From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.192] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Vz2pu-00060Z-UK for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 03 Jan 2014 11:22:42 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.192.196 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.192.196; envelope-from=tier.nolan@gmail.com; helo=mail-pd0-f196.google.com; Received: from mail-pd0-f196.google.com ([209.85.192.196]) by sog-mx-2.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Vz2pu-0000cn-2Z for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 03 Jan 2014 11:22:42 +0000 Received: by mail-pd0-f196.google.com with SMTP id p10so11416907pdj.3 for ; Fri, 03 Jan 2014 03:22:36 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.68.245.200 with SMTP id xq8mr93575933pbc.21.1388748156111; Fri, 03 Jan 2014 03:22:36 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.70.70.196 with HTTP; Fri, 3 Jan 2014 03:22:35 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: <52A3C8A5.7010606@gmail.com> <1795f3067ba3fcdd0caf978cc59ff024.squirrel@fruiteater.riseup.net> <52A435EA.7090405@gmail.com> <201312081237.24473.luke@dashjr.org> <20131212205106.GA4572@netbook.cypherspace.org> <20140103054515.GL3180@nl.grid.coop> Date: Fri, 3 Jan 2014 11:22:35 +0000 Message-ID: From: Tier Nolan To: Bitcoin Dev Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=047d7b1636c387121b04ef0f2085 X-Spam-Score: -0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -0.0 RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE RBL: Sender listed at http://www.dnswl.org/, no trust [209.85.192.196 listed in list.dnswl.org] -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (tier.nolan[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1Vz2pu-0000cn-2Z Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] Dedicated server for bitcoin.org, your thoughts? X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 03 Jan 2014 11:22:43 -0000 --047d7b1636c387121b04ef0f2085 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 On Fri, Jan 3, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Drak wrote: > Which is why, as pointed out several times at 30c3 by several renowned > figures, why cryptography has remained squarely outside of mainstream use. > It needs to just work and until you can trust the connection and what the > end point sends you, automatically, it's a big fail and the attack vectors > are many. > > I can just see my mother or grandma manually checking the hash of > a download... > Maybe a simple compromise would be to add a secure downloader to the bitcoin client. The download link could point to a meta-data file that has info on the download. file_url= hash_url= sig_url= message=This is version x.y.z of the bitcoin client It still suffers from the root CA problem though. The bitcoin client would accept Gavin's signature or a "core team" signature. At least it would provide forward security. It could also be used to download files for different projects, with explicit warnings that you are adding a new trusted key. When you try to download, you would be given a window Project: Some Alternative Wallet Signed by: P. Lead Message: Confirm download Yes No However, even if you do that, each trusted key is only linked to a particular project. It would say if the project and/or leader is unknown. --047d7b1636c387121b04ef0f2085 Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On Fri, Jan 3, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Drak <= ;drak@zikula.org&g= t; wrote:
<= blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-l= eft:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
Which is why, as pointed out several times at 30c3= by several renowned figures, why cryptography has remained squarely outsid= e of mainstream use. It needs to just work and until you can trust the conn= ection and what the end point sends you, automatically, it's a big fail= and the attack vectors are many.=A0

<sarcasm>I can just see my mother or grandma manu= ally checking the hash of a download... </sarcasm>
<= /div>

Maybe a simple compromise would be t= o add a secure downloader to the bitcoin client.

The download link could point to a met= a-data file that has info on the download.

file_url=3D
hash_url=3D
sig_= url=3D
message=3DThis is version x.y.z of the bit= coin client

It still suffers from t= he root CA problem though.=A0 The bitcoin client would accept Gavin's s= ignature or a "core team" signature.

At least it would provide forward security.

It could also be used to download files for different projects= , with explicit warnings that you are adding a new trusted key.

When you try to download, you would be given a w= indow

Project: Some Alternative Wallet
S= igned by: P. Lead
Message:

Confirm download Yes No

How= ever, even if you do that, each trusted key is only linked to a particular = project.

It wo= uld say if the project and/or leader is unknown.
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