From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Ysiyr-0002qq-Vt for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 14 May 2015 02:34:37 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.220.181 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.220.181; envelope-from=voisine@gmail.com; helo=mail-qk0-f181.google.com; Received: from mail-qk0-f181.google.com ([209.85.220.181]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Ysiyo-0000qe-KS for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 14 May 2015 02:34:37 +0000 Received: by qkp63 with SMTP id 63so4221894qkp.0 for ; Wed, 13 May 2015 19:34:29 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.55.31.40 with SMTP id f40mr4081391qkf.49.1431570869222; Wed, 13 May 2015 19:34:29 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.140.91.37 with HTTP; Wed, 13 May 2015 19:34:29 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: <5550D8BE.6070207@electrum.org> Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 19:34:29 -0700 Message-ID: From: Aaron Voisine To: Pieter Wuille Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a114780b821833d05160191e2 X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (voisine[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1Ysiyo-0000qe-KS Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Long-term mining incentives X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 14 May 2015 02:34:38 -0000 --001a114780b821833d05160191e2 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > I concede the point. Perhaps a flag date based on previous observation of network upgrade rates with a conservative additional margin in addition to supermajority of mining power. It occurs to me that this would allow for a relatively small percentage of miners to stop the upgrade if the flag date turns out to be poorly chosen and a large number of non-mining nodes haven't upgraded yet. Would be a nice safety fallback. Aaron Voisine co-founder and CEO breadwallet.com On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 6:31 PM, Aaron Voisine wrote: > > by people and businesses deciding to not use on-chain settlement. > > I completely agree. Increasing fees will cause people voluntary economize > on blockspace by finding alternatives, i.e. not bitcoin. A fee however is a > known, upfront cost... unpredictable transaction failure in most cases will > be a far higher, unacceptable cost to the user than the actual fee. The > higher the costs of using the system, the lower the adoption as a > store-of-value. The lower the adoption as store-of-value, the lower the > price, and the lower the value of bitcoin to the world. > > > That only measures miner adoption, which is the least relevant. > > I concede the point. Perhaps a flag date based on previous observation of > network upgrade rates with a conservative additional margin in addition to > supermajority of mining power. > > > Aaron Voisine > co-founder and CEO > breadwallet.com > > On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 6:19 PM, Pieter Wuille > wrote: > >> On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Aaron Voisine wrote: >> >>> Conservative is a relative term. Dropping transactions in a way that is >>> unpredictable to the sender sounds incredibly drastic to me. I'm suggesting >>> increasing the blocksize, drastic as it is, is the more conservative choice. >>> >> >> Transactions are already being dropped, in a more indirect way: by people >> and businesses deciding to not use on-chain settlement. That is very sad, >> but it's completely inevitable that there is space for some use cases and >> not for others (at whatever block size). It's only a "things don't fit >> anymore" when you see on-chain transactions as the only means for doing >> payments, and that is already not the case. Increasing the block size >> allows for more utility on-chain, but it does not fundamentally add more >> use cases - only more growth space for people already invested in being >> able to do things on-chain while externalizing the costs to others. >> >> >>> I would recommend that the fork take effect when some specific large >>> supermajority of the pervious 1000 blocks indicate they have upgraded, as a >>> safer alternative to a simple flag date, but I'm sure I wouldn't have to >>> point out that option to people here. >>> >> >> That only measures miner adoption, which is the least relevant. The >> question is whether people using full nodes will upgrade. If they do, then >> miners are forced to upgrade too, or become irrelevant. If they don't, the >> upgrade is risky with or without miner adoption. >> >> -- >> Pieter >> >> > --001a114780b821833d05160191e2 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
>=C2=A0I concede the poi= nt. Perhaps a flag date based on previous observation of network upgrade ra= tes with a conservative additional margin in addition to supermajority of m= ining power.

It occurs to me that this would allow for a relatively small percentage o= f miners to stop the upgrade if the flag date turns out to be poorly chosen= and a large number of non-mining nodes haven't upgraded yet. Would be = a nice safety fallback.


Aaron Voisine
co-founder and CEO
breadwallet.com
=

On Wed, May 13, 2015 at 6:31 PM, Aaron Voisi= ne <voisine@gmail.com> wrote:
>=C2=A0by people and businesses deciding to not use on-chain settlement.

I complet= ely agree. Increasing fees will cause people voluntary economize on blocksp= ace by finding alternatives, i.e. not bitcoin. A fee however is a known, up= front cost... unpredictable transaction failure in most cases will be a far= higher, unacceptable cost to the user than the actual fee. The higher the = costs of using the system, the lower=C2=A0the adoption as a store-of-value.= The lower the adoption as store-of-value, the lower the price, and the low= er the value of bitcoin to the world.

&= gt;=C2=A0That only measures miner ado= ption, which is the least relevant.

I concede the point. Perhaps a flag d= ate based on previous observation of network upgrade rates with a conservat= ive additional margin in addition to supermajority of mining power.


Aaron Voisine
co= -founder and CEO
br= eadwallet.com

On Wed, May 13= , 2015 at 6:19 PM, Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com> wrote:
On Wed= , May 13, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Aaron Voisine <voisine@gmail.com>= wrote:
Conservative is a relati= ve term. Dropping transactions in a way that is unpredictable to the sender= sounds incredibly drastic to me. I'm suggesting increasing the blocksi= ze, drastic as it is, is the more conservative choice.

Transactions are already being dropped, in a more = indirect way: by people and businesses deciding to not use on-chain settlem= ent. That is very sad, but it's completely inevitable that there is spa= ce for some use cases and not for others (at whatever block size). It's= only a "things don't fit anymore" when you see on-chain tran= sactions as the only means for doing payments, and that is already not the = case. Increasing the block size allows for more utility on-chain, but it do= es not fundamentally add more use cases - only more growth space for people= already invested in being able to do things on-chain while externalizing t= he costs to others.
=C2=A0
I would recommend that the fork take effect whe= n some specific large supermajority of the pervious 1000 blocks indicate th= ey have upgraded, as a safer alternative to a simple flag date, but I'm= sure I wouldn't have to point out that option to people here.

That only measures miner adoption, whi= ch is the least relevant. The question is whether people using full nodes w= ill upgrade. If they do, then miners are forced to upgrade too, or become i= rrelevant. If they don't, the upgrade is risky with or without miner ad= option.

--
Pieter



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