that the code
> does only what it should, and no more.
>
> Andreas used a few words of indecision to make excuses for not
> code-reviewing BIP119 or the pull request, while using a lot of words
> talking about: how dangerous any change is; conservative consensus
> process; and GovCoin blacklists.  This gave the strong impression that
> the change was dangerous and could easily lead to the creation of
> blacklists enforced by L1 consensus itself (rather than enforced by
> other signers in a sidechain or unwanted-multisig).
>
> Andreas also didn't look into the reason that the proposed client was
> safe and would not cause a chain split.  Speedy Trials by themselves
> don't risk chain splits, they poll.  There was no UASF in the planned
> executable.  Some devs hate ST because it puts the initiative in
> miner's hands to gauge **user support and readiness** - which those
> devs feel the miners have no reason to be good at - but that expires
> speedily.  If everyone loved the change and the trial was about to
> pass, except ornery users - who we love when UASF is needed, of
> course - were going to cause a chain split of their own to block it,
> then ST offers miners the capability to - very quickly, faster than a
> release can be pushed out - change their signaling to again prevent a
> chain split.
>

I don't think that's enough of a reason to justify you calling andreas
"clueless". I'm sure whatever andreas said, he said it with the best
intentions.
Remember:

- Avoid personal attacks

Accusing andreas of being clueless is spreading misinformation.

Russell O'Connor wrote the definitive explanation for how ST arose in
> the consensus process and how it was designed to make everyone
> unhappy.  It's a great explanation of what we went through last year.
>
>   https://r6.ca/blog/20210615T191422Z.html
>
>     "On Building Consensus and Speedy Trial"
>
>     on | 2021-06-15T19:14:22Z
>     by | Russell O'Connor
>

That's a lot of text, are you sure he said in there he designed speedy
trial to make everyone unhappy?
Well, if we're still talking about it, that proves that it failed at its
own design criterion of failing fast.
But if you think my judgement about speedy trial (sorry, we discussed it
for so long that I forgot the BIP number, it wasn't eight, I remember that)
and I locked my mind in about speedy trial too soon and without giving
anyone a chance to coordinate about my personal signaling of the
proposal...I guess I can give you a grace period of 6 months to upgrade
your own mind about it and accept my judgment about it, so that concern
about my criticism on the proposal is addressed.
There may be a couple of people trying to create dissent about this opinion
of mine. But once all concerns are addressed...

Andreas also didn't look for a non-attack reason for a separate binary
> release.  (Here I feel like I should be naming a lot of devs as well,
> hmm.)  Let's go back to O'Connor, who reminds us of a faction from the
> last consensus change:
>
>   > The "devs-do-not-decide" faction's concern is regarding the
>   > appearance of Bitcoin developers deciding the rules of Bitcoin.
>   > [...]  This faction would be fine with users building their own
>   > alternative client for forced activation, or a configuration flag
>   > for enabling some kind of forced activation that is not enabled by
>   > default.
>

Yeah, I know, both speedy trial and CTV could be perceived as developers
trying to dictate rules.
I guess that criticism against bip8 can be applied from now on to any
proposal forever. what a great precedent.
It's not always that software designers should focus on making everyone
unhappy (like any other kind of designer, I guess), but some times it's
potential perceptions from vaguely defined groups that should be at the
heart of your design decisions.


> Maintainers of the repository and "Big Name" devs have very personal
> reasons to take this stance.  Meanwhile, devs who want to form an
> opinion on some given matter but who do not want to do their own code
> reviews typically look to Big Name code reviewers for guidance, in a
> "Consensus Beauty Contest" [note_kbc].  Contrast this with everyone
> who restricts their opinion-formation to their own review of the code;
> they are "Doing Consensus Right", rather than being stuck in the
> Beauty Contest.  Now, if a "devs-do-not-decide" dev wrote some code,
> they implicitly reviewed their own code, right?  But!  If they did not
> write that code, then they **must avoid it** ...in proportion to how
> much it affects consensus.  According to this theory of Bitcoin's
> consensus, we would **expect** Big Names to be partly missing from the
> OP_CTV code reviews.  This confuses people who are used to playing the
> Consensus Beauty Contest.
>
>   [note_kbc:] for another game about what everybody else thinks,
>     see Keynesian beauty contest:
>       https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keynesian_beauty_contest
>
>     (The connection is funny to me because we all have to individually
>     play this game when deciding what money is, and in so doing pay a
>     last homage to Keynes, during our multi-generational exit from his
>     eponymous economics of manipulated interest rates.)
>
> Jimmy Song, in a video best fitting the advocacy referred to by
> Michael (who did not give any specific link), claims that the OP_CTV
> review process is "routing around" some Big Names.  Jimmy is seemingly
> unaware that some Big Names are explicitly not participating in
> guiding what Bitcoin's consensus should be, and that some are even
> using strategic ambiguity to do so.  With the context above, we have a
> much less nefarious interpretation of motive for releasing a
> binary - one that is part of the consensus process.
>
>   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5VNiiCYnIg
>     "Bitcoin Brief - BIP119, Mexico CBDC & Bitcoin's Role in Russia vs
>     Ukraine!"
>     on | Apr 25, 2022
>
>     (mark 1:13:52.0) Jimmy Song
>     (mark 1:18:00.0) "routing around"
>
> An alternative client must, by necessity, offer both its consensus
> feature and its activation.  Releasing an alternative client is not a
> decision made from impatience and disrespect.  It’s the result of
> asking everyone, getting literal non-responses, and intuiting that the
> landscape has changed, so something on this path must be different
> from last time.  While the alternative client route surprised me when
> I heard about it, I cannot say that I personally knew of any other way
> to advance what has clearly been a blocked discussion, and so I did
> not disassociate myself from the effort.  People do not understand how
> blocked up consensus is, and no dev has verbalized a better solution
> for maintainers than strategic ambiguity, which is most confusing when
> it is delivering only silence.
>

I don't know about beauty contest or big names.
But if you want to speak in those terms...
If there was a beauty contest for activation proposals and I was part of
the jury, BIP8 would win.
I was once in love with bip9, but, no offense, she is getting old.
And regarding speedy trial, whatever its bip was...sorry, I was trying to
follow your analogy, but some times my instinct tells me not to make
certain jokes about the lord of the rings in certain contexts.
As it turns out, not everyone likes the lord of the rings, or beauty
contests.


> The typical alternative offered by other devs is, "Wait."  Well, this
> "Wait" has almost always meant "Never."  Take a look at CSFS and APO.
> They've been waiting, but for what?  What's the bug that BIP authors
> can't fix?  Where's the concrete pull request?  Who is going to anoint
> them as done?  OP_CTV has made its rite of passage and transcended
> these questions.  Its only competition is whether something better can
> be imagined, but those arguments need to explain why learning from a
> good opcode in the meantime is worth waiting years to work through new
> safety concerns.  If any of this matters, then timing matters, too.
> OP_CTV is sitting at the front of the bus
>

Speedy covenants (I will write an email explaining the proposal and asking
for a bip number) is I think a superior covenant prooposal in terms of not
waiting. Minor activation details aside, it has been implemented for longer
than OP_CTV, and discussed for longer too.
I know what you're thinking: but that would be a hardfork and necromancy.
No, it wouldn't, well, at least not the hardfork part. Can we undo a
softfork with another softfork?
Well, I don't know if always, but some times, in practice, yes we can.
I will explain how in the coming "speedy covenants".


> Personally, I suspect that the "something better" crowd wants
> recursive covenants, yet recognizes the argument is difficult and
> would have put it off in a sense of misplaced priorities, but we'll
> find out soon.  If there were some kind of assurance that could be
> offered, something that would result in a less contentious soft fork,
> instead of stonewalling resistance that makes all soft forks more
> contentious, then a later "epsilon" upgrade to covenants would be
> easier instead of harder.  This is because everyone who believes that
> recursive covenants are not a new threat to Bitcoin could argue
> towards a common purpose and resolve that in a binding consensus
> agreement.  One such binding mechanism could be parties committing
> matched coins locked under a future opcode, although this would be an
> extreme departure from typical development and incur massive risk to
> the parties if for other reasons phase two of the initiative fails.
> It's too bad the game theory isn't simpler.
>

Let's not allow perfection to be the enemy of the good sutff, or something
like that.
Hopefully speedy covenants will solve all the latest tensions around.
And OP_CTV can always be implemented afterwards if it is more optimal under
some criteria.

Finally, Andreas summarized the conservatism in his position as
> basically, "If you want scripting and contracts, go buy ETH."  Which
> is offensive to everyone trying to make bitcoins more protective of
> individual freedom and thus more valuable; whether you're working on
> scaling and privacy, the Lightning Network, Discreet Log Contracts,
> CoinPool covenants, self-custody vault covenants, building out Taproot
> capabilities, or working on other infrastructure.  What a clueless
> shitcoiner!
>
>   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vAE5fOZ2Luw
>
>     "BIP119, EU regulatory attack, El Salvador, and much more in Q&A
>     with aantonop (April 2022)"
>
>     on | Apr 24, 2022
>     by | aantonop
>
>     (mark 30:34.0) "if you want to do smart contracts..."
>
> The path to redemption in the Bitcoin community is to unequivocally
> help Bitcoin.
>

The path to redemption for whom?


> Jeremy wasn't always Bitcoin-only, but his efforts have been sincere
> and he works in the concrete realm where anyone can judge how pure his
> contributions are.  Even if OP_CTV is never activated, or if no
> covenant opcode is ever activated, Bitcoin is much more secure due to
> the critical bug fixes that Jeremy has already seen merged just
> planning ahead for a mempool that could handle dependent transactions.
> Bitcoin was never under attack or at risk of harm from Jeremy's
> actions to advance the covenants discussion.
>
> Andreas is welcome to research technical merits better before
> communicating, and to discover how a vision of powerful contract
> covenants - in the most decentralized money that exists - can affect
> people's freedom.  In so doing, join us.
>

yeah, jeremy is welcomed to understand bip8 and the analysis behind it.
He just needs to be open minded and not worry about "perceptions" for a few
minutes, so I don't think he will be able to, sadly.
But let's not personally attack andreas for his opinions.
The only reason you don't like bip8 is because you're ignorant about it and
you haven't reviewed it enough.
join bip8, join us. do it for freedom.

Speaking less specifically of ctv, SC or other covenants proposals, but
more generally about covenants...
What are your thoughts on "visacoin" (described on the technical bitcoin
forums) in the context of covenants?

Anyway, I should be working on a covenants proposal older than ctv myself.
Instead of just talking and criticizing what others have done.
You have a point there.

Jappy Janukka

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