From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1589F17ED for ; Fri, 9 Feb 2018 07:30:32 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from dmz-mailsec-scanner-7.mit.edu (dmz-mailsec-scanner-7.mit.edu [18.7.68.36]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3C918F6 for ; Fri, 9 Feb 2018 07:30:31 +0000 (UTC) X-AuditID: 12074424-cc9ff700000034a6-99-5a7d4e13d220 Received: from mailhub-auth-2.mit.edu ( [18.7.62.36]) (using TLS with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate) by dmz-mailsec-scanner-7.mit.edu (Symantec Messaging Gateway) with SMTP id 4F.C4.13478.41E4D7A5; Fri, 9 Feb 2018 02:30:29 -0500 (EST) Received: from outgoing.mit.edu (OUTGOING-AUTH-1.MIT.EDU [18.9.28.11]) by mailhub-auth-2.mit.edu (8.13.8/8.9.2) with ESMTP id w197UOag026038 for ; Fri, 9 Feb 2018 02:30:25 -0500 Received: from mail-yw0-f174.google.com (mail-yw0-f174.google.com [209.85.161.174]) (authenticated bits=0) (User authenticated as jlrubin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU) by outgoing.mit.edu (8.13.8/8.12.4) with ESMTP id w197ULVt001997 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 9 Feb 2018 02:30:23 -0500 Received: by mail-yw0-f174.google.com with SMTP id m84so4492766ywd.5 for ; Thu, 08 Feb 2018 23:30:22 -0800 (PST) X-Gm-Message-State: APf1xPBx6MZzPObC4ePGqZrbswww0QnlgXYGMG3YxI7CSx4es+OtGkwF ggMtIj1PY6ep75AwS9aS4JrpNT1djSud+kNYxu4= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AH8x226ULtc0WHpFGI/WUKrP82gQa7dcDC7l2pBxFR3GVlV1/phO8sXMNQXMNmN8HhMMCa/7gdza52TUJWsct2MG00w= X-Received: by 10.37.129.210 with SMTP id n18mr1099370ybm.413.1518161421655; Thu, 08 Feb 2018 23:30:21 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: by 10.13.235.138 with HTTP; Thu, 8 Feb 2018 23:29:58 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: From: Jeremy Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2018 23:29:58 -0800 X-Gmail-Original-Message-ID: Message-ID: To: Gregory Maxwell , Bitcoin Protocol Discussion Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="089e08268c403fe64a0564c28082" X-Brightmail-Tracker: H4sIAAAAAAAAA+NgFrrHKsWRmVeSWpSXmKPExsUixG6noivqVxtlcO+0uEXTa1sHRo/fPyYz BjBGcdmkpOZklqUW6dslcGVsPbefvWCHesWLFZtZGxgXKHUxcnJICJhI7Dn1jbmLkYtDSGAx k8SVy00sEM4dRom1N+YyglQJCXxmkjj4iw/CXsAoceoNN0R3ucT1K52sEHaRxNxfk9gh7BKJ ZX+fsIDYvAKCEidnQthCAl4Sexf8ZAOxOQUCJT7+X8EKt+zptnVAzRwcbAJyEh9+mYLUsAio SBx4upcJYmaixLV7LYwgJbwCARKne5NAwsICORKNex8zg9giAoUSi3/3gtnMAuoSP84eZ4Ww fSQ+TT7OPoFRZBaSi2YhSUHYmhKt239D2RoSC+7sY4SwtSWWLXzNvICRdRWjbEpulW5uYmZO cWqybnFyYl5eapGuuV5uZoleakrpJkZwhLio7GDs7vE+xCjAwajEwzshpiZKiDWxrLgy9xCj JAeTkijv5l6gEF9SfkplRmJxRnxRaU5q8SFGCQ5mJRHePJPaKCHelMTKqtSifJiUNAeLkjiv h4l2lJBAemJJanZqakFqEUxWhoNDSYJ3hi9Qo2BRanpqRVpmTglCmomDE2Q4D9DwpSA1vMUF ibnFmekQ+VOM4RwfPt9rY+b4NusBkJwwH0Q+2wsiv017DiS3PHoJJA+AyRsvXrcxC7Hk5eel SonzOoOMEwAZl1GaB7cRlCwvhi5c94pRHBgAwrxbfICqeICJFm7nK6BzmIDOuesAdk5JIkJK qoHRau/eiUsOWHOELreR7Dnp7cy4Jm/W68IbWTUBX402eTL5rsxbqRsZenlllKHiDkXDR/Ly O0zvn9yRqM2+rDdsc8gSu4hfHFye+jWPJuSUHJs6T7x4r9Gi8OnbzQTs6h8pnbD91/jzTuOU jsOfEl59cxPg1tnRqcrw0+BV8CKHb8dPzvnixT9DiaU4I9FQi7moOBEAoZdJlXEDAAA= X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.2 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,HTML_MESSAGE, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED,T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Graftroot: Private and efficient surrogate scripts under the taproot assumption X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 09 Feb 2018 07:30:32 -0000 --089e08268c403fe64a0564c28082 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" This might be unpopular because of bad re-org behavior, but I believe the utility of this construction can be improved if we introduce functionality that makes a script invalid after a certain time (correct me if I'm wrong, I believe all current timelocks are valid after a certain time and invalid before, this is the inverse). Then you can exclude old delegates by timing/block height arguments, or even pre-sign delegates for different periods of time (e.g., if this happens in the next 100 blocks require y, before the next 1000 blocks but after the first 100 require z, etc). -- @JeremyRubin On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 11:58 AM, Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 3:56 PM, Ryan Grant wrote: > > Am I reading correctly that this allows unilateral key rotation (to a > > previously unknown key), without invalidating the interests of other > > parties in the existing multisig (or even requiring any on-chain > > transaction), at the cost of storing the signed delegation? > > Yes, though I'd avoid the word rotation because as you note it doesn't > invalidate the interests of any key, the original setup remains able > to sign. You could allow a new key of yours (plus everyone else) to > sign, assuming the other parties agree... but the old one could also > still sign. > _______________________________________________ > bitcoin-dev mailing list > bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev > --089e08268c403fe64a0564c28082 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
This might be unpopula= r because of bad re-org behavior, but I believe the utility of this constru= ction can be improved if we introduce functionality that makes a script = invalid after a certain time (correct me if I'm wrong, I believe al= l current timelocks are valid after a certain time and invalid before, this= is the inverse).

Then you can exclude old delegates by timing/= block height arguments, or even pre-sign delegates for different periods of= time (e.g., if this happens in the next 100 blocks require y, before the n= ext 1000 blocks but after the first 100 require z, etc).



On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 11:58 AM, Gregory Max= well via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundatio= n.org> wrote:
On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 3:56 PM, Ryan Grant <bitcoin-dev@rgrant.org> wrote:
> Am I reading correctly that this allows unilateral key rotation (to a<= br> > previously unknown key), without invalidating the interests of other > parties in the existing multisig (or even requiring any on-chain
> transaction), at the cost of storing the signed delegation?

Yes, though I'd avoid the word rotation because as you note it d= oesn't
invalidate the interests of any key, the original setup remains able
to sign.=C2=A0 You could allow a new key of yours (plus everyone else) to sign, assuming the other parties agree... but the old one could also
still sign.
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bitcoin-dev mailing list
bitcoin-dev@lists.= linuxfoundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org= /mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev

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