From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.193] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-1.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Yxv50-0002eb-Ec for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 28 May 2015 10:30:26 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.220.181 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.220.181; envelope-from=tier.nolan@gmail.com; helo=mail-qk0-f181.google.com; Received: from mail-qk0-f181.google.com ([209.85.220.181]) by sog-mx-3.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Yxv4y-0004xn-A6 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Thu, 28 May 2015 10:30:26 +0000 Received: by qkdn188 with SMTP id n188so22071959qkd.2 for ; Thu, 28 May 2015 03:30:18 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.140.202.130 with SMTP id x124mr2313028qha.9.1432809018853; Thu, 28 May 2015 03:30:18 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.140.85.241 with HTTP; Thu, 28 May 2015 03:30:18 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 28 May 2015 11:30:18 +0100 Message-ID: From: Tier Nolan Cc: Bitcoin Development Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11432f14998e76051721d8fc X-Spam-Score: 3.3 (+++) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (tier.nolan[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.2 MISSING_HEADERS Missing To: header 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature 2.7 MALFORMED_FREEMAIL Bad headers on message from free email service X-Headers-End: 1Yxv4y-0004xn-A6 Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Consensus-enforced transaction replacement via sequence numbers X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 28 May 2015 10:30:26 -0000 --001a11432f14998e76051721d8fc Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Can you update it so that it only applies to transactions with version number 3 and higher. Changing the meaning of a field is exactly what the version numbers are for. You could even decode version 3 transactions like that. Version 3 transactions have a sequence number of 0xFFFFFFFF and the sequence number field is re-purposed for relative lock time. This means that legacy transactions that have already been signed but have a locktime in the future will still be able to enter the blockchain (without having to wait significantly longer than expected). On Thu, May 28, 2015 at 10:56 AM, Mark Friedenbach wrote: > I have no problem with modifying the proposal to have the most significant > bit signal use of the nSequence field as a relative lock-time. That leaves > a full 31 bits for experimentation when relative lock-time is not in use. I > have adjusted the code appropriately: > > https://github.com/maaku/bitcoin/tree/sequencenumbers > > On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 10:39 AM, Mike Hearn wrote: > >> Mike, this proposal was purposefully constructed to maintain as well as >>> possible the semantics of Satoshi's original construction. Higher sequence >>> numbers -- chronologically later transactions -- are able to hit the chain >>> earlier, and therefore it can be reasonably argued will be selected by >>> miners before the later transactions mature. Did I fail in some way to >>> capture that original intent? >>> >> >> Right, but the original protocol allowed for e.g. millions of revisions >> of the transaction, hence for high frequency trading (that's actually how >> Satoshi originally explained it to me - as a way to do HFT - back then the >> channel concept didn't exist). >> >> As you point out, with a careful construction of channels you should only >> need to bump the sequence number when the channel reverses direction. If >> your app only needs to do that rarely, it's a fine approach.And your >> proposal does sounds better than sequence numbers being useless like at the >> moment. I'm just wondering if we can get back to the original somehow or at >> least leave a path open to it, as it seems to be a superset of all other >> proposals, features-wise. >> > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > _______________________________________________ > Bitcoin-development mailing list > Bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development > > --001a11432f14998e76051721d8fc Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Can you update it so that it only applies t= o transactions with version number 3 and higher.=C2=A0 Changing the meaning= of a field is exactly what the version numbers are for.

You c= ould even decode version 3 transactions like that.=C2=A0

Vers= ion 3 transactions have a sequence number of 0xFFFFFFFF and the sequence nu= mber field is re-purposed for relative lock time.=C2=A0

This = means that legacy transactions that have already been signed but have a loc= ktime in the future will still be able to enter the blockchain (without hav= ing to wait significantly longer than expected).

On Thu, May 28, 2015 at 10:56 AM, = Mark Friedenbach <mark@friedenbach.org> wrote:
I have no problem with modifying t= he proposal to have the most significant bit signal use of the nSequence fi= eld as a relative lock-time. That leaves a full 31 bits for experimentation= when relative lock-time is not in use. I have adjusted the code appropriat= ely:

https://github.com/maaku/bitcoin/tree/sequencenumbers<= /a>

On Wed, May 27, 2015 at 10:39 AM, Mike = Hearn <mike@plan99.net> wrote:
Mike, this proposal was purposefully constructed to maintain as well a= s possible the semantics of Satoshi's original construction. Higher seq= uence numbers -- chronologically later transactions -- are able to hit the = chain earlier, and therefore it can be reasonably argued will be selected b= y miners before the later transactions mature. Did I fail in some way to ca= pture that original intent?

Right, but t= he original protocol allowed for e.g. millions of revisions of the transact= ion, hence for high frequency trading (that's actually how Satoshi orig= inally explained it to me - as a way to do HFT - back then the channel conc= ept didn't exist).

As you point out, with a careful construction of channels = you should only need to bump the sequence number when the channel reverses = direction. If your app only needs to do that rarely, it's a fine approa= ch.And your proposal does sounds better than sequence numbers being useless= like at the moment. I'm just wondering if we can get back to the origi= nal somehow or at least leave a path open to it, as it seems to be a supers= et of all other proposals, features-wise.


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