From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com ([172.29.43.191] helo=mx.sourceforge.net) by sfs-ml-3.v29.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtp (Exim 4.76) (envelope-from ) id 1Z5zf5-0001rB-35 for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 19 Jun 2015 17:01:03 +0000 Received-SPF: pass (sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com: domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.216.177 as permitted sender) client-ip=209.85.216.177; envelope-from=tier.nolan@gmail.com; helo=mail-qc0-f177.google.com; Received: from mail-qc0-f177.google.com ([209.85.216.177]) by sog-mx-1.v43.ch3.sourceforge.com with esmtps (TLSv1:RC4-SHA:128) (Exim 4.76) id 1Z5zf3-0002GZ-9S for bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net; Fri, 19 Jun 2015 17:01:03 +0000 Received: by qcwx2 with SMTP id x2so35257430qcw.1 for ; Fri, 19 Jun 2015 10:00:55 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.55.31.85 with SMTP id f82mr24960244qkf.88.1434733255874; Fri, 19 Jun 2015 10:00:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.140.85.241 with HTTP; Fri, 19 Jun 2015 10:00:55 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <83A7C606-B601-47D2-BE10-2A1412D97514@gmail.com> References: <20150619103959.GA32315@savin.petertodd.org> <04CE3756-B032-464C-8FBD-7ACDD1A3197D@gmail.com> <812d8353e66637ec182da31bc0a9aac1@riseup.net> <1727885.UUNByX4Jyd@crushinator> <83A7C606-B601-47D2-BE10-2A1412D97514@gmail.com> Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2015 18:00:55 +0100 Message-ID: From: Tier Nolan Cc: Bitcoin Dev Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a1147b3ae105ffa0518e1de18 X-Spam-Score: 0.6 (/) X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. -1.5 SPF_CHECK_PASS SPF reports sender host as permitted sender for sender-domain 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (tier.nolan[at]gmail.com) -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record 1.2 MISSING_HEADERS Missing To: header 1.0 HTML_MESSAGE BODY: HTML included in message -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature X-Headers-End: 1Z5zf3-0002GZ-9S Subject: Re: [Bitcoin-development] F2Pool has enabled full replace-by-fee X-BeenThere: bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2015 17:01:03 -0000 --001a1147b3ae105ffa0518e1de18 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 5:42 PM, Eric Lombrozo wrote: > If we want a non-repudiation mechanism in the protocol, we should > explicitly define one rather than relying on =E2=80=9Cprima facie=E2=80= =9D assumptions. > Otherwise, I would recommend not relying on the existence of a signed > transaction as proof of intent to pay=E2=80=A6 > Outputs could be marked as "locked". If you are performing a zero confirmation spend, then the recipient could insist that you flag the output for them as non-reducible. This reduces privacy since it would be obvious which output was change. If both are locked, then the fee can't be increased. This would be information that miners could ignore though. Creating the right incentives is hard though. Blocks could be "discouraged" if they have a double spend that is known about for a while which reduces payment for a locked output. --001a1147b3ae105ffa0518e1de18 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On Fri, Jun 19, 2015 at 5:42 PM, Eric Lombrozo <elomb= rozo@gmail.com> wrote:
If we = want a non-repudiation mechanism in the protocol, we should explicitly defi= ne one rather than relying on =E2=80=9Cprima facie=E2=80=9D assumptions. Ot= herwise, I would recommend not relying on the existence of a signed transac= tion as proof of intent to pay=E2=80=A6

Outputs could be marked as "locked".=C2=A0 If y= ou are performing a zero confirmation spend, then the recipient could insis= t that you flag the output for them as non-reducible.

This reduces p= rivacy since it would be obvious which output was change.=C2=A0 If both are= locked, then the fee can't be increased.

This would be information that miners could ignore though.=C2=A0=

Creating the right incentives is hard though.=C2=A0 Blocks could b= e "discouraged" if they have a double spend that is known about f= or a while which reduces payment for a locked output.
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