From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1X7ejU-00022j-Ut for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 17 Jul 2014 05:59:56 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of mit.edu designates 18.9.25.13 as permitted sender) client-ip=18.9.25.13; envelope-from=jlrubin@mit.edu; helo=dmz-mailsec-scanner-2.mit.edu; Received: from dmz-mailsec-scanner-2.mit.edu ([18.9.25.13]) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:AES256-SHA:256) (Exim 4.76) id 1X7ejS-00034Z-U8 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 17 Jul 2014 05:59:56 +0000 X-AuditID: 1209190d-f79c06d000002f07-6f-53c766555f19 Received: from mailhub-auth-1.mit.edu ( [18.9.21.35]) (using TLS with cipher AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by dmz-mailsec-scanner-2.mit.edu (Symantec Messaging Gateway) with SMTP id AE.E4.12039.55667C35; Thu, 17 Jul 2014 01:59:49 -0400 (EDT) Received: from outgoing.mit.edu (outgoing-auth-1.mit.edu [18.9.28.11]) by mailhub-auth-1.mit.edu (8.13.8/8.9.2) with ESMTP id s6H5xm16013785 for ; Thu, 17 Jul 2014 01:59:48 -0400 Received: from mail-wg0-f46.google.com (mail-wg0-f46.google.com [74.125.82.46]) (authenticated bits=0) (User authenticated as jlrubin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU) by outgoing.mit.edu (8.13.8/8.12.4) with ESMTP id s6H5xkE7007548 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=RC4-SHA bits=128 verify=NOT) for ; Thu, 17 Jul 2014 01:59:47 -0400 Received: by mail-wg0-f46.google.com with SMTP id m15so1765227wgh.17 for ; Wed, 16 Jul 2014 22:59:46 -0700 (PDT) X-Received: by 10.194.60.110 with SMTP id g14mr27327214wjr.101.1405576786141; Wed, 16 Jul 2014 22:59:46 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.180.11.6 with HTTP; Wed, 16 Jul 2014 22:59:25 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: From: Jeremy Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 01:59:25 -0400 Message-ID: To: Jeff Garzik Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7ba97be60ae8ee04fe5d599b X-Brightmail-Tracker: H4sIAAAAAAAAA+NgFlrFKsWRmVeSWpSXmKPExsUixCmqrBuadjzYYFG/lEXDBF4HRo/dCz4z BTBGcdmkpOZklqUW6dslcGUsfveeseBoWMXuV4uYGhhPe3UxcnJICJhInP34ix3CFpO4cG89 WxcjF4eQwGwmiV/TN7BDOA8ZJZYc3soEUiUk8JFJYtetNIjEEkaJic8/MUO0l0p8PrkYrIhX QFDi5MwnLBANnhIXVlwFW8EpECjxZ8UsqKnTGSU+/toFlmATkJN4cfQ82CAWAVWJpcdPsEAM CpBouLAbLC4sYC2xpm0JWFxEQEWi6/1RNhCbWSBO4nDXIlYI20ti9rzVbBMYhWYhuWMWktQs Rg4gW11i/TwhiLCaxO1tV9khbG2JZQtfMy9gZF3FKJuSW6Wbm5iZU5yarFucnJiXl1qka6SX m1mil5pSuokRHPSSvDsY3x1UOsQowMGoxMOb0HosWIg1say4MvcQoyQHk5Ior2bs8WAhvqT8 lMqMxOKM+KLSnNTiQ4wSHMxKIrz1vkA53pTEyqrUonyYlDQHi5I471trq2AhgfTEktTs1NSC 1CKYrAwHh5IE7+EUoEbBotT01Iq0zJwShDQTByfIcB6g4a9BaniLCxJzizPTIfKnGC05mn4d bWPi+HXzGJD8seh0G5MQS15+XqqUOO/LZKAGAZCGjNI8uJmwJPaKURzoRWHe2yBjeYAJEG7q K6CFTEALy2sOgywsSURISTUwLrvKE7hVKZylPeO3fLu656EfDHWGiXmvlzcsKM4NODVnT/+a oNVXE3zzTFSvrCg+HsbEb55xrOdOkGff1TU+X86Vt66ZF1pkfW1C9SbpK6KfTI58v5pU3Lvs xaxDU1J//njkzL8+KaVZKD+hLiNog2v0Kou3r+5lGVrv/JPadkz/Q9+0qEPmSizFGYmGWsxF xYkANwdOtz0DAAA= X-Spam-Score: -0.5 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record -0.0 RP_MATCHES_RCVD Envelope sender domain matches handover relay domain 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message X-Headers-End: 1X7ejS-00034Z-U8 Cc: Bitcoin Dev Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Pay to MultiScript hash: X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 05:59:57 -0000 --047d7ba97be60ae8ee04fe5d599b Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Additional costs would be in terms of A) chance of user error/application error -- proposed method is much simpler, as well as extra bytes for control flow ( 4 per script if I am counting right). The costs on a normal script do seem slightly more friendly, except this method allows for hidden-till-spent permission groups, as well as as smaller blockchain bloat overall (if scriptSig script has to store the logic for all the potential permission group, it will be a larger script versus only needing one permission group's script). An added benefit could also be in blockchain analysis -- you can actively monitor the utxo pool for your known associated scripts, whereas you couldn't for specialty scripts assembled per group. Enables repeated spends with groups as a "cost object" w/o having to recall all participants. ie, pay to the same perm groups as the other employee did last time, but include me as a root this time. Do you have a transcript of that chat by any chance? An interesting way to do that would be to push the sigs onto the stack & have implicit orders, then do expressions with their aliases, and then be able to assign "spending groups". ex: code_sep push script0 push script1 push script2 push script3 group_sep mkgroup_2, 0,1 ; the id will be 4 mkgroup_3, 0,2,3 ; the id will be 5 mkUnionGroup_2, 4,5 ; the id will be 6 2_of_3_group 0, 1, 2 mkIntersectionGroup_2 5, 6 complement_last ; complements last group, mutation del_group 1 ; deletes the group #1, groups then reindex after deletion (maybe the group was useful base class). etc... multisig check perm groups (checks if any groups on stack are valid from script) or even something like adding a little SAT scripting language with an eval. push script0 push script1 push script2 push script3 push eval On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 12:52 AM, Jeff Garzik wrote: > On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 1:56 PM, Jeremy wrote: > > Right now, this could be expressed multiple ways (ie, using an op_dup if > > then else chain) , but all would incur additional costs in terms of > > complicated control flows. Instead, I would propose: > > Can you quantify "additional costs in terms of complicated control flows"? > > > > There is an implication in terms of increased utxo pool bloat, but also > an > > implication in terms of increased txn complexity (each 20 byte hash > allows > > for a 500 byte script, only one of the 500 byte scripts has to be > > permanently stored on blockchain). > > When considering these costs, using a normal P2SH output + a script > with OP_IF and friends seems more straightforward? > > Doing boolean logic with multisig groups is quite possible, e.g. > "group AND group", "group OR (group AND group)" etc. Definitely a > valid use case. I discussed how to do this on IRC with gmaxwell > several months ago. I call it "multi-multisig" for lack of a better > name. > -- Jeremy Rubin --047d7ba97be60ae8ee04fe5d599b Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Additional costs would= be in terms of A) chance of user error/application error -- proposed metho= d is much simpler, as well as extra bytes for control flow ( 4 per script i= f I am counting right).


The costs on a normal scr= ipt do seem slightly more friendly, except this method allows for hidden-ti= ll-spent permission groups, as well as as smaller blockchain bloat overall = (if scriptSig script has to store the logic for all the potential permissio= n group, it will be a larger script=C2=A0 versus only needing one permissio= n group's script). An added benefit could also be in blockchain analysi= s -- you can actively monitor the utxo pool for your known associated scrip= ts, whereas you couldn't for specialty scripts assembled per group. Ena= bles repeated spends with groups as a "cost object" w/o having to= recall all participants. ie, pay to the same perm groups as the other empl= oyee did last time, but include me as a root this time.


Do you have a transcript of that chat by any chance? An interesting way to = do that would be to push the sigs onto the stack & have implicit orders= , then do expressions with their aliases, and then be able to assign "= spending groups".
ex:
code_sep
push script0
push script1
push script2
p= ush script3
group_sep
mkgroup_2, 0,1 =C2= =A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ; the id will be 4
mkgroup_3, 0,2,3 =C2=A0 ; the id will be 5
mkUnionGroup_2, 4,5 ; the id will be 6
2_of_3_group 0, 1, 2
mkInterse= ctionGroup_2 5, 6
complement_last=C2=A0 ; complements last group, mutation
del_group 1=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0= =C2=A0=C2=A0=C2=A0 ; deletes the group #1, groups then reindex after deleti= on (maybe the group was useful base class).
etc...
multisig check perm groups (checks if any groups on stack are valid from sc= ript)


or even something like adding= a little SAT scripting language with an eval.

push script0
push script1
<= /div>push script2
push script3
push <a=3D(1 & 2 & 0), b=3Da-1, a | 3 | b >
eval











On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 12:52 AM, Jeff Garzik <= jgarzik@bitpay.com<= /a>> wrote:
On Wed, Jul 16, 2014 at 1:56= PM, Jeremy <jlrubin@mit.edu> = wrote:
> Right now, this could be expressed multiple ways (ie, using an op_dup = if
> then else chain) , but all would incur additional costs in terms of > complicated control flows. Instead, I would propose:

Can you quantify "additional costs in terms of complicated contr= ol flows"?


> There is an implication in terms of increased utxo pool bloat, but als= o an
> implication in terms of increased txn complexity (each 20 byte hash al= lows
> for a 500 byte script, only one of the 500 byte scripts has to be
> permanently stored on blockchain).

When considering these costs, using a normal P2SH output + a script
with OP_IF and friends seems more straightforward?

Doing boolean logic with multisig groups is quite possible, e.g.
"group AND group", "group OR (group AND group)" etc. = =C2=A0Definitely a
valid use case. =C2=A0I discussed how to do this on IRC with gmaxwell
several months ago. =C2=A0I call it "multi-multisig" for lack of = a better
name.



--
Jeremy= Rubin
--047d7ba97be60ae8ee04fe5d599b--