From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F2B87CB8 for ; Thu, 17 Dec 2015 18:27:13 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-ig0-f172.google.com (mail-ig0-f172.google.com [209.85.213.172]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9BE26108 for ; Thu, 17 Dec 2015 18:27:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-ig0-f172.google.com with SMTP id mv3so18485473igc.0 for ; Thu, 17 Dec 2015 10:27:13 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:to :cc:content-type; bh=7iiQRvqtEa4rcLOWObXMPMo7Y3A6VhJOwznBArnLlxA=; b=K4TSbIAm8coNTu8axQH3GDlC9BCc25/sQMGIGBE/7LA4/SMdg/e7F1+TbA4mjRz/uZ +0ZbToZ/PAePbH/jvMKE6Puml7+XudokXS3yLfl2mwh55ngF4TEVBJYwvTJg73enIbVF mDEOj6b0Ogt5n4Mki0Tge0U8nknH9MxkxU9buasvshbqraJax53rh7+gB0zbnMheDJwc 5eFds+IskELdaYOeSEBMEinFMlyDEoNokDbCTDxutHtFgCpkgOBEztW/6Cq04MuIKT3U WRzc9/gbplP1gRsaO6z+szpOlCx/nhbgy6FBAYH1gKvZj5e2jeBdE4I8I6aSi1998+3p Mp4A== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.36.105 with SMTP id p9mr5657271igj.54.1450376833134; Thu, 17 Dec 2015 10:27:13 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.79.8.198 with HTTP; Thu, 17 Dec 2015 10:27:13 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 13:27:13 -0500 Message-ID: From: Jeff Garzik To: Pieter Wuille Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=089e01176343edf66a05271c2b2c X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.7 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FROM,HTML_MESSAGE,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=ham version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Cc: Bitcoin development mailing list Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Segregated Witness in the context of Scaling Bitcoin X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 18:27:14 -0000 --089e01176343edf66a05271c2b2c Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Wed, Dec 16, 2015 at 5:09 PM, Jeff Garzik wrote: > SW presents a blended price and blended basket of two goods. You can > interact with the Service through the blended price, but that does not > erase the fact that the basket contains two separate from similar resources. > > A different set of economic actors uses one resource, and/or both. There > are explicit incentives to shift actors from solely using one resource to > using both. > Illustration: If SW is deployed via soft fork, the count of nodes that validate witness data is significantly lower than the count of nodes that validate non-witness data. Soft forks are not trustless operation, they depend on miner trust, slowly eroding the trustless validation of older nodes over time. Higher security in one data area versus another produces another economic value distinction between the two goods in the basket, and creates a "pay more for higher security in core block, pay less for lower security in witness" dynamic. This economic distinction is not present if SW is deployed via hard fork. --089e01176343edf66a05271c2b2c Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On Wed, Dec 16, 2015 at 5:09 PM, Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@gma= il.com> wrote:
SW presents= a blended price and blended basket of two goods.=C2=A0 You can interact wi= th the Service through the blended price, but that does not erase the fact = that the basket contains two separate from similar resources.
A different set of economic actors uses one resource, and/or bo= th.=C2=A0 There are explicit incentives to shift actors from solely using o= ne resource to using both.

Illustration: =C2=A0If SW is deployed via sof= t fork, the count of nodes that validate witness data is significantly lowe= r than the count of nodes that validate non-witness data.=C2=A0 Soft forks = are not trustless operation, they depend on miner trust, slowly eroding the= trustless validation of older nodes over time.

Higher security in one data area = versus another produces another economic value distinction between the two = goods in the basket, and creates a "pay more for higher security in co= re block, pay less for lower security in witness" dynamic.

This economic dis= tinction is not present if SW is deployed via hard fork.





--089e01176343edf66a05271c2b2c--