From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EFC17E90 for ; Thu, 17 Dec 2015 16:58:03 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-io0-f173.google.com (mail-io0-f173.google.com [209.85.223.173]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 792BC107 for ; Thu, 17 Dec 2015 16:58:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-io0-f173.google.com with SMTP id 186so62503478iow.0 for ; Thu, 17 Dec 2015 08:58:03 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:cc :content-type; bh=Q5P8q91WwUtlJ+tOQcWqsCQmaPEsS16onX2gzGc2IDE=; b=Dz/aXGBkJi3u2hLQ3XIhxWeYd6+/1gmDRN3MqeKOnjc2vTaoHv3XUZAe4jRD/4m97s 3Fb5rovJLP/xJ1wUIVcxDMKjpY6IbcwF6N1vtsozJm1pC3iFdxJ5sb0F/WOR82UNCOd+ 5njRweiFtUBzRovAOG+X01LB9kVII3peyQQqLPQfahWqqliH2IQSt7A0PmUxXMP/10Xn E9ndvgEc8V5xlafR8vLAr1YMjEzrPRXFCcITIhjISRVuFyaBlctGBRk/skNGnyhOiYZL H5QLvZjW+Aim8tHbJRALHoOaeU8oX0lpx4CZLrhZCED6IoJtcfs4wD+wOL6s++L5NXTi OMgw== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.107.153.79 with SMTP id b76mr30081314ioe.71.1450371482846; Thu, 17 Dec 2015 08:58:02 -0800 (PST) Received: by 10.79.77.75 with HTTP; Thu, 17 Dec 2015 08:58:02 -0800 (PST) In-Reply-To: References: Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 16:58:02 +0000 Message-ID: From: Tier Nolan Cc: Bitcoin development mailing list Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a1140f7e0070b2805271aedb5 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.2 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, MALFORMED_FREEMAIL, MISSING_HEADERS,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] Block size: It's economics & user preparation & moral hazard X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 16:58:04 -0000 --001a1140f7e0070b2805271aedb5 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Wed, Dec 16, 2015 at 9:11 PM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev < bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > We are not avoiding a choice. We don't have the authority to make a choice. > This is really the most important question. Bitcoin is kind of like a republic where there is separation of powers between various groups. The power blocs in the process include - Core Devs - Miners - Exchanges - Merchants - Customers Complete agreement is not required for a change. If merchants and their customers were to switch to different software, then there is little any of the other groups could do. Consensus is nice, certainly, and it is a good social norm to seek widespread agreement before committing to a decision above objection. Committing to no block increase is also committing to a decision against objections. Having said that, each of the groups are not equal in power and organisation. Merchants and their customers have potentially a large amount of power, but they are disorganised. There is little way for them to formally express a view, much less put their power behind making a change. Their potential power is crippled by public action problems. On the other extreme is the core devs. Their power is based on legitimacy due to having a line of succession starting with Satoshi and respect gained due to technical and political competence. Being a small group, they are organised and they are also more directly involved. The miners are less centralised, but statements supported by the majority of the hashing power are regularly made. The miners' position is that they want dev consensus. This means that they have delegated their decision making to the core devs. The means that the two most powerful groups in Bitcoin have given the core devs the authority to make the decision. They don't have carte blanche from the miners. If the core devs made the 2MB hard-fork with a 75% miner threshold, it is highly likely that the other groups would accept it. That is the only authority that exists in Bitcoin. The check is that if the authority is abused, the other groups can simply leave (or use checkpointing) --001a1140f7e0070b2805271aedb5 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On W= ed, Dec 16, 2015 at 9:11 PM, Pieter Wuille via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
We are not avoiding a choice. We don't have the authority to mak= e a choice.

This is really the most imp= ortant question.

Bitcoin is kind of like a republic where ther= e is separation of powers between various groups.

The power blocs in the process include

- Core Devs
- Mine= rs
- Exchanges
- Merchants
- Customers
=
Complete agreement is not required for= a change.=C2=A0 If merchants and their customers were to switch to differe= nt software, then there is little any of the other groups could do.

Consensus is nice, certainly, and it is a = good social norm to seek widespread agreement before committing to a decisi= on above objection.=C2=A0 Committing to no block increase is also committin= g to a decision against objections.

Having said that, each of the groups are not equal in power and organisati= on.

Merchants and their customers h= ave potentially a large amount of power, but they are disorganised.=C2=A0 T= here is little way for them to formally express a view, much less put their= power behind making a change.=C2=A0 Their potential power is crippled by p= ublic action problems.

On the other= extreme is the core devs. Their power is based on legitimacy due to having= a line of succession starting with Satoshi and respect gained due to techn= ical and political competence.=C2=A0 Being a small group, they are organis= ed and they are also more directly involved.

The miners are less ce= ntralised, but statements supported by the majority of the hashing power ar= e regularly made.=C2=A0 The miners' position is that they want dev cons= ensus.=C2=A0 This means that they have delegated their decision making to t= he core devs.=C2=A0

The means that= the two most powerful groups in Bitcoin have given the core devs the autho= rity to make the decision.=C2=A0 They don't have carte blanche from the= miners.

If the core devs made the = 2MB hard-fork with a 75% miner threshold, it is highly likely that the othe= r groups would accept it.

That is the only authority that exists in = Bitcoin.=C2=A0 The check is that if the authority is abused, the other grou= ps can simply leave (or use checkpointing)
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