From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1UcJ3D-0000I8-9n for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 14 May 2013 17:30:11 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.220.172 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.220.172; envelope-from=grarpamp@gmail.com; helo=mail-vc0-f172.google.com; Received: from mail-vc0-f172.google.com ([209.85.220.172]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1UcJ3C-0004ll-ML for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Tue, 14 May 2013 17:30:11 +0000 Received: by mail-vc0-f172.google.com with SMTP id m17so887256vca.3 for ; Tue, 14 May 2013 10:30:05 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.52.122.109 with SMTP id lr13mr19261617vdb.91.1368552605137; Tue, 14 May 2013 10:30:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.220.115.7 with HTTP; Tue, 14 May 2013 10:30:05 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <20130514140902.GA22447@netbook.cypherspace.org> References: <20130514115151.GA21600@netbook.cypherspace.org> <20130514140902.GA22447@netbook.cypherspace.org> Date: Tue, 14 May 2013 13:30:05 -0400 Message-ID: From: grarpamp To: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 X-Spam-Score: -1.6 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (grarpamp[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1UcJ3C-0004ll-ML Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] bitcoin taint & unilateral revocability (Re: ecash and revocability) X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 14 May 2013 17:30:11 -0000 > Bitcoins relative lack of privacy creates a problem with tainted coins > risking becoming unspendable, or spendable only with some users, or at a > discount. So while the policy coded says all coins are equally acceptable, > the information exists so people can unilaterally reject them, depending on > what the taint is. So far revocability hasnt reared it's head that I heard, > nor taint inspection too much? However people have the choice and technical > means to check the taint and send the bitcoins back. a) Is there a paper detailing bitcoin traceability issues? Particularly when using various combinations of the often advised 'use different address for every transaction', 'wash coins', and 'use anonymity networks' privacy enhancement methods. b) People would be nuts to reject tainted coins on the current chain, or any chain. How many of the bills in your wallet passed through 'illicit' transactions? How would you feel if your payee's serial checker bounced yours, possibly forcing you to dispense with them through other, possibly illicit, means? What about a total blackball? Who's going to compensate you? How exactly do you roll that all back? And are you going to KYC and scour the lives of your every potential customer beforehand? What if someone has money to burn and blackballs a million notes for fun. A currency of common global adoption that you can't spend after some thieving crackdealer bought an onion off your garden stand isn't of much use to anyone, not even the purists who come up with such ideas. Specialized currencies in special markets, sure, maybe, all still fraught with the same dilemmas. But for a global common one? No.