Thanks for the link.  I readily admit only having given pay-to-future-miner a little bit of thought.  Not convinced it sets a minimal tx fee in all cases.


On Thu, Sep 3, 2015 at 12:55 AM, <jl2012@xbt.hk> wrote:
Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev 於 2015-09-03 00:05 寫到:
Schemes proposing to pay with difficulty / hashpower to change block
size should be avoided.  The miners incentive has always been fairly
straightforward - it is rational to deploy new hashpower as soon as
you can get it online.  Introducing the concepts of (a) requiring
out-of-band collusion to change block size and/or (b) requiring miners
to have idle hashpower on hand to change block size are both
unrealistic and potentially corrosive.  That potentially makes the
block size - and therefore fee market - too close, too sensitive to
the wild vagaries of the mining chip market.

Pay-to-future-miner has neutral, forward looking incentives worth
researching.


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I explained here why pay with difficulty is bad for everyone: miners and users, and described the use of OP_CLTV for pay-to-future-miner

However, a general problem of pay-to-increase-block-size scheme is it indirectly sets a minimal tx fee, which could be difficult and arbitrary, and is against competition