From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4560E3235 for ; Sat, 19 Jan 2019 05:35:58 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-qt1-f179.google.com (mail-qt1-f179.google.com [209.85.160.179]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 65B1CE6 for ; Sat, 19 Jan 2019 05:35:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-qt1-f179.google.com with SMTP id i7so17634549qtj.10 for ; Fri, 18 Jan 2019 21:35:57 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=HfEQjb0yOLooFOREsyAJSFCQRa4Ac267btYrBhhBpdc=; b=g9MntNAstlxuaSGiHdTlnhWAO7bs15Z1fFUlxwoiWyXqMkO/aUTSLbiu14v1CLeac8 Oq7mrVQ7oS5ZcBEw3ufoynqlnEDWlmw379aPu1ZPwy1VUaT76LALGISIRwLPWEt8BkVU gVLhx8kq5yO/Hr+vDAWp71DLBzU64RKE3CgpmCWmubBpjER8RO9X5V+U0ZQxzkH9Kn5T PsfIpsWZHZXicQl9sBDFI6RngwZURSaZXqFmfaDJTkLRXnvyyUM3Y/RYFD41CGDxWCmP uGQpOC1ZHgBz7NQjw5SN1runCbNfkeeyMHfl0MTZZkNycbVd1qKnSZGWEGc9qLhAFsQw 2+Pg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=HfEQjb0yOLooFOREsyAJSFCQRa4Ac267btYrBhhBpdc=; b=a5TKUIcAduvNmMkJzTHWOD7RoJhSnPp7loJhKr+Sg++S+ndNTB+v0RDBrCkk5929O8 nda6Ykasie4tGA8VNEAwOE7imCf3DW4I6UmdzDaTRHoHSoA9edE3Q6LQYkEIBJyS/Xcx 8c5/1JPmmOzl4BaqS8VV6zPOVKN1hWYDrhV0632TRWwZAOOO3ZtQ3Edslhvc3F1AVRur UnfI1N24M2+dcOng3WPm3tayc6VF0/LM+tEJO/zoWM5nnkAGmbhh5hbGRwhlg5biVfho g/+fLTlsHXfgpK7WfZj4SIEeyEqMApR61mB5jFgS0zXL3eRIxs826R0gVKCNDlcFMep3 JJPg== X-Gm-Message-State: AJcUukc74LJ+rQ3fVpSDD5ODqjQ3tK63UWL3FTxv8OFWoRxnq4GeirHh LJHXiqqKngXex+bfM6LXKXW82C0ohuz1KmwXgY8= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ALg8bN5LP5LWrNGjR6OsY8sPMNE5mylCz7n5QJp8K2WjHgBBPJeaLSTIiFbcubhWjxGcuAiTCm1je/h5Eb4VIV8HIR8= X-Received: by 2002:ac8:1779:: with SMTP id u54mr18587364qtk.285.1547876156318; Fri, 18 Jan 2019 21:35:56 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Matt Bell Date: Fri, 18 Jan 2019 21:35:43 -0800 Message-ID: To: ZmnSCPxj Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000007428df057fc900e4" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Sat, 19 Jan 2019 15:43:58 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Proof-of-Stake Bitcoin Sidechains X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Sat, 19 Jan 2019 05:35:58 -0000 --0000000000007428df057fc900e4 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi ZmnSCPxj, Just to clarify, my design does not specify the source of voting power, so it is agnostic to whatever system you want to derive stake or valdiator set membership from. Your idea of timelocking Bitcoin is interesting, I am eager to find a solution where holding Bitcoin is enough to get voting power. It's possible there may be an issue with the fact that the Bitcoin is not slashable (although their voting power is), meaning a validator who double-signs cannot have their Bitcoin removed from them. However their UTXO can be blacklisted which does make their attack costly since they lose out on the time-value of their stake. Our current thinking for the source of stake is to pay out stake to Bitcoin merged-miners although I'll definitely do some more thinking about timelocked Bitcoin as stake. On Fri, Jan 18, 2019, 5:42 PM ZmnSCPxj Good morning Matt, > > It seems to me much more interesting if the stakes used to weigh voting > power are UTXOs on the Bitcoin blockchain. > This idea is what I call "mainstake"; rather than a blockchain having its > own token that is self-attesting (which is insecure). > It seems to me, naively, that the same script you propose here can be use= d > for mainstake. > > For instance, the sidechain network might accept potential stakers on the > mainchain, if the staker proves the existence of a mainchain transaction > whose output is for example: > > OP_DROP > "1 year" OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY OP_DROP > OP_CHECKSIG > > The sidechain network could accept this and use the value of the output a= s > the weight of the vote of that stake. > > Regards, > ZmnSCPxj > > Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email. > > =E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90 Original = Message =E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90 > On Saturday, January 19, 2019 6:59 AM, Matt Bell via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > > > I have been working on a design for Bitcoin sidechains using the > Tendermint BFT consensus protocol, which is commonly used to build > proof-of-stake networks (Cosmos is the notable one). > > > > The design ends up being very similar to Blockstream's Liquid sidechain= , > since Tendermint consensus is not far off from Liquid's "strong federatio= n" > consensus. > > > > Any feedback about improvements or critical flaws would be greatly > appreciated. The design document is here: > https://github.com/mappum/bitcoin-peg/blob/master/bitcoinPeg.md (that > repo also contains a simplified implementation of this sidechain design). > > > > Thanks for your feedback, > > Matt Bell > --0000000000007428df057fc900e4 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi ZmnSCPxj,

Just to clarify, my design does not specify the source of voting powe= r, so it is agnostic to whatever system you want to derive stake or valdiat= or set membership from.

= Your idea of timelocking Bitcoin is interesting, I am eager to find a solut= ion where holding Bitcoin is enough to get voting power. It's possible = there may be an issue with the fact that the Bitcoin is not slashable (alth= ough their voting power is), meaning a validator who double-signs cannot ha= ve their Bitcoin removed from them. However their UTXO can be blacklisted w= hich does make their attack costly since they lose out on the time-value of= their stake.

Our current thinking for the source of stake is to p= ay out stake to Bitcoin merged-miners although=C2=A0I'll definitely do some more thinking about timelocked = Bitcoin as stake.

On Fri, Jan 18, 2019, 5:42 PM ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@protonmail.com wrote:
Good morning Matt,

It seems to me much more interesting if the stakes used to weigh voting pow= er are UTXOs on the Bitcoin blockchain.
This idea is what I call "mainstake"; rather than a blockchain ha= ving its own token that is self-attesting (which is insecure).
It seems to me, naively, that the same script you propose here can be used = for mainstake.

For instance, the sidechain network might accept potential stakers on the m= ainchain, if the staker proves the existence of a mainchain transaction who= se output is for example:

<sidechain identifier> OP_DROP
"1 year" OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY OP_DROP
<pubkey> OP_CHECKSIG

The sidechain network could accept this and use the value of the output as = the weight of the vote of that stake.

Regards,
ZmnSCPxj

Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email.

=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90 Original Me= ssage =E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90=E2=80=90
On Saturday, January 19, 2019 6:59 AM, Matt Bell via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> I have been working on a design for Bitcoin sidechains using the Tende= rmint BFT consensus protocol, which is commonly used to build proof-of-stak= e networks (Cosmos is the notable one).
>
> The design ends up being very similar to Blockstream's Liquid side= chain, since Tendermint consensus is not far off from Liquid's "st= rong federation" consensus.
>
> Any feedback about improvements or critical flaws would be greatly app= reciated. The design document is here: https://github.com/mappum/bitcoin-peg/blob/master/bitcoinPeg.m= d (that repo also contains a simplified implementation of this sidechai= n design).
>
> Thanks for your feedback,
> Matt Bell
--0000000000007428df057fc900e4--