Re: [bitcoin-dev] BIP: OP_PRANDOM

[Jeremy <jlrubin@mit.edu>]

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nack -- not secure.

OP_PRANDOM also adds extra validation overhead on a block potentially
composed of transactions all spending an OP_PRANDOM output from all
different blocks.

I do agree that random numbers are highly desirable though.

I think it would be much better for these use cases to add OP_XOR back and
then use something like Blum's fair coin-flipping over the phone. OP_XOR
may have other uses too.

I have a write-up from a while back which does Blum's without OP_XOR using
OP_SIZE for off-chain probabilistic payments if anyone is interested. No
fork needed, but of course it is more limited and broken in a number of
ways.

(sorry to those of you seeing this twice, my first email bounced the list)

--
@JeremyRubin <https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>
<https://twitter.com/JeremyRubin>

On Fri, May 20, 2016 at 2:32 PM, Eric Martindale via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:

> Matthew,
>
> You should take a look at OP_DETERMINISTICRANDOM [1] from the Elements
> Project.  It aims to achieve a similar goal.
>
> Code is in the `alpha` branch [2].
>
> [1]: https://www.elementsproject.org/elements/opcodes/
> [2]:
> https://github.com/ElementsProject/elements/blob/alpha/src/script/interpreter.cpp#L1252-L1305
>
> On Fri, May 20, 2016 at 8:29 AM Matthew Roberts via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> Good point, to be honest. Maybe there's a better way to combine the block
>> hashes like taking the first N bits from each block hash to produce a
>> single number but the direction that this is going in doesn't seem ideal.
>>
>> I just asked a friend about this problem and he mentioned using the hash
>> of the proof of work hash as part of the number so you have to throw away a
>> valid POW if it doesn't give you the hash you want. I suppose its possible
>> to make it infinitely expensive to manipulate the number but I can't think
>> of anything better than that for now.
>>
>> I need to sleep on this for now but let me know if anyone has any better
>> ideas.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, May 20, 2016 at 6:34 AM, Johnson Lau <jl2012@xbt.hk> wrote:
>>
>>> Using the hash of multiple blocks does not make it any safer. The miner
>>> of the last block always determines the results, by knowing the hashes of
>>> all previous blocks.
>>>
>>>
>>> == Security
>>>
>>> Pay-to-script-hash can be used to protect the details of contracts that
>>> use OP_PRANDOM from the prying eyes of miners. However, since there is also
>>> a non-zero risk that a participant in a contract may attempt to bribe a
>>> miner the inclusion of multiple block hashes as a source of randomness is a
>>> must. Every miner would effectively need to be bribed to ensure control
>>> over the results of the random numbers, which is already very unlikely. The
>>> risk approaches zero as N goes up.
>>>
>>>
>>>
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