From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E3218F67 for ; Thu, 4 Feb 2016 17:36:08 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-lb0-f169.google.com (mail-lb0-f169.google.com [209.85.217.169]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 33FC81B2 for ; Thu, 4 Feb 2016 17:36:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-lb0-f169.google.com with SMTP id x4so36190055lbm.0 for ; Thu, 04 Feb 2016 09:36:08 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=Oe1u6+HUAU8cKeqkcGOyWUGKzgxqFiXgaPlauT0lfLc=; b=TNwt3ew8/9L9z6NYkfqT8iLhEHETZ0zWYD5Ef0lPoOavodnyt6ML91mz2ofxzpAsNd 172serJiQIw8nqM+D8+Oh6+9Czjfm5cWgJ5eY6dgjqPm8v2GaQp7PEreBq7XYJ1ec72L hEY8KpAA+QxxawkHMx3nbaTLTixji8wIeQhxw1ey70MMpol0QEAWN3fd8Gq4KBIrq7Na etLvCZdpso78/qI1Ljb7U33TjhtZRnvnIvQXevSEGvOTbmWAzpiOBOXKsAM12teCFz+u 34ouIkuuExwKAhEuwg4PtCgy8XyuAr6K7ogsbnDoqtLguuZCL3EZCymsrKCW7Xu5pmAb VuXg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=Oe1u6+HUAU8cKeqkcGOyWUGKzgxqFiXgaPlauT0lfLc=; b=dYZ94Xfw5rJCM/WTCZm3U+ehXLw7oFlOlL4M/NdnYNCtCOPl5oCVjdmw4SlOdMjU/L BNfuo6TdVFWta76KjvSCm9YWEJphxKnm2PJevA8Ta4fx8eL1Nk9s0iZY5iGIScEHeMoJ BynU6yfxX4klMdM9Oil14PUdw/8KaLRAUI6zsz5eXBKUGcDIVKmJ6UZSA7a9xMaXkslt xwggLI4FbwSzcP+4+3ljmJ+eT7Lo6z08o76PXoy9Nr5jp2So4TDX8H667CvEvYNr9HaB WHsZgn3Giu+NYn/jGNbsQPKiMtRSajmNVThFGJ7+j/vf2LbTFQrdch21WdjJX6UGYeKi rGZQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AG10YOQHJ4D+MoMA8kEWJ9el7R/klHB9hDXM7V8eVdfrAbkwvCcu7PV3Yuz3TKIN0Pcs4UjRf46+leL3QH4vgA== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.112.147.41 with SMTP id th9mr3970026lbb.74.1454607366449; Thu, 04 Feb 2016 09:36:06 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.25.79.208 with HTTP; Thu, 4 Feb 2016 09:36:06 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2016 12:36:06 -0500 Message-ID: From: Gavin Andresen To: jl2012 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7b3a84c45d73cf052af52bf5 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Thu, 04 Feb 2016 17:37:05 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Hardfork bit BIP X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 04 Feb 2016 17:36:09 -0000 --047d7b3a84c45d73cf052af52bf5 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 This BIP is unnecessary, in my opinion. I'm going to take issue with items (2) and (3) that are the motivation for this BIP: " 2. Full nodes and SPV nodes following original consensus rules may not be aware of the deployment of a hardfork. They may stick to an economic-minority fork and unknowingly accept devalued legacy tokens." If a hardfork is deployed by increasing the version number in blocks (as is done for soft forks), then there is no risk-- Full and SPV nodes should notice that they are seeing up-version blocks and warn the user that they are using obsolete software. It doesn't matter if the software is obsolete because of hard or soft fork, the difference in risks between those two cases will not be understood by the typical full node or SPV node user. " 3. In the case which the original consensus rules are also valid under the new consensus rules, users following the new chain may unexpectedly reorg back to the original chain if it grows faster than the new one. People may find their confirmed transactions becoming unconfirmed and lose money." If a hard or soft fork uses a 'grace period' (as described in BIP 9 or BIP 101) then there is essentially no risk that a reorg will happen past the triggering block. A block-chain re-org of two thousand or more blocks on the main Bitcoin chain is unthinkable-- the economic chaos would be massive, and the reaction to such a drastic (and extremely unlikely) event would certainly be a hastily imposed checkpoint to get everybody back onto the chain that everybody was using for economic transactions. Since I don't agree with the motivations for this BIP, I don't think the proposed mechanism (a negative-version-number-block) is necessary. And since it would simply add more consensus-level code, I believe the keep-it-simple principle applies. -- -- Gavin Andresen --047d7b3a84c45d73cf052af52bf5 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
This BIP is unnecessary, in my opinion.
I'm going to take issue with items (2) and (3) that are the moti= vation for this BIP:

" 2.=C2= =A0Full nodes and SPV nodes following original consensus rules may not be a= ware of the deployment of a hardfork. They may stick to an economic-minorit= y fork and unknowingly accept devalued legacy tokens."

If a hardfork is deployed b= y increasing the version number in blocks (as is done for soft forks), then= there is no risk-- Full and SPV nodes should notice that they are seeing u= p-version blocks and warn the user that they are using obsolete software.

It does= n't matter if the software is obsolete because of hard or soft fork, th= e difference in risks between those two cases will not be understood by the= typical full node or SPV node user.

" 3.=C2=A0In the case which the original= consensus rules are also valid under the new consensus rules, users follow= ing the new chain may unexpectedly reorg back to the original chain if it g= rows faster than the new one. People may find their confirmed transactions = becoming unconfirmed and lose money."

If a hard or soft fork use= s a 'grace period' (as described in BIP 9 or BIP 101) then there is= essentially no risk that a reorg will happen past the triggering block. A = block-chain re-org of two thousand or more blocks on the main Bitcoin chain= is unthinkable-- the economic chaos would be massive, and the reaction to = such a drastic (and extremely unlikely) event would certainly be a hastily = imposed checkpoint to get everybody back onto the chain that everybody was = using for economic transactions.

=

Since I don't agree with the motivations for this BIP, I don'= t think the proposed mechanism (a negative-version-number-block) is necessa= ry. And since it would simply add more consensus-level code, I believe the = keep-it-simple principle applies.


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Gavi= n Andresen

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