From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AD2C8BDF for ; Wed, 11 Oct 2017 15:28:11 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-oi0-f54.google.com (mail-oi0-f54.google.com [209.85.218.54]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EDFC53FA for ; Wed, 11 Oct 2017 15:28:09 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-oi0-f54.google.com with SMTP id v9so3671618oif.13 for ; Wed, 11 Oct 2017 08:28:09 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=bspFNT/WyelcEcA4DdOmSUmb0eR2EzGNbK/ZiHjbVJY=; b=ekiLwEciEhO31Rb+5Litn3DQz73kbQLXW8B5xz3otgn83zcfCvfY572DUKsyGE0eKN ZF8vWyRZwSnax0jDnv6al7B/p+eqwvQ+4aREl/CRYgiPJIJnm+66awFlPQG6QpzpfSiD h5paWaKCTu9ZLGq0g2PgE2XerNVdHMGKohxAM/rB9G4tG0EiyiIF+Jr6MoFaEpg/HHMQ EymBdz5xfF+P4oRm8DS2hyTRxxBMlOTq0//XrQaDyKDLCR5ocTtKX0gFxAF9Qft1wNeP 6aESb8gb67jDrW4gonYPnHse5xcdwjvtlWPR/oFtq4e+sGpmv/Grc3ucxYyM4oPX6di3 tVUg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to; bh=bspFNT/WyelcEcA4DdOmSUmb0eR2EzGNbK/ZiHjbVJY=; b=Z/kgbmQyyO24hwbdeqBOnbgvQovIvd5CNMr4qRFX6YsMvSHZLNpTm3N4tddvbTZCbG N0TcQeSsWycjPIR2qhUbdx7m7DWIz8c/WLVSEnTlS8Iz6uh/ZTV+luJ0D4bHptJl4k0N r0+euIQD7BKc/PbRJLR85CBfbkB9DDUJf3ECeJbIMfqRweBeigkVzAbiQzF6Vd+mxSD+ MxyACUrd9IDCUuSc617PsZFmEYgOrBNLU9XHZHTrld3rmvkE3KqtPp+jptS7QLb3CzwW shrdkGvB1Trnb2gnzyBBTe1bdQB6op7Ot+KNvnyXAazeBgdK5I9lf348wyDPtRfZ7BaU S24g== X-Gm-Message-State: AMCzsaVoPiWWekPYLqIYmxdXofHihMcAeS3tGAFFwK1PkscSzLAOO/4S nEGxHhCuzuGlyznqdGYLHVAyyrdn0FsOpqRmjHkzuxir X-Google-Smtp-Source: AOwi7QCby/HRFrpHa8+9jDQJ+JZzmRCbPQpnczD0IJIuQX+VP6YnDKw77O7p6h5knFaGyPWOcl5mz8oL8c2nZj6Fck4= X-Received: by 10.202.208.93 with SMTP id h90mr3630oig.436.1507735688913; Wed, 11 Oct 2017 08:28:08 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.157.68.169 with HTTP; Wed, 11 Oct 2017 08:28:08 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <1213518291.4328204.1507589852818.ref@mail.yahoo.com> <1213518291.4328204.1507589852818@mail.yahoo.com> From: Moral Agent Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2017 11:28:08 -0400 Message-ID: To: Mark Friedenbach , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="001a114483262726ae055b4712dd" X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.4 required=5.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE, RCVD_IN_SORBS_SPAM autolearn=disabled version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Wed, 11 Oct 2017 15:29:41 +0000 Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] New difficulty algorithm needed for SegWit2x fork? (reformatted text) X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2017 15:28:11 -0000 --001a114483262726ae055b4712dd Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable >Instead of there being one altcoin fighting to take hashpower from bitcoin, there=E2=80=99d now be 2 Yes, there would be 2. One of which would (in the scenario we are discussing) be producing blocks excruciatingly slowly but be the same in all other aspects. >changing the difficulty adjustment algorithm doesn=E2=80=99t solve the und= erlying issue=E2=80=94hashpower not being aligned with users=E2=80=99 (or even its = owners=E2=80=99) interests I disagree. Changing the difficulty adjustment algorithm could improve the functionality of a chain, which could be an important prerequisite to using and trading the tokens on the chain. This property could help keep the price of the token high, which is what pressures hashpower to align with user interests. >And so yes, *if* this incentive problem can=E2=80=99t be solved, and the u= naltered bitcoin chain dies from disuse after suffering a hashpower attack, especially a centrally and/or purposefully instigated one, then bitcoin would be failed a failed project. IF the incentive problem could not be resolved then Bitcoin would be a failed project. But here is a bit of good news. Bitcoin has developers! And those developers can publish a contingency plan! And that contingency plan can be an emergency hard fork to a different retarget algorithm. And that emergency hard fork can gain consensus if it is broadly preferred over the status quo. If 90% of the hash power follows NYA, blocks are going to take 100 minutes until difficulty adjusts after 4.5 months. That is quite a handicap, even for a honey badger. Emergency hard fork carries a risk, but depending on the scenario in November, it could be a risk worth taking. One more thing. If miners think they are going to succeed in starving the legacy chain to death, they might be more likely to try. If they get a credible signal that the legacy chain will react by changing the retarget function and thereby be more likely to survive, they might feel less committed to a strategy of starving the legacy chain. This could be especially true if they are giving up profit for what they fervently hope will be a short period of time. On Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at 12:08 AM, Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > You phrase the question as if =E2=80=9Cdeploying a hard fork to bitcoin= =E2=80=9D would > protect the bitcoin chain from the attack. But that=E2=80=99s not what ha= ppens. If > you are hard forking from the perspective of deployed nodes, you are an > different ledger, regardless of circumstance or who did it. Instead of > there being one altcoin fighting to take hashpower from bitcoin, there=E2= =80=99d > now be 2. It is not at all obvious to me that this would be a better > outcome. > > If that isn=E2=80=99t reason enough, changing the difficulty adjustment a= lgorithm > doesn=E2=80=99t solve the underlying issue=E2=80=94hashpower not being al= igned with users=E2=80=99 > (or even its owners=E2=80=99) interests. Propose a fix to the underlying = cause and > that might be worth considering, if it passes peer review. But without th= at > you=E2=80=99d just be making the state of affairs arguably worse. > > And so yes, *if* this incentive problem can=E2=80=99t be solved, and the = unaltered > bitcoin chain dies from disuse after suffering a hashpower attack, > especially a centrally and/or purposefully instigated one, then bitcoin > would be failed a failed project. > > The thesis (and value proposition) of bitcoin is that a particular > category of economic incentives can be used to solve the problem of > creating a secure trustess ledger. If those incentives failed, then he > thesis of bitcoin would have been experimentally falsified, yes. Maybe th= e > incentives can be made better to save the project, but we=E2=80=99d have = to fix the > source of the problem not the symptoms. > > On Oct 10, 2017, at 6:44 PM, Ben Kloester wrote: > > Mark, this seems an awful lot like an answer of "no", to my question "Is > there a contingency plan in the case that the incumbent chain following t= he > Bitcoin Core consensus rules comes under 51% attack?" - is this a correct > interpretation? > > In fact, beyond a no, it seems like a "no, and I disagree with the idea o= f > creating one". > > So if Bitcoin comes under successful 51%, the project, in your vision, ha= s > simply failed? > > *Ben Kloester* > > On 10 October 2017 at 13:19, Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev < > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> The problem of fast acting but non vulnerable difficulty adjustment >> algorithms is interesting. I would certainly like to see this space furt= her >> explored, and even have some ideas myself. >> >> However without commenting on the technical merits of this specific >> proposal, I think it must be said upfront that the stated goal is not go= od. >> The largest technical concern (ignoring governance) over B2X is that it = is >> a rushed, poorly reviewed hard fork. Hard forks should not be rushed, an= d >> they should receive more than the usual level of expert and community >> review. >> >> I=E2=80=99m that light, doing an even more rushed hard fork on an even n= ewer idea >> with even less review would be hypocritical at best. I would suggest >> reframing as a hardfork wishlist research problem for the next properly >> planned hard fork, if one occurs. You might also find the hardfork resea= rch >> group a more accommodating venue for this discussion: >> >> https://bitcoinhardforkresearch.github.io/ >> >> On Oct 9, 2017, at 3:57 PM, Scott Roberts via bitcoin-dev < >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: >> >> Sorry, my previous email did not have the plain text I intended. >> >> Background: >> >> The bitcoin difficulty algorithm does not seem to be a good one. If ther= e >> is a fork due to miners seeking maximum profit without due regard to >> security, users, and nodes, the "better" coin could end up being the >> minority chain. If 90% of hashrate is really going to at least initially >> go >> towards using SegWit2x, BTC would face 10x delays in confirmations >> until the next difficulty adjustment, negatively affecting its price >> relative >> to BTC1, causing further delays from even more miner abandonment >> (until the next adjustment). The 10% miners remaining on BTC do not >> inevitably lose by staying to endure 10x delays because they have 10x >> less competition, and the same situation applies to BTC1 miners. If the >> prices are the same and stable, all seems well for everyone, other thing= s >> aside. But if the BTC price does not fall to reflect the decreased >> hashrate, >> he situation seems to be a big problem for both coins: BTC1 miners will >> jump back to BTC when the difficulty adjustment occurs, initiating a >> potentially never-ending oscillation between the two coins, potentially >> worse than what BCH is experiencing. They will not issue coins too fast >> like BCH because that is a side effect of the asymmetry in BCH's rise an= d >> fall algorithm. >> >> Solution: >> >> Hard fork to implement a new difficulty algorithm that uses a simple >> rolling >> average with a much smaller window. Many small coins have done this as >> a way to stop big miners from coming on and then suddenly leaving, >> leaving >> constant miners stuck with a high difficulty for the rest of a (long) >> averaging >> window. Even better, adjust the reward based on recent solvetimes to >> motivate more mining (or less) if the solvetimes are too slow (or too >> fast). >> This will keep keep coin issuance rate perfectly on schedule with real >> time. >> >> I recommend the following for Bitcoin, as fast, simple, and better than >> any >> other difficulty algorithm I'm aware of. This is the result of a lot of >> work the >> past year. >> >> =3D=3D=3D Begin difficulty algorithm =3D=3D=3D >> # Zawy v6 difficulty algorithm (modified for bitcoin) >> # Unmodified Zawy v6 for alt coins: >> # http://zawy1.blogspot.com/2017/07/best-difficulty-algorithm- >> zawy-v1b.html >> # All my failed attempts at something better: >> # https://github.com/seredat/karbowanec/commit/231db5270acb2e6 >> 73a641a1800be910ce345668a >> # >> # Keep negative solvetimes to correct bad timestamps. >> # Do not be tempted to use: >> # next_D =3D sum(last N Ds) * T / [max(last N TSs) - min(last N TSs]; >> # ST=3D Solvetime, TS =3D timestamp >> >> # set constants until next hard fork: >> >> T=3D600; # coin's TargetSolvetime >> N=3D30; # Averaging window. Smoother than N=3D15, faster response than N= =3D60. >> X=3D5; >> limit =3D X^(2/N); # limit rise and fall in case of timestamp manipulati= on >> adjust =3D 1/(1+0.67/N); # keeps avg solvetime on track >> >> # begin difficulty algorithm >> >> avg_ST=3D0; avg_D=3D0; >> for ( i=3Dheight; i > height-N; i--) { # go through N most recent blo= cks >> avg_ST +=3D (TS[i] - TS[i-1]) / N; >> avg_D +=3D D[i]/N; >> } >> avg_ST =3D T*limit if avg_ST > T*limit; >> avg_ST =3D T/limit if avg_ST < T/limit; >> >> next_D =3D avg_D * T / avg_ST * adjust; >> >> # Tim Olsen suggested changing reward to protect against hash attacks. >> # Karbowanek coin suggested something similar. >> # I could not find anything better than the simplest idea below. >> # It was a great surprise that coin issuance rate came out perfect. >> # BaseReward =3D coins per block >> >> next_reward =3D BaseReward * avg_ST / T; >> >> =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D end algo =3D=3D=3D=3D >> >> Due to the limit and keeping negative solvetimes in a true average, >> timestamp errors resulting in negative solvetimes are corrected in the >> next >> block. Otherwise, one would need to do like Zcash and cause a 5-block >> delay in the response by resorting to the median of past 11 blocks (MPT) >> as the most recent timestamp, offsetting the timestamps from their >> corresponding difficulties by 5 blocks. (it does not cause an averaging >> problem, but it does cause a 5-block delay in the response.) >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> bitcoin-dev mailing list >> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org >> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >> >> > > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > > --001a114483262726ae055b4712dd Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
>Instead of there being one altcoin fighting = to take hashpower from bitcoin, there=E2=80=99d now be 2

Yes, there would be 2. One of which= would (in the scenario we are discussing) be producing blocks excruciating= ly slowly but be the same in all other aspects.
=
>changing the difficulty adjustment algorithm doesn= =E2=80=99t solve the underlying issue=E2=80=94hashpower not being aligned w= ith users=E2=80=99 (or even its owners=E2=80=99) interests

I disagree. Changing the di= fficulty adjustment algorithm could improve the functionality of a chain, w= hich could be an important prerequisite to using and trading the tokens on = the chain. This property could help keep the price of the token high, which= is what pressures hashpower to align with user interests.

>And so yes, *if* this incentive problem = can=E2=80=99t be solved, and the unaltered bitcoin chain dies from disuse a= fter suffering a hashpower attack, especially a centrally and/or purposeful= ly instigated one, then bitcoin would be failed a failed project.

IF the incentive pro= blem could not be resolved then Bitcoin would be a failed project.

But here is a bit of good news.

Bitcoin has developers!

And those=C2=A0developers can publ= ish a contingency plan!

= And that contingency plan can be an emerge= ncy hard fork to a different retarget algorithm.

And that emergenc= y hard fork can gain consensus if it is broadly preferred over the status q= uo.

If 90% of the hash power follows NYA, blocks are going to take= 100 minutes until difficulty adjusts after 4.5 months.

=
That is qu= ite a handicap, even for a honey badger. Emergency hard fork carries a risk= , but depending on the scenario in November, it could be a risk worth takin= g.

One more thing.= If miners think they are going to succeed in starving the legacy chain to = death, they might be more likely to try. If they get a credible signal that= the legacy chain will react by changing the retarget function and thereby = be more likely to survive, they might feel less committed=C2=A0to a strateg= y of starving the legacy chain. This could be especially true if they are g= iving up profit for what they fervently hope will be a short period of time= .

On Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at 12:08 AM, Mark Friedenbach via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote= :
You phrase the questi= on as if =E2=80=9Cdeploying a hard fork to bitcoin=E2=80=9D would protect t= he bitcoin chain from the attack. But that=E2=80=99s not what happens. If y= ou are hard forking from the perspective of deployed nodes, you are an diff= erent ledger, regardless of circumstance or who did it. Instead of there be= ing one altcoin fighting to take hashpower from bitcoin, there=E2=80=99d no= w be 2. It is not at all obvious to me that this would be a better outcome.=

If that isn=E2=80=99t reason enough, changing the diffi= culty adjustment algorithm doesn=E2=80=99t solve the underlying issue=E2=80= =94hashpower not being aligned with users=E2=80=99 (or even its owners=E2= =80=99) interests. Propose a fix to the underlying cause and that might be = worth considering, if it passes peer review. But without that you=E2=80=99d= just be making the state of affairs arguably worse.

And so yes, *if* this incentive problem can=E2=80=99t be solved, and the= unaltered bitcoin chain dies from disuse after suffering a hashpower attac= k, especially a centrally and/or purposefully instigated one, then bitcoin = would be failed a failed project.

The thesis (and = value proposition) of bitcoin is that a particular category of economic inc= entives can be used to solve the problem of creating a secure trustess ledg= er. If those incentives failed, then he thesis of bitcoin would have been e= xperimentally falsified, yes. Maybe the incentives can be made better to sa= ve the project, but we=E2=80=99d have to fix the source of the problem not = the symptoms.

On Oct 10, 2017, at= 6:44 PM, Ben Kloester <benkloester@gmail.com> wrote:

Mark, this seems an awful lot like an an= swer of "no", to my question "Is there a contingency plan in the case that the incumbent chain followi= ng the Bitcoin Core consensus rules comes under 51% attack?" - is this= a correct interpretation?

=
In fact, beyond a no, it= seems like a "no, and I disagree with the idea of creating one".=

So if Bitcoin comes under successful 51%, th= e project, in your vision, has simply failed?

Ben Kloester=


On 10 October 2017 at 13:19, Mark Friedenbac= h via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundat= ion.org> wrote:
The problem of fast acting but non vulnerable difficulty adjustment = algorithms is interesting. I would certainly like to see this space further= explored, and even have some ideas myself.

However with= out commenting on the technical merits of this specific proposal, I think i= t must be said upfront that the stated goal is not good. The largest techni= cal concern (ignoring governance) over B2X is that it is a rushed, poorly r= eviewed hard fork. Hard forks should not be rushed, and they should receive= more than the usual level of expert and community review.

I=E2=80=99m that light, doing an even more rushed hard fork on an = even newer idea with even less review would be hypocritical at best. I woul= d suggest reframing as a hardfork wishlist research problem for the next pr= operly planned hard fork, if one occurs. You might also find the hardfork r= esearch group a more accommodating venue for this discussion:
<= div class=3D"m_-1882877176600384466h5">

On Oct 9, 2017, at 3:5= 7 PM, Scott Roberts via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundat= ion.org> wrote:

So= rry, my previous email did not have the plain text I intended.

Background:

The bitc= oin difficulty algorithm does not seem to be a good one. If there is a fork due to miners seeking maximum profit without due regard t= o
security, users, and nodes, the "better" coin = could end up being the
minority chain. If 90% of hashrate = is really going to at least initially go
towards using Seg= Wit2x, BTC would face 10x delays in confirmations
until th= e next difficulty adjustment, negatively affecting its price relative
to BTC1, causing further delays from even more miner abandonmen= t
(until the next adjustment). The 10% miners remaining on= BTC do not
inevitably lose by staying to endure 10x delay= s because they have 10x
less competition, and the same sit= uation applies to BTC1 miners. If the
prices are the same = and stable, all seems well for everyone, other things
asid= e. But if the BTC price does not fall to reflect the decreased hashrate,
he situation seems to be a big problem for both coins: BTC1 = miners will
jump back to BTC when the difficulty adjustmen= t occurs, initiating a
potentially never-ending oscillatio= n between the two coins, potentially
worse than what BCH i= s experiencing.=C2=A0 They will not issue coins too fast
l= ike BCH because that is a side effect of the asymmetry in BCH's rise an= d
fall algorithm.

Soluti= on:

Hard fork to implement a new difficul= ty algorithm that uses a simple rolling
average with a muc= h smaller window.=C2=A0 Many small coins have done this as
a way to stop big miners from coming on and then suddenly leaving, leaving=
constant miners stuck with a high difficulty for the rest= of a (long) averaging
window.=C2=A0 Even better, adjust t= he reward based on recent solvetimes to
motivate more mini= ng (or less) if the solvetimes are too slow (or too fast).
This will keep keep coin issuance rate perfectly on schedule with real tim= e.

I recommend the following for Bitcoin,= as fast, simple, and better than any
other difficulty alg= orithm I'm aware of.=C2=A0 This is the result of a lot of work the
past year.

=3D=3D=3D Begin d= ifficulty algorithm =3D=3D=3D
# Zawy v6 difficulty algorit= hm (modified for bitcoin)
# Unmodified Zawy v6 for alt coi= ns:
# http://zawy1.blogspot.c= om/2017/07/best-difficulty-algorithm-zawy-v1b.html # All my failed attempts at something better:
# https://github.com/seredat/karbo= wanec/commit/231db5270acb2e673a641a1800be910ce345668a
<= span>#
# Keep negative solvetimes to correct bad timestamp= s.
# Do not be tempted to use:
# next_D = =3D sum(last N Ds) * T / [max(last N TSs) - min(last N TSs];
# ST=3D Solvetime, TS =3D timestamp

# = set constants until next hard fork:

T=3D6= 00; # coin's TargetSolvetime
N=3D30; # Averaging windo= w. Smoother than N=3D15, faster response than N=3D60.
X=3D= 5;
limit =3D X^(2/N); # limit rise and fall in case of tim= estamp manipulation
adjust =3D 1/(1+0.67/N); =C2=A0# keeps= avg solvetime on track

# begin difficult= y algorithm

avg_ST=3D0; avg_D=3D0;
for ( i=3Dheight; =C2=A0i > height-N; =C2=A0i--) { =C2=A0# go= through N most recent blocks
avg_ST +=3D (TS[i] - TS[i-1]= ) / N;
avg_D +=3D D[i]/N;
}
avg_ST =3D T*limit if avg_ST > T*limit;
avg_ST =3D = T/limit if avg_ST < T/limit;

next_D = =3D avg_D * T / avg_ST * adjust;

# Tim Ol= sen suggested changing reward to protect against hash attacks.
<= span># Karbowanek coin suggested something similar.
# I co= uld not find anything better than the simplest idea below.
# It was a great surprise that coin issuance rate came out perfect.
# BaseReward =3D coins per block

next_reward =3D BaseReward * avg_ST / T;

=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D end algo =3D=3D=3D=3D

= Due to the limit and keeping negative solvetimes in a true average, <= /span>
timestamp errors resulting in negative solvetimes are corre= cted in the next
block. Otherwise, one would need to do li= ke Zcash and cause a 5-block
delay in the response by reso= rting to the median of past 11 blocks (MPT)
as the most re= cent timestamp, offsetting the timestamps from their
corre= sponding difficulties by 5 blocks. (it does not cause an averaging <= br>problem, but it does cause a 5-block delay in the response.)
_______________________________________________
<= span>bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfounda= tion.org
https://lists.linuxfoun= dation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

__________________________________= _____________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
= bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org= /mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev



____________________________= ___________________
bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org= /mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev


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