Hi All,

Auction theory is a well-studied problem in the economics literature. Currently what bitcoin has is Generalized first-price auction, where winning bidders pay their full bids. Alternatively, two approaches are potentially viable, which are Generalized second-price auction and Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction. Generalized second-price auction, where winning bidders pay their next highest bids, reduces (but not eliminate) the need for bidders to strategize by allowing them to bid closer to their reservation price. Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction, a more sophisticated system that considers all bids in relation to one another, elicit truthful bids from bidders, but may not maximize miners' fees as the other two systems will. 

Due to one result called Revenue Equivalence, the choice of fee design will not impact miners' fees unless the outcomes of the auction changes (i.e, the highest bidders do not always win). In addition, the sole benefit of second-price auction over first-price auction is to spare people's mental troubles from strategizing, rather than actually saving mining fees, because in equilibrium the fees bidders pay remain the same. Therefore, in balance, I do not see substantial material benefits arising from switching to a different fee schedule. 

Best,

Chenxi Cai