From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (smtp1.linux-foundation.org [172.17.192.35]) by mail.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EBD0911FB for ; Wed, 16 Sep 2015 20:30:29 +0000 (UTC) X-Greylist: whitelisted by SQLgrey-1.7.6 Received: from mail-vk0-f49.google.com (mail-vk0-f49.google.com [209.85.213.49]) by smtp1.linuxfoundation.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 33BA613C for ; Wed, 16 Sep 2015 20:30:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: by vkgd64 with SMTP id d64so109441279vkg.0 for ; Wed, 16 Sep 2015 13:30:27 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject:from:cc :content-type; bh=fEK9g60EiPzAi0cyvtCDA/KmRJ58azAIXuro71PPKoA=; b=Qv17MI4j9fX4ujPgfILx9hP4y39AiTf4ewem9NKuJSNLOjupMb/DQir0rj9bdMxrdD JFVYIPNWSWn52GfXwXwvPaT73S5Qg/ugiuAqrr4/OKLI4kO70YoaN8OUc8ctl4VlDGp6 T1LYv+K6zHeZ6bMwJ9i2PpBdE3GLr6fgkFTFzXSkAVr1WO1ZWM0Pl/Mj4zE2UN8p10/4 c8b5+ncrABzhfUweF8kWFfCatW5LGJevuvztOM5w2lBu6ADwq3GbshFXh0djj+ev2Qv0 kdDHNfQa0HxzIxXZ/K/HUlxTK8kd63menUGfnQUcMSKyK8GxW+y6VuKNR2BbpPbm9GU1 WdFw== MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.31.5.205 with SMTP id 196mr30497269vkf.88.1442435427590; Wed, 16 Sep 2015 13:30:27 -0700 (PDT) Received: by 10.103.65.204 with HTTP; Wed, 16 Sep 2015 13:30:27 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <87r3lyjewl.fsf@rustcorp.com.au> References: <87mvwqb132.fsf@rustcorp.com.au> <87r3lyjewl.fsf@rustcorp.com.au> Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2015 21:30:27 +0100 Message-ID: From: Tier Nolan Cc: Bitcoin Dev Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a1143dda045ec3e051fe32b02 X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.3 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID, DKIM_VALID_AU, FREEMAIL_FROM, HTML_MESSAGE, MALFORMED_FREEMAIL, MISSING_HEADERS,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW autolearn=no version=3.3.1 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.3.1 (2010-03-16) on smtp1.linux-foundation.org Subject: Re: [bitcoin-dev] [BIP Proposal] Version bits with timeout and delay. X-BeenThere: bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Bitcoin Development Discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2015 20:30:30 -0000 --001a1143dda045ec3e051fe32b02 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 On Wed, Sep 16, 2015 at 9:19 PM, Rusty Russell wrote: > I couldn't see a use for it, since partial enforcement of a soft fork is > pretty useless. > It isn't useful for actually using the feature, but some miners might set the bit but not actually create blocks that comply with the new rule. This would cause their blocks to be orphaned until they fixed it. OK, *that* variant makes perfect sense, and is no more complex, AFAICT. > > So, there's two weeks to detect bad implementations, then you everyone > stops setting the bit, for later reuse by another BIP. > It could be more than two weeks if the support stays between 80% and 90% for a while. 75%+ checks that blocks with the bit set follow the rule. 95%+ enters lock-in and has the same rules as 75%+, but is irreversible at that point. > You need a timeout: an ancient (non-mining, thus undetectable) node > should never fork itself off the network because someone reused a failed > BIP bit. > I meant if the 2nd bit was part of the BIP. One of the 2 bits is "FOR" and the other is "AGAINST". If against hits 25%, then it is deemed a failure. The 2nd bit wouldn't be used normally. This means that proposals can be killed quickly if they are obviously going to fail. --001a1143dda045ec3e051fe32b02 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable


On Wed, Sep 16, 2015 at 9:19 PM, Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com= .au> wrote:
I couldn't = see a use for it, since partial enforcement of a soft fork is
pretty useless.
=C2=A0
It isn't useful for actually using the feature, but some miners = might set the bit but not actually create blocks that comply with the new r= ule.

This would cause their blocks to be orphaned until t= hey fixed it.

OK, *that* variant makes perfect sense, and is no more complex, AFAI= CT.

So, there's two weeks to detect bad implementations, then you everyone<= br> stops setting the bit, for later reuse by another BIP.

It could be more than two weeks if the support stays betwee= n 80% and 90% for a while.

75%+ checks that blocks with t= he bit set follow the rule.

95%+ enters lock-in and has t= he same rules as 75%+, but is irreversible at that point.
=C2= =A0
You need a timeout: an ancient (non-mining, thus undetectable) node<= br> should never fork itself off the network because someone reused a failed BIP bit.

I meant if the 2nd bit was par= t of the BIP.=C2=A0 One of the 2 bits is "FOR" and the other is &= quot;AGAINST".=C2=A0 If against hits 25%, then it is deemed a failure.=

The 2nd bit wouldn't be used normally.=C2=A0 This me= ans that proposals can be killed quickly if they are obviously going to fai= l.
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