From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4C6D7CAD; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 13:49:24 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-lj1-f170.google.com (mail-lj1-f170.google.com [209.85.208.170]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EA9F087B; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 13:49:22 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-lj1-f170.google.com with SMTP id j19so25128546lja.1; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 06:49:22 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=Ap5w/y69qvIJpGA7vfOz8lZgukArEzjDjbS437tTPyI=; b=c/g2FCAavwUE318kn8jC77icl9/wmiN0Acg6cSzfZq9eiUybU4j0i4aNg29rASgemh NzNdBlxLSU5V2DabGLsnoWeHL3Z9pPgDaLSmEGCo7boUdDaxnzIV+mA1yWXY7IZz7pks /kZu2JWSWBbFwvixA/ZrhxE3wCJkzRc09aheAjsPnMM2Sp/1rpeLrynUY61B4rPviPfm qZcr7ApbBEpmPSo8ShTXr4CHfz2vqR332bFDkSR+UqJX9bn6quiOM/loWhyOjNWxqVSJ d8mj6ihiL6CQIls6N0LnhtWGplNVa+MHkRbgAFSS0cQ6TwgY2QyoMXa1De6PxxBh32vk v36w== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=Ap5w/y69qvIJpGA7vfOz8lZgukArEzjDjbS437tTPyI=; b=jnhKfvSMTPCv8TFOJqKcPbrst2KsaHmASIcAmO0c6jpifdZnwdrebXQVzjs2lbeTWv zAP4SQ9o8mNb2zL9tISxYCc5saLJGi4OcZ/4wXwy+TEtgvAOjLxww4ufgeNfKSya9k9L ORjG0fLuj5qMgPUMDCCsgQU7L00sGAREfYr92+JeKBlXly6OePDuKNp4rWKZtSK/2w6U o0AAPA+0g2RVKBxQgamiKiqbIQ/NrIt7OZ4bDYRdSLzDvCJkd/E63msdQOhtYw1Me+hZ HSSVbpB83IeA67isXArzhQErymDS0QWcZA1lVoROlCfeFi6jwpcaaWSG6Z2eTSqrUaYC Zr8w== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAWZAEBmq0KgvDYDf/gBG8y8GjauN1PNZ0fThwnynMuF4Q3JqdfB /AWxvDhLHWekYDxUgoKoCpEr5i57IOhfqP+r/Tfg3+0+ X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqwGaD+t0f9bwcI7RxIO8izZSQWY0t/tr8vuONjDlQuUA9RcU1QgvfUtxb6Vv62zmxVhIp4mm6jeBbWmYL1OuH4= X-Received: by 2002:a2e:8694:: with SMTP id l20mr25928218lji.64.1571924961049; Thu, 24 Oct 2019 06:49:21 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <878t163qzi.fsf@rustcorp.com.au> <725fc55a-6263-a9fc-74a5-1017cb1cc885@mattcorallo.com> <87wonfem03.fsf@rustcorp.com.au> <87zhr0gvw0.fsf@rustcorp.com.au> In-Reply-To: <87zhr0gvw0.fsf@rustcorp.com.au> From: =?UTF-8?Q?Johan_Tor=C3=A5s_Halseth?= Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2019 15:49:09 +0200 Message-ID: To: Rusty Russell Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000eac0fb0595a84ccc" X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, DOS_RCVD_IP_TWICE_B, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Approved-At: Thu, 24 Oct 2019 14:22:28 +0000 Cc: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion , lightning-dev Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [Lightning-dev] CPFP Carve-Out for Fee-Prediction Issues in Contracting Applications (eg Lightning) X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 24 Oct 2019 13:49:24 -0000 --000000000000eac0fb0595a84ccc Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Reviving this old thread now that the recently released RC for bitcoind 0.19 includes the above mentioned carve-out rule. In an attempt to pave the way for more robust CPFP of on-chain contracts (Lightning commitment transactions), the carve-out rule was added in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15681. However, having worked on an implementation of a new commitment format for utilizing the Bring Your Own Fees strategy using CPFP, I=E2=80=99m wondering if the special case rule sh= ould have been relaxed a bit, to avoid the need for adding a 1 CSV to all outputs (in case of Lightning this means HTLC scripts would need to be changed to add the CSV delay). Instead, what about letting the rule be The last transaction which is added to a package of dependent transactions in the mempool must: * Have no more than one unconfirmed parent. This would of course allow adding a large transaction to each output of the unconfirmed parent, which in effect would allow an attacker to exceed the MAX_PACKAGE_VIRTUAL_SIZE limit in some cases. However, is this a problem with the current mempool acceptance code in bitcoind? I would imagine evicting transactions based on feerate when the max mempool size is met handles this, but I=E2=80=99m asking since it seems like there has been sev= eral changes to the acceptance code and eviction policy since the limit was first introduced. - Johan On Wed, Feb 13, 2019 at 6:57 AM Rusty Russell wrote= : > Matt Corallo writes: > >>> Thus, even if you imagine a steady-state mempool growth, unless the > >>> "near the top of the mempool" criteria is "near the top of the next > >>> block" (which is obviously *not* incentive-compatible) > >> > >> I was defining "top of mempool" as "in the first 4 MSipa", ie. next > >> block, and assumed you'd only allow RBF if the old package wasn't in t= he > >> top and the replacement would be. That seems incentive compatible; mo= re > >> than the current scheme? > > > > My point was, because of block time variance, even that criteria doesn'= t > hold up. If you assume a steady flow of new transactions and one or two > blocks come in "late", suddenly "top 4MWeight" isn't likely to get > confirmed until a few blocks come in "early". Given block variance within= a > 12 block window, this is a relatively likely scenario. > > [ Digging through old mail. ] > > Doesn't really matter. Lightning close algorithm would be: > > 1. Give bitcoind unileratal close. > 2. Ask bitcoind what current expidited fee is (or survey your mempool). > 3. Give bitcoind child "push" tx at that total feerate. > 4. If next block doesn't contain unilateral close tx, goto 2. > > In this case, if you allow a simpified RBF where 'you can replace if > 1. feerate is higher, 2. new tx is in first 4Msipa of mempool, 3. old tx > isnt', > it works. > > It allows someone 100k of free tx spam, sure. But it's simple. > > We could further restrict it by marking the unilateral close somehow to > say "gonna be pushed" and further limiting the child tx weight (say, > 5kSipa?) in that case. > > Cheers, > Rusty. > _______________________________________________ > Lightning-dev mailing list > Lightning-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev > --000000000000eac0fb0595a84ccc Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Reviving this old thread now that th= e recently released RC for bitcoind 0.19 includes the above mentioned carve= -out rule.

In an attempt to pave the way for more = robust CPFP of on-chain contracts (Lightning commitment transactions), the = carve-out rule was added in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15681. However, havi= ng worked on an implementation of a new commitment format for utilizing the= Bring Your Own Fees strategy using CPFP, I=E2=80=99m wondering if the spec= ial case rule should have been relaxed a bit, to avoid the need for adding = a 1 CSV to all outputs (in case of Lightning this means HTLC scripts would = need to be changed to add the CSV delay).

Instead,= what about letting the rule be

The last transacti= on which is added to a package of dependent
transactions in the m= empool must:
=C2=A0 * Have no more than one unconfirmed parent.

This would of course allow adding a large transacti= on to each output of the unconfirmed parent, which in effect would allow an= attacker to exceed the MAX_PACKAGE_VIRTUAL_SIZE limit in some cases. Howev= er, is this a problem with the current mempool acceptance code in bitcoind?= I would imagine evicting transactions based on feerate when the max mempoo= l size is met handles this, but I=E2=80=99m asking since it seems like ther= e has been several changes to the acceptance code and eviction policy since= the limit was first introduced.

- Johan


On Wed, Feb 13, 2019 at 6:57 AM Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> wrote:
<= /div>
Matt Corallo <lf-lists@mattcor= allo.com> writes:
>>> Thus, even if you imagine a steady-state mempool growth, unles= s the
>>> "near the top of the mempool" criteria is "near= the top of the next
>>> block" (which is obviously *not* incentive-compatible) >>
>> I was defining "top of mempool" as "in the first 4 = MSipa", ie. next
>> block, and assumed you'd only allow RBF if the old package was= n't in the
>> top and the replacement would be.=C2=A0 That seems incentive compa= tible; more
>> than the current scheme?
>
> My point was, because of block time variance, even that criteria doesn= 't hold up. If you assume a steady flow of new transactions and one or = two blocks come in "late", suddenly "top 4MWeight" isn&= #39;t likely to get confirmed until a few blocks come in "early".= Given block variance within a 12 block window, this is a relatively likely= scenario.

[ Digging through old mail. ]

Doesn't really matter.=C2=A0 Lightning close algorithm would be:

1.=C2=A0 Give bitcoind unileratal close.
2.=C2=A0 Ask bitcoind what current expidited fee is (or survey your mempool= ).
3.=C2=A0 Give bitcoind child "push" tx at that total feerate.
4.=C2=A0 If next block doesn't contain unilateral close tx, goto 2.

In this case, if you allow a simpified RBF where 'you can replace if 1. feerate is higher, 2. new tx is in first 4Msipa of mempool, 3. old tx is= nt',
it works.

It allows someone 100k of free tx spam, sure.=C2=A0 But it's simple.
We could further restrict it by marking the unilateral close somehow to
say "gonna be pushed" and further limiting the child tx weight (s= ay,
5kSipa?) in that case.

Cheers,
Rusty.
_______________________________________________
Lightning-dev mailing list
Lightning-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/ma= ilman/listinfo/lightning-dev
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