From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from hemlock.osuosl.org (smtp2.osuosl.org [140.211.166.133]) by lists.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C9A9FC016F for ; Mon, 8 Jun 2020 06:43:54 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hemlock.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B184487D80 for ; Mon, 8 Jun 2020 06:43:54 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at osuosl.org Received: from hemlock.osuosl.org ([127.0.0.1]) by localhost (.osuosl.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ztnWYhR-4tcZ for ; Mon, 8 Jun 2020 06:43:53 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: domain auto-whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from outgoing.mit.edu (outgoing-auth-1.mit.edu [18.9.28.11]) by hemlock.osuosl.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5313587D65 for ; Mon, 8 Jun 2020 06:43:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mail-io1-f47.google.com (mail-io1-f47.google.com [209.85.166.47]) (authenticated bits=0) (User authenticated as jlrubin@ATHENA.MIT.EDU) by outgoing.mit.edu (8.14.7/8.12.4) with ESMTP id 0586hoO7006617 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128 verify=NOT) for ; Mon, 8 Jun 2020 02:43:51 -0400 Received: by mail-io1-f47.google.com with SMTP id m81so17389594ioa.1 for ; Sun, 07 Jun 2020 23:43:51 -0700 (PDT) X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533SPPbX1Zr8tce3p//+DSyuRFfHy1q/937EXm+zEF7wFZVAbPKc fdaCV5kE8wBCr3UB91yFdSKeBmmSWWyn8BsPWh8= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJy5Qm3dMrJ/PmeVqPhAAehM5tQ9HOXvabgN0/If0l5y8odF+Wax6cTw58pTlAyYzliumzQc9sI+tXREqcfrMZI= X-Received: by 2002:a6b:fd18:: with SMTP id c24mr19271249ioi.97.1591598630524; Sun, 07 Jun 2020 23:43:50 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <1cQUGt1pX0_lWPJm-tFDr9fQCvrPd5vqmCorgN89jy7gUF0m9wsouUosrFm1eal3jO9oB1BvMtORGE2htLdFjyDD5lno_QkXCFn971LQNZY=@protonmail.com> <20200608110545.078f8e81@simplexum.com> In-Reply-To: <20200608110545.078f8e81@simplexum.com> From: Jeremy Date: Sun, 7 Jun 2020 23:43:39 -0700 X-Gmail-Original-Message-ID: Message-ID: Cc: Jeremy via bitcoin-dev Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000ff5b3705a78cee11" Subject: [bitcoin-dev] [was BIP OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY] Fee Bumping Operation X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Protocol Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 08 Jun 2020 06:43:54 -0000 --000000000000ff5b3705a78cee11 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Broke out to a separate thread. At core, the reason why this method *might* work is that it's essentially just CPFP but we can guarantee that the link we're examining is always exactly one hop away, so we get rid of most of the CPFP graph traversal issues. Your description largely matches my thinking for how something like this could work (pay for neighbor). The issue is that the extant CPFP logic is somewhat brittle and doesn't work as expected (Child not Children, which is problematic for multiple PFN's). > PFN transaction would still be valid if some of 'ghost parents' are already confirmed, so the miners could have more fees than strictly necessary. But this is the same as with CPFP. This is problematic and can't be done as it requires a new index of all past txns for consensus. My thinking is that a Fee Bump transaction can name a list of TXIDs (Or one TXID which implies all ancestors of) that it wishes to be included in a block with. It must be included in that block. A Fee Bump transaction may have no unconfirmed ancestors nor any children. Potentially, it also may not be RBF'd. You treat the Fee Bump Transactions as the lowest descendant of whatever it targets and then set it's feerate/total fee based on the package that would have to co-confirm for it to be worth mining. This makes it sort like normal transactions for inclusion. You can require some minimums for mempool inclusion at all. If it's target is confirmed or replaced, it should drop from the mempool. Transactions in the mempool may set a flag that opts out of CPFP for descendants/blocks any descendants. Channel protocols should set this bit to prevent pinning, and then use the Fee Bump to add fees to whatever txns need to go through. If done right you can also layer a coinswap protocol with the fee-bumping txns change so that you are getting a privacy benefit at the same time. BTW the annex *could* be used for this purpose, but it would also be acceptable to have it be in some kind of anyone can spend output. Then it would just be a anyone-can-spend tx with OP_CHECK_TXID_IN_BLOCK (or OP_CHECK_UTXO_SPENT_IN_BLOCK), and a miner could claim all such outputs at the end of the block. This is worse in terms of on-chain overheads, but nice in that it's the minimal semantic change & introduces some general purpose functionality. But my thoughts are still pretty loose at the moment around it. I suspect that to make fee bumping work nicely would require removing CPFP entirely, but I don't know that to be the case concretely. -- @JeremyRubin On Sun, Jun 7, 2020 at 11:02 PM Dmitry Petukhov wrote: > =D0=92 Sun, 7 Jun 2020 15:45:16 -0700 > Jeremy via bitcoin-dev wrote: > > > What I think we'll eventually land on is a way of doing a tx > > that contributes fee to another tx chain as a passive observer to > > them. While this breaks one abstraction around how dependencies > > between transactions are processed, it also could help resolve some > > really difficult challenges we face with application-DoS (pinning and > > other attacks) in the mempool beyond CTV. I have a napkin design for > > how this could work, but nothing quite ready to share yet. > > I had an idea of 'Pay for neighbor' transaction where a transaction > that is not directly a child of some other transaction can specify that > it wants to pay the fee for that other transaction(s). It can become > like 'ghost child' transaction for them, in what it cannot be mined > unless its 'ghost parents' are confirmed, too. It will be like CPFP, > but without direct dependency via inputs. Such 'PFN' transaction would > not spend any coins beside what it specifies in its own inputs, of > course. > > The idea required a hardfork at first, but Anthony Towns suggested > a way to make it into a soft fork (past-taproot) by putting the txids of > 'ghost parents' into taproot annex. > > PFN transaction would still be valid if some of 'ghost parents' are > already confirmed, so the miners could have more fees than strictly > necessary. But this is the same as with CPFP. > > Looking at the mempool code, it seems that only a way how parent/child > transactions relationships are established will need to be adjusted to > account for this 'ghost relationships', and once established, other > logic will work as with CPFP. There could be complications regarding > transaction package size. But I cannot claim that I understand that > code enough to say something about this with certainty. > > --000000000000ff5b3705a78cee11 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Broke ou= t to a separate thread.

At core, the reason why this method *might* w= ork is that it's essentially just CPFP but we can guarantee that the li= nk we're examining is always exactly one hop away, so we get rid of mos= t of the CPFP graph traversal issues.

Your description largely matche= s my thinking for how something like this could work (pay for neighbor). Th= e issue is that the extant CPFP logic is somewhat brittle and doesn't w= ork as expected (Child not Children, which is problematic for multiple PFN&= #39;s).

> PFN transaction would still be valid if some of 'gho= st parents' are
already confirmed, so the miners could have more fees than strictly
necessary. But this is the same as with CPFP.

This is problematic and= can't be done as it requires a new index of all past txns for consensu= s.

My thinking is that a Fee Bump transaction can name a list of TXID= s (Or one TXID which implies all ancestors of) that it wishes to be include= d in a block with. It must be included in that block. A Fee Bump transactio= n may have no unconfirmed ancestors nor any children. Potentially, it also = may not be RBF'd. You treat the Fee Bump Transactions as the lowest des= cendant of whatever it targets and then set it's feerate/total fee base= d on the package that would have to co-confirm for it to be worth mining. T= his makes it sort like normal transactions for inclusion. You can require s= ome minimums for mempool inclusion at all.

If it's target is conf= irmed or replaced, it should drop from the mempool.

Transactions in t= he mempool may set a flag that opts out of CPFP for descendants/blocks any = descendants. Channel protocols should set this bit to prevent pinning, and = then use the Fee Bump to add fees to whatever txns need to go through. If d= one right you can also layer a coinswap protocol with the fee-bumping txns = change so that you are getting a privacy benefit at the same time.

B= TW the annex *could* be used for this purpose, but it would also be accepta= ble to have it be in some kind of anyone can spend output. Then it would ju= st be a anyone-can-spend tx with OP_CHECK_TXID_IN_BLOCK (or OP_CHECK_UTXO_S= PENT_IN_BLOCK), and a miner could claim all such outputs at the end of the = block. This is worse in terms of on-chain overheads, but nice in that it= 9;s the minimal semantic change & introduces some general purpose funct= ionality.

But my thoughts are still pretty loose at the moment= around it. I suspect that to make fee bumping work nicely would require re= moving CPFP entirely, but I don't know that to be the case concretely. =


<= /div>
O= n Sun, Jun 7, 2020 at 11:02 PM Dmitry Petukhov <dp@simplexum.com> wrote:
=D0=92 Sun, 7 Jun 2020 15:45:= 16 -0700
Jeremy via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wr= ote:

> What I think we'll eventually land on is a way of doing a tx
> that contributes fee to another tx chain as a passive observer to
> them. While this breaks one abstraction around how dependencies
> between transactions are processed, it also could help resolve some > really difficult challenges we face with application-DoS (pinning and<= br> > other attacks) in the mempool beyond CTV. I have a napkin design for > how this could work, but nothing quite ready to share yet.

I had an idea of 'Pay for neighbor' transaction where a transaction=
that is not directly a child of some other transaction can specify that
it wants to pay the fee for that other transaction(s). It can become
like 'ghost child' transaction for them, in what it cannot be mined=
unless its 'ghost parents' are confirmed, too. It will be like CPFP= ,
but without direct dependency via inputs. Such 'PFN' transaction wo= uld
not spend any coins beside what it specifies in its own inputs, of
course.

The idea required a hardfork at first, but Anthony Towns suggested
a way to make it into a soft fork (past-taproot) by putting the txids of 'ghost parents' into taproot annex.

PFN transaction would still be valid if some of 'ghost parents' are=
already confirmed, so the miners could have more fees than strictly
necessary. But this is the same as with CPFP.

Looking at the mempool code, it seems that only a way how parent/child
transactions relationships are established will need to be adjusted to
account for this 'ghost relationships', and once established, other=
logic will work as with CPFP. There could be complications regarding
transaction package size. But I cannot claim that I understand that
code enough to say something about this with certainty.

--000000000000ff5b3705a78cee11--