From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from hemlock.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [140.211.166.133]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 331EFC016F for ; Mon, 22 Jun 2020 08:25:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hemlock.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2207688AC7 for ; Mon, 22 Jun 2020 08:25:22 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org Received: from hemlock.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id YDqQqiRouQn7 for ; Mon, 22 Jun 2020 08:25:21 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: from auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ot1-f50.google.com (mail-ot1-f50.google.com [209.85.210.50]) by hemlock.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1AF038877D for ; Mon, 22 Jun 2020 08:25:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-ot1-f50.google.com with SMTP id s13so12393619otd.7 for ; Mon, 22 Jun 2020 01:25:21 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=acinq-fr.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=7mb0EBOZWBkdq+mqsln2508MQ2fQAVPDRdAc3qN7bzI=; b=H0CmzuO9ruUk9DLSSKrVUQVwWxpR65wE+q/n+DLnxicwREIpWEv0Z3MIqLkHuuhHdj bhtQTjj2E8kNDcIf4OgYwhyEHgR1CR+2UlAP1pJBlC7JzvjUTHU1Gs9G986yHZaUeCIu sTaW9+8BClYqZHegW9vhxp2anGtY8/HMkQLL6y3HWOw2r/Xa/DJjRXOGO7JP2aHPpAxv ZBvSAcVh04PZj+teKJHxLBSIyIbtof9JkIMLFZKLCS66vrOjXPWsoRNFxuMTFka4x89m 3SIM41OVVlYkwkFOkBS5lK0OsTZd2Uzw0KWKOZhJ4qt8f6tkI6fGTa/Y5F9Hu6lJq1v1 gvXA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=7mb0EBOZWBkdq+mqsln2508MQ2fQAVPDRdAc3qN7bzI=; b=lluBf6RX5uMfUULO69UlkIBoce8RLZEXPEfdcIpjPGyQGEnLb+Rz2BOLa9dSBO6nlI kIVf7OdF04IcONoFPWRCh/QSKDYtRJ5/GFJrpDOJwEubsIfnDcs3E9+rWD00u9g4j6n2 hKwB9PKU3RRMXyHLa1t02kbYgN8wAbz0ndOoMDH3J9r83PeuSF5oGyu1TrmjdXcSMF4X KP4Pn2/wmtryJXIemyZZhRuRNwroHm3hvnIxUEg3oOLxcst2KcJBVr6xrLE1blvTgUq8 TLQLieVKyghgIcuiwZyub8hvVRxVCgEWg3M2jcPXQXkvR8d0dDRChxmFeIlilINPprqF WRlQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530xla217+2AorUh2NKOvZ1CeQqNLa4c4+COY8M2hIYd6FpMAsL9 G96Dgf9FWuml/eiqfqPekSXUbSjdh8v9Tb+NhCvOHA== X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzCvGzjLY7y07jyCHxED5ku6J6WD1dpyEoZ3im6DNv1uY/T34Ss2Rem41boyARDNb8NIBTvzTIHvx3NVRNCGnY= X-Received: by 2002:a05:6830:22f1:: with SMTP id t17mr13314876otc.288.1592814320176; Mon, 22 Jun 2020 01:25:20 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <67334082-5ABA-45C7-9C09-FF19B119C80D@mattcorallo.com> <62P_3wvv8z7AVCdKPfh-bs30-LliHkx9GI9Og3wqIK6hadIG0d6MJJm077zac1erpPUy31FqgZjkAjEl9AQtrOCg4XA5cxozBb7-OIbbgvE=@protonmail.com> <4c4f3a06-0078-ef6a-7b06-7484f0f9edf1@mattcorallo.com> <20200619195846.fclw4ilngvbbf2kk@ganymede> <20200619205220.fshbr7pbijaerbf2@ganymede> <20200620103647.g62srlcxbjqpaqj6@ganymede> In-Reply-To: From: Bastien TEINTURIER Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2020 10:25:09 +0200 Message-ID: To: ZmnSCPxj Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000bf61e705a8a7fb58" X-Mailman-Approved-At: Mon, 22 Jun 2020 11:03:50 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion , lightning-dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] RBF Pinning with Counterparties and Competing Interest X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2020 08:25:22 -0000 --000000000000bf61e705a8a7fb58 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hey ZmnSCPxj, I agree that in theory this looks possible, but doing it in practice with accurate control of what parts of the network get what tx feels impractical to me (but maybe I'm wrong!). It feels to me that an attacker who would be able to do this would break *any* off-chain construction that relies on absolute timeouts, so I'm hoping this is insanely hard to achieve without cooperation from a miners subset. Let me know if I'm too optimistic on this! Cheers, Bastien Le lun. 22 juin 2020 =C3=A0 10:15, ZmnSCPxj a =C3= =A9crit : > Good morning Bastien, > > > Thanks for the detailed write-up on how it affects incentives and > centralization, > > these are good points. I need to spend more time thinking about them. > > > > > This is one reason I suggested using independent pay-to-preimage > > > transactions[1] > > > > While this works as a technical solution, I think it has some incentive= s > issues too. > > In this attack, I believe the miners that hide the preimage tx in their > mempool have > > to be accomplice with the attacker, otherwise they would share that tx > with some of > > their peers, and some non-miner nodes would get that preimage tx and be > able to > > gossip them off-chain (and even relay them to other mempools). > > I believe this is technically possible with current mempool rules, withou= t > miners cooperating with the attacker. > > Basically, the attacker releases two transactions with near-equal fees, s= o > that neither can RBF the other. > It releases the preimage tx near miners, and the timelock tx near > non-miners. > > Nodes at the boundaries between those that receive the preimage tx and th= e > timelock tx will receive both. > However, they will receive one or the other first. > Which one they receive first will be what they keep, and they will reject > the other (and *not* propagate the other), because the difference in fees > is not enough to get past the RBF rules (which requires not just a feerat= e > increase, but also an increase in absolute fee, of at least the minimum > relay feerate times transaction size). > > Because they reject the other tx, they do not propagate the other tx, so > the boundary between the two txes is inviolate, neither can get past that > boundary, this occurs even if everyone is running 100% unmodified Bitcoin > Core code. > > I am not a mempool expert and my understanding may be incorrect. > > Regards, > ZmnSCPxj > --000000000000bf61e705a8a7fb58 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hey ZmnSCPxj,

I agree that in theory th= is looks possible, but doing it in practice with accurate control
of what parts of the network get what tx feels impractical to me (but mayb= e I'm wrong!).

It feels to me that an attacker= who would be able to do this would break *any* off-chain
constru= ction that relies on absolute timeouts, so I'm hoping this is insanely = hard to
achieve without cooperation from a miners=C2=A0subset. Le= t me know if I'm too optimistic on
this!

=
Cheers,
Bastien

Le=C2=A0lun. 22 juin 2020 =C3=A0=C2=A01= 0:15, ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj@prot= onmail.com> a =C3=A9crit=C2=A0:
Good morning Bastien,

> Thanks for the detailed write-up on how it affects incentives and cent= ralization,
> these are good points. I need to spend more time thinking about them.<= br> >
> > This is one reason I suggested using independent pay-to-preimage<= br> > > transactions[1]
>
> While this works as a technical solution, I think it has some incentiv= es issues too.
> In this attack, I believe the miners that hide the preimage tx in thei= r mempool have
> to be accomplice with the attacker, otherwise they would share that tx= with some of
> their peers, and some non-miner nodes would get that preimage tx and b= e able to
> gossip them off-chain (and even relay them to other mempools).

I believe this is technically possible with current mempool rules, without = miners cooperating with the attacker.

Basically, the attacker releases two transactions with near-equal fees, so = that neither can RBF the other.
It releases the preimage tx near miners, and the timelock tx near non-miner= s.

Nodes at the boundaries between those that receive the preimage tx and the = timelock tx will receive both.
However, they will receive one or the other first.
Which one they receive first will be what they keep, and they will reject t= he other (and *not* propagate the other), because the difference in fees is= not enough to get past the RBF rules (which requires not just a feerate in= crease, but also an increase in absolute fee, of at least the minimum relay= feerate times transaction size).

Because they reject the other tx, they do not propagate the other tx, so th= e boundary between the two txes is inviolate, neither can get past that bou= ndary, this occurs even if everyone is running 100% unmodified Bitcoin Core= code.

I am not a mempool expert and my understanding may be incorrect.

Regards,
ZmnSCPxj
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