Re: [bitcoin-dev] Annex Purpose Discussion: OP_ANNEX, Turing Completeness, and other considerations

[Jeremy Rubin <jeremy.l.rubin@gmail.com>]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 13353 bytes --]

Hi Christian,

For that purpose I'd recommend having a checksig extra that is

<data> <n> <sig> <pk> checksigextra that allows N extra data items on the
stack in addition to the txn hash. This would allow signers to sign some
addtl arguments, but would not be an annex since the values would not have
any consensus meaning (whereas annex is designed to have one)


I've previously discussed this for eltoo with giving signatures an explicit
extra seqnum, but it can be generalized as above.



W.r.t. pinning, if the annex is a pure function of the script execution,
then there's no issue with letting it be mutable (e.g. for a validation
cost hint). But permitting both validation cost commitments and stack
readability is asking too much of the annex IMO.

On Sun, Mar 6, 2022, 1:13 PM Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
wrote:

> One thing that we recently stumbled over was that we use CLTV in eltoo not
> for timelock but to have a comparison between two committed numbers coming
> from the spent and the spending transaction (ordering requirement of
> states). We couldn't use a number on the stack of the scriptSig as the
> signature doesn't commit to it, which is why we commandeered nLocktime
> values that are already in the past.
>
> With the annex we could have a way to get a committed to number we can
> pull onto the stack, and free the nLocktime for other uses again. It'd also
> be less roundabout to explain in classes :-)
>
> An added benefit would be that update transactions, being singlesig, can
> be combined into larger transactions by third parties or watchtowers to
> amortize some of the fixed cost of getting them confirmed, allowing
> on-path-aggregation basically (each node can group and aggregate
> transactions as they forward them). This is currently not possible since
> all the transactions that we'd like to batch would have to have the same
> nLocktime at the moment.
>
> So I think it makes sense to partition the annex into a global annex
> shared by the entire transaction, and one for each input. Not sure if one
> for inputs would also make sense as it'd bloat the utxo set and could be
> emulated by using the input that is spending it.
>
> Cheers,
> Christian
>
> On Sat, 5 Mar 2022, 07:33 Anthony Towns via bitcoin-dev, <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Mar 04, 2022 at 11:21:41PM +0000, Jeremy Rubin via bitcoin-dev
>> wrote:
>> > I've seen some discussion of what the Annex can be used for in Bitcoin.
>>
>>
>> https://www.erisian.com.au/meetbot/taproot-bip-review/2019/taproot-bip-review.2019-11-12-19.00.log.html
>>
>> includes some discussion on that topic from the taproot review meetings.
>>
>> The difference between information in the annex and information in
>> either a script (or the input data for the script that is the rest of
>> the witness) is (in theory) that the annex can be analysed immediately
>> and unconditionally, without necessarily even knowing anything about
>> the utxo being spent.
>>
>> The idea is that we would define some simple way of encoding (multiple)
>> entries into the annex -- perhaps a tag/length/value scheme like
>> lightning uses; maybe if we add a lisp scripting language to consensus,
>> we just reuse the list encoding from that? -- at which point we might
>> use one tag to specify that a transaction uses advanced computation, and
>> needs to be treated as having a heavier weight than its serialized size
>> implies; but we could use another tag for per-input absolute locktimes;
>> or another tag to commit to a past block height having a particular hash.
>>
>> It seems like a good place for optimising SIGHASH_GROUP (allowing a group
>> of inputs to claim a group of outputs for signing, but not allowing inputs
>> from different groups to ever claim the same output; so that each output
>> is hashed at most once for this purpose) -- since each input's validity
>> depends on the other inputs' state, it's better to be able to get at
>> that state as easily as possible rather than having to actually execute
>> other scripts before your can tell if your script is going to be valid.
>>
>> > The BIP is tight lipped about it's purpose
>>
>> BIP341 only reserves an area to put the annex; it doesn't define how
>> it's used or why it should be used.
>>
>> > Essentially, I read this as saying: The annex is the ability to pad a
>> > transaction with an additional string of 0's
>>
>> If you wanted to pad it directly, you can do that in script already
>> with a PUSH/DROP combo.
>>
>> The point of doing it in the annex is you could have a short byte
>> string, perhaps something like "0x010201a4" saying "tag 1, data length 2
>> bytes, value 420" and have the consensus intepretation of that be "this
>> transaction should be treated as if it's 420 weight units more expensive
>> than its serialized size", while only increasing its witness size by
>> 6 bytes (annex length, annex flag, and the four bytes above). Adding 6
>> bytes for a 426 weight unit increase seems much better than adding 426
>> witness bytes.
>>
>> The example scenario is that if there was an opcode to verify a
>> zero-knowledge proof, eg I think bulletproof range proofs are something
>> like 10x longer than a signature, but require something like 400x the
>> validation time. Since checksig has a validation weight of 50 units,
>> a bulletproof verify might have a 400x greater validation weight, ie
>> 20,000 units, while your witness data is only 650 bytes serialized. In
>> that case, we'd need to artificially bump the weight of you transaction
>> up by the missing 19,350 units, or else an attacker could fill a block
>> with perhaps 6000 bulletproofs costing the equivalent of 120M signature
>> operations, rather than the 80k sigops we currently expect as the maximum
>> in a block. Seems better to just have "0x01024b96" stuck in the annex,
>> than 19kB of zeroes.
>>
>> > Introducing OP_ANNEX: Suppose there were some sort of annex pushing
>> opcode,
>> > OP_ANNEX which puts the annex on the stack
>>
>> I think you'd want to have a way of accessing individual entries from
>> the annex, rather than the annex as a single unit.
>>
>> > Now suppose that I have a computation that I am running in a script as
>> > follows:
>> >
>> > OP_ANNEX
>> > OP_IF
>> >     `some operation that requires annex to be <1>`
>> > OP_ELSE
>> >     OP_SIZE
>> >     `some operation that requires annex to be len(annex) + 1 or does a
>> > checksig`
>> > OP_ENDIF
>> >
>> > Now every time you run this,
>>
>> You only run a script from a transaction once at which point its
>> annex is known (a different annex gives a different wtxid and breaks
>> any signatures), and can't reference previous or future transactions'
>> annexes...
>>
>> > Because the Annex is signed, and must be the same, this can also be
>> > inconvenient:
>>
>> The annex is committed to by signatures in the same way nVersion,
>> nLockTime and nSequence are committed to by signatures; I think it helps
>> to think about it in a similar way.
>>
>> > Suppose that you have a Miniscript that is something like: and(or(PK(A),
>> > PK(A')), X, or(PK(B), PK(B'))).
>> >
>> > A or A' should sign with B or B'. X is some sort of fragment that might
>> > require a value that is unknown (and maybe recursively defined?) so
>> > therefore if we send the PSBT to A first, which commits to the annex,
>> and
>> > then X reads the annex and say it must be something else, A must sign
>> > again. So you might say, run X first, and then sign with A and C or B.
>> > However, what if the script somehow detects the bitstring WHICH_A
>> WHICH_B
>> > and has a different Annex per selection (e.g., interpret the bitstring
>> as a
>> > int and annex must == that int). Now, given and(or(K1, K1'),... or(Kn,
>> > Kn')) we end up with needing to pre-sign 2**n annex values somehow...
>> this
>> > seems problematic theoretically.
>>
>> Note that you need to know what the annex will contain before you sign,
>> since the annex is committed to via the signature. If "X" will need
>> entries in the annex that aren't able to be calculated by the other
>> parties, then they need to be the first to contribute to the PSBT, not A.
>>
>> I think the analogy to locktimes would be "I need the locktime to be at
>> least block 900k, should I just sign that now, or check that nobody else
>> is going to want it to be block 950k or something? Or should I just sign
>> with nLockTime at 900k, 910k, 920k, 930k, etc and let someone else pick
>> the right one?" The obvious solution is just to work out what the
>> nLockTime should be first, then run signing rounds. Likewise, work out
>> what the annex should be first, then run the signing rounds.
>>
>> CLTV also has the problem that if you have one script fragment with
>> CLTV by time, and another with CLTV by height, you can't come up with
>> an nLockTime that will ever satisfy both. If you somehow have script
>> fragments that require incompatible interpretations of the annex, you're
>> likewise going to be out of luck.
>>
>> Having a way of specifying locktimes in the annex can solve that
>> particular problem with CLTV (different inputs can sign different
>> locktimes, and you could have different tags for by-time/by-height so
>> that even the same input can have different clauses requiring both),
>> but the general problem still exists.
>>
>> (eg, you might have per-input by-height absolute locktimes as annex
>> entry 3, and per-input by-time absolute locktimes as annex entry 4,
>> so you might convert:
>>
>>  "900e3 CLTV DROP" -> "900e3 3 PUSH_ANNEX_ENTRY GREATERTHANOREQUAL VERIFY"
>>
>>  "500e6 CLTV DROP" -> "500e6 4 PUSH_ANNEX_ENTRY GREATERTHANOREQUAL VERIFY"
>>
>> for height/time locktime checks respectively)
>>
>> > Of course this wouldn't be miniscript then. Because miniscript is just
>> for
>> > the well behaved subset of script, and this seems ill behaved. So maybe
>> > we're OK?
>>
>> The CLTV issue hit miniscript:
>>
>> https://medium.com/blockstream/dont-mix-your-timelocks-d9939b665094
>>
>> > But I think the issue still arises where suppose I have a simple thing
>> > like: and(COLD_LOGIC, HOT_LOGIC) where both contains a signature, if
>> > COLD_LOGIC and HOT_LOGIC can both have different costs, I need to decide
>> > what logic each satisfier for the branch is going to use in advance, or
>> > sign all possible sums of both our annex costs? This could come up if
>> > cold/hot e.g. use different numbers of signatures / use checksigCISAadd
>> > which maybe requires an annex argument.
>>
>> Signatures pay for themselves -- every signature is 64 or 65 bytes,
>> but only has 50 units of validation weight. (That is, a signature check
>> is about 50x the cost of hashing 520 bytes of data, which is the next
>> highest cost operation we have, and is treated as costing 1 unit, and
>> immediately paid for by the 1 byte that writing OP_HASH256 takes up)
>>
>> That's why the "add cost" use of the annex is only talked about in
>> hypotheticals, not specified -- for reasonable scripts with today's
>> opcodes, it's not needed.
>>
>> If you're doing cross-input signature aggregation, everybody needs to
>> agree on the message they're signing in the first place, so you definitely
>> can't delay figuring out some bits of some annex until after signing.
>>
>> > It seems like one good option is if we just go on and banish the
>> OP_ANNEX.
>> > Maybe that solves some of this? I sort of think so. It definitely seems
>> > like we're not supposed to access it via script, given the quote from
>> above:
>>
>> How the annex works isn't defined, so it doesn't make any sense to
>> access it from script. When how it works is defined, I expect it might
>> well make sense to access it from script -- in a similar way that the
>> CLTV and CSV opcodes allow accessing nLockTime and nSequence from script.
>>
>> To expand on that: the logic to prevent a transaction confirming too
>> early occurs by looking at nLockTime and nSequence, but script can
>> ensure that an attempt to use "bad" values for those can never be a
>> valid transaction; likewise, consensus may look at the annex to enforce
>> new conditions as to when a transaction might be valid (and can do so
>> without needing to evaluate any scripts), but the individual scripts can
>> make sure that the annex has been set to what the utxo owner considered
>> to be reasonable values.
>>
>> > One solution would be to... just soft-fork it out. Always must be 0.
>> When
>> > we come up with a use case for something like an annex, we can find a
>> way
>> > to add it back.
>>
>> The point of reserving the annex the way it has been is exactly this --
>> it should not be used now, but when we agree on how it should be used,
>> we have an area that's immediately ready to be used.
>>
>> (For the cases where you don't need script to enforce reasonable values,
>> reserving it now means those new consensus rules can be used immediately
>> with utxos that predate the new consensus rules -- so you could update
>> offchain contracts from per-tx to per-input locktimes immediately without
>> having to update the utxo on-chain first)
>>
>> Cheers,
>> aj
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
>

[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 15809 bytes --]