* Re: [Bitcoin-development] Fake PGP key for Gavin
2014-03-22 17:03 [Bitcoin-development] Fake PGP key for Gavin Mike Hearn
@ 2014-03-22 17:33 ` Gavin Andresen
2014-03-22 18:21 ` Peter Todd
` (2 subsequent siblings)
3 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Gavin Andresen @ 2014-03-22 17:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mike Hearn; +Cc: Bitcoin Dev
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On Sat, Mar 22, 2014 at 1:03 PM, Mike Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:
> do we codesign the Windows binaries?
Yes, the -setup.exe installers are Authenticode (or whatever Microsoft is
calling that these days) code-signed.
--
--
Gavin Andresen
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bitcoin-development] Fake PGP key for Gavin
2014-03-22 17:03 [Bitcoin-development] Fake PGP key for Gavin Mike Hearn
2014-03-22 17:33 ` Gavin Andresen
@ 2014-03-22 18:21 ` Peter Todd
2014-03-23 0:59 ` Oliver Egginger
2014-03-23 22:12 ` Troy Benjegerdes
3 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Peter Todd @ 2014-03-22 18:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mike Hearn; +Cc: Bitcoin Dev
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On Sat, Mar 22, 2014 at 06:03:03PM +0100, Mike Hearn wrote:
> In case you didn't see this yet,
>
> http://gavintech.blogspot.ch/2014/03/it-aint-me-ive-got-pgp-imposter.html
>
> If you're using PGP to verify Bitcoin downloads, it's very important that
> you check you are using the right key. Someone seems to be creating fake
> PGP keys that are used to sign popular pieces of crypto software, probably
> to make a MITM attack (e.g. from an intelligence agency) seem more
> legitimate.
Note that Bitcoin source and binary downloads are protected by both the
PGP WoT and the certificate authority PKI system. The binaries are
hosted on bitcoin.org, which is https and protected by a the PKI system,
and the source code is hosted on github, again, https protected. A MITM
attack would need to compromise the PKI system as well, at least
provided users aren't fooled into downloading over http.
--
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
0000000000000000657de91df7a64d25adfd3ff117bc30d00f5aa3065894f4a5
[-- Attachment #2: Digital signature --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 685 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bitcoin-development] Fake PGP key for Gavin
2014-03-22 17:03 [Bitcoin-development] Fake PGP key for Gavin Mike Hearn
2014-03-22 17:33 ` Gavin Andresen
2014-03-22 18:21 ` Peter Todd
@ 2014-03-23 0:59 ` Oliver Egginger
2014-03-23 22:12 ` Troy Benjegerdes
3 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Oliver Egginger @ 2014-03-23 0:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mike Hearn; +Cc: Bitcoin Development
Am 22.03.2014 18:03, schrieb Mike Hearn:
> In case you didn't see this yet,
>
> http://gavintech.blogspot.ch/2014/03/it-aint-me-ive-got-pgp-imposter.html
>
> If you're using PGP to verify Bitcoin downloads, it's very important
> that you check you are using the right key. Someone seems to be creating
> fake PGP keys that are used to sign popular pieces of crypto software,
> probably to make a MITM attack (e.g. from an intelligence agency) seem
> more legitimate.
From the user's perspective: In the beginning I found it difficult to
find the keys. At last I have made this side for documentation:
https://www.olivere.de/blog/archives/2013/06/02/install_bitcoin_client/
Okay, is outdated meanwhile ...
Normally people fetch the keys by key-id from a well known key server.
Not because they are paranoid, but because it is the most convenient
method under Linux.
A Google search for Gavin+Andresen+gpg brings me herein:
http://sourceforge.net/p/bitcoin/mailman/message/30551147/
Key-Id?
Nevertheless, I'm glad that you guys signed anything. That makes me
sleep better. I really check this.
- oliver
GPG: https://olivere.de/gpg
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bitcoin-development] Fake PGP key for Gavin
2014-03-22 17:03 [Bitcoin-development] Fake PGP key for Gavin Mike Hearn
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2014-03-23 0:59 ` Oliver Egginger
@ 2014-03-23 22:12 ` Troy Benjegerdes
2014-03-24 19:44 ` The Doctor
3 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Troy Benjegerdes @ 2014-03-23 22:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mike Hearn; +Cc: Bitcoin Dev
On Sat, Mar 22, 2014 at 06:03:03PM +0100, Mike Hearn wrote:
> In case you didn't see this yet,
>
> http://gavintech.blogspot.ch/2014/03/it-aint-me-ive-got-pgp-imposter.html
>
> If you're using PGP to verify Bitcoin downloads, it's very important that
> you check you are using the right key. Someone seems to be creating fake
> PGP keys that are used to sign popular pieces of crypto software, probably
> to make a MITM attack (e.g. from an intelligence agency) seem more
> legitimate.
I find it more likely that fake PGP keys are from corporate industrial
espionage and/or organized crime outfits. Intelligence agencies will stick
to compromised X509, network cards, and binary code blobs.
Besides, why would an intelligence agency want your bitcoin when they can
just intercept ASIC miners and make their own?
> I think the Mac DMG's of Core are signed for Gatekeeper, but do we codesign
> the Windows binaries? If not it'd be a good idea, if only because AV
> scanners learn key reputations to reduce false positives. Of course this is
> not a panacea, and Linux unfortunately does not support X.509 code signing,
> but having extra signing can't really hurt.
Uhhmm, real operating system use package managers with PGP instead of pre-
compromised X.509 nonsense. https://wiki.debian.org/SecureApt
--
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Troy Benjegerdes 'da hozer' hozer@hozed.org
7 elements earth::water::air::fire::mind::spirit::soul grid.coop
Never pick a fight with someone who buys ink by the barrel,
nor try buy a hacker who makes money by the megahash
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [Bitcoin-development] Fake PGP key for Gavin
2014-03-23 22:12 ` Troy Benjegerdes
@ 2014-03-24 19:44 ` The Doctor
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: The Doctor @ 2014-03-24 19:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: bitcoin-development
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
On 03/23/2014 03:12 PM, Troy Benjegerdes wrote:
> I find it more likely that fake PGP keys are from corporate
> industrial espionage and/or organized crime outfits. Intelligence
> agencies will stick to compromised X509, network cards, and binary
> code blobs.
We're seeing the same thing happen to a couple of developers active in
the censorship circumvention problem space as well (though it's not
for the first time it's happened).
> Besides, why would an intelligence agency want your bitcoin when
> they can just intercept ASIC miners and make their own?
Perhaps they have other motives for attempting a cybil attack against
developers than trying to acquire Bitcoins. Say, by making it easier
to subtitute alternate versions which are instrumented to make the
users easier to spy upon and later take down?
- --
The Doctor [412/724/301/703] [ZS]
Developer, Project Byzantium: http://project-byzantium.org/
PGP: 0x807B17C1 / 7960 1CDC 85C9 0B63 8D9F DD89 3BD8 FF2B 807B 17C1
WWW: https://drwho.virtadpt.net/
"The enemies know the system. The allies do not." --Jay Jacobs
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Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/
iEYEAREKAAYFAlMwixgACgkQO9j/K4B7F8FQEACfQG8+5rYDuJd+6P50Bgc8RRfU
Q28AoNdyUbR2k05wTka30OcUUQNK5FcN
=IeMU
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread